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MONEY AND PLANNING FOR SOCIALIST TRANSITION;
THE MOZAMBICAN EXPERIENCE
abstract
This study develops an argument about the role of money in the 
process of planning for socialist transformation in the concrete 
case of the Mozambican experience in the period 1975-1983.
The context was an economy were the peasantry through its 
production of cash crops as well as through its supply of labour 
power constituted the cornerstone of the social organization of 
production. Hence, the nationalisations of the major means of 
production created a state sector which was only part of a wider 
economy.
This study argues that, within this context, the role of money 
can only be understood with respect to the dynamic, but not ex­
clusive, role of the state sector in propelling the wider 
transformation of the economy.
The actual experience in Mozambique was characterised by a 
process of state centered accumulation which implied that planning . 
boiled down to mobilising resources behind the accelerated 
development^ of the state sector. The result was the separation as 
between the official and parallel economies, and the dynamics of 
peasant agriculture became determined by the latter. Money ac­
quired an active function in this process inasmuch as monetary 
imbalances originating in the state sector fuelled the development 
of speculative capital in the parallel economy, and hence enhanced 
the social differentiation of the peasantry. As a result, the 
control of the state over the economy was weakened and the process 
of socialisation of the countryside effectively blocked.
Hence, the conclusion is that money matters in the context of 
socialist transition, because its role is not neutral with respect 
to the process of transforming production.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Money and Planning for Socialist Transition
This study develops an argument about the role of money in the 
transition to socialism. More specifically, it raises the question 
as to the relationship of money to the process of planning for 
socialist transformation of an economy.
The theoretical analysis of the interdependence between money 
and planning is developed out of the concrete study of the 
Mozambican experience. This does not limit however the relevance 
of this study to a specific contribution to the analysis of the 
political economy of the transitional period in Mozambique. 
Rather, this study aims to contribute to the wider debate on the 
role of money in the transition to socialism by analysing this 
question within the context of a concrete experience.
As such, this study involves blending a concrete analysis of 
the Mozambican experience with a discussion of broader theoretical 
questions posed in the theoretical littérature. The way this is 
done is not by developing firstly a theoretical framework which is 
subsequently applied to the Mozambican experience. Rather, this 
study proceeds frcxn the analysis of this concrete experience and
aims to arrive at various propositions about the role of money in 
the transition to socialism which have a wider relevance than the 
case study upon which they are based, but which acquire their 
sharpness precisely because they are situated in a concrete 
context.
The aim of this study is therefore twofold;
V ■
(1) To contribute to the analysis of the concrete experience 
of planning for socialism in Mozambique and to.inves­
tigate the role of money within this process;
(2) To relate this analysis of the interconnectedness between
■ I
money and planning in the transition to socialismto the 
wider debate on this issue in socialist littérature
The central focuss of this study is to look at planning within 
the period of transition and to investigate its relationship to 
the role of money. Planning is not seen here as a matter of tech­
niques required to , balance different sectors of an economy. 
Rather, planning is seen to constitute the dynamic intervention of 
the state within the economy and society at large so as to trans­
form the social organization of production, exchange and 
distribution. Hence, within a context of transition, planning is 
about changing society.
The main structure of the argumentation in this study can be 
synthetised by putting forward seven basic propositions on plan­
ning for socialist transition and the role of money therein.
Firstly, planning takes place within a concrete context and is 
itself determined by that context. In the case of Mozambique, the 
terrain of the struggles for planning was set within a context of 
the legacy of colonial capitalism. It was the development of the 
latter which shaped class forces within the country.
The colonial economy was rooted in the exploitation of the 
peasantry. The dominant aspect of colonial development was the 
economic integration of Mozambique and its dependence on South 
Africa and Rhodesia. The export of labour power within the migrant 
labour system was the principal aspect of this dependence, and as 
such, the principal force which shaped the integration of the 
peasantry in the monetary economy. The other key aspect was the 
fact that the colonial economy was a strongly regulated economy 
with respect to ’planning’ labour requirements for capitalist 
development within Mozambique and within the wider context of 
Southern Africa. The colonial state enforced and regulated the 
supply of labour power drawn from the peasantry in a general 
situation of chronic labour shortages.
The outcome was a peasantry which was not only deeply in­
tegrated within the monetary economy, but which was also a 
differentiated peasantry as a result of this process of monetiza­
tion of the rural economy.
The implications of this colonial legacy for the period of 
transition were twofold; (1) the basic unity of interests as 
between the struggle for socialism in Mozambique and the struggle 
for the political liberation and economic emancipation of Southern
Africa, and, (2) the centrality of the agrarian question,in the 
period of transition.
Secondly, the question of planning relates to the way in which 
state economic power is constituted and the manner in which, it is 
used to propel the process of transformation within the economy 
and society. Clearly, selective nationalizations constitute a 
prerequisite for the formation of state economic power, b^t the 
key question revolves around the issue as to how this, state 
economic power is used to engage on a protracted process of 
socialization of production. In the case of post-independence 
Mozambique, strategic as well as defensive nationalisations were 
undertaken in the aftermath of independence in 1975. The former 
type of nationalisations centered around the social services and 
reflected a conscious move on the part of the state to gain con­
trol of these sectors and to initiate their socialisation. The 
latter type was characteristic within the economic sector and was 
forced upon the government as a result of economic crisis and 
sabotage. Only at a later stage, at the Third Congress in 1977, 
the Party formulated a strategy for socialist development and it 
undertook to consciously build up the state sector.
Thirdly, planning for socialisation of production involves 
political struggles over the content as well as the organisation 
of this process of change. In the case of Mozambique, the com­
plexity and richness of these type of struggles came to the fore 
most clearly in the case of the transformation of social services, 
and more specifically in health care.
The health services were nationalised in 1975, but it was the 
Socialisation of Medicine Act of 1977 which set the stage for its 
transformation, as health care became free of charge to the 
consumer. Clearly, the needs for health services were far greater 
than the available capacity, and hence imbalances would prevail 
for a long time to come as between need and supply. This involved 
struggles over content: the setting of priorities and rationing
within priorities (e.g. the shift in emphasis to preventive health 
care and the need to extend coverage to the rural areas). Planning 
content directly interrelated with planning organization in order 
to concretise priorities and rationing in practice. This involved 
not only restructuring the state sector itself, but also estab­
lishing the relation of the state sector to the community at 
large. The state sector can only assume a dynamic role insofar as 
its action mobilises social forces which propel the direction of 
change. The role of the state sector was the dynamic, but not the 
exclusive force in transforming health care. Finally, this process
involved political struggles within the state apparatus which
related both to the content and the form of planning, and which 
were often posed as technical issues. The real content of these 
struggles was about socialisation of medicine: whether transforma­
tion would consist of nationalization while continuing the same 
pattern of health care as was characteristic for the colonial 
times (a position defended on grounds of preserving and improving 
the quality of health care within its given pattern) or whether it 
was necessary to reshape the whole system so as to make it cor­
respond to the most basic needs of health care within the country.
In this study, it will be argued that at the level of economic 
planning the question of the content of socialisation of produc­
tion and of its organisation in practice was resolved by centering 
resources virtually exclusively on the nationalised state tsector 
and by defining its quantitative expansion as the basic content of 
socialist development. The argument to defend this policy was 
often formulated in technical terms: to preserve and develop
productive forces for socialism within the confines of the- state 
Sector. As in the case of health care, this argument was presented 
as one of quality, but it suffered from the same weakness a^s was 
inherent in the position of those who argued for quality in the 
health services. It took as its basic premise the existing struc­
ture of productive forces which it aimed to expand quantitatively 
within the boundaries of the nationalised state sector. As such, 
it did not address the question of the transformation of class 
relations.The strategy for socialist transformation of the economy 
therefore boiled down to a modernization strategy based on the 
state sector.
Fourthly, the content of economic planning consisted of 
state-centered accumulation and was organized by setting up the 
machinery of a centrally planned economy. From 1980 onwards, 
production within the state sector became organized according to 
the specifications of the central plan which was virtually ex­
clusively preoccupied with the quantitative expansion of the.state 
sector. This was not only the case with respect to the allocation 
of material resources, but also with respect to the allocation of 
cadres within the state apparatus to the tasks of economic
management. The drive towards the quantitative build-up of the 
state sector within a system of central planning produced the 
dynamics of a resource-constrained system as far as the state 
sector was concerned (Kornai, 1979). Within the context of the 
resulting shortage economy (accentuated by war and drought) the 
priority lay firmly on the expansion of the state sector, and 
rationing accordingly favoured the state sector in comparison with 
household production, and favoured accumulation as against 
consumption. The policy could be summed up as a policy which 
sought to tighten the belt to allow for state-centered 
accumulation. Within this perspective, the transformation of the 
rural economy through the cooperative movement was relegated to a 
secondary position, and accordingly state effort and resources 
were only marginally devoted to this aim.
Fifthly, the relationship of money to the process of planning 
for the transition to socialism can only be understood within the 
context of an analysis as to the dynamic, but not exclusive role 
of the state sector in propelling the wider transformation of 
production within the economy. This is specifically so in the case 
were the peasantry through its production of cash crops as well as 
through its supply of labour power constitutes the cornerstone of 
the social organization of production. The nationalization of the 
major means of production provides a context in which the public 
sector is only part of a wider economy, and in which the develop­
ment of this sector depends in part on wage labour provided by the 
peasantry.
8Two views on the role of money within transition will be dis­
cussed. The former argues that money ceases to be important as the 
economy becomes reorganised along the lines of a centrally planned 
economy. Money then becomes endogeneous to the requirements of the 
central plan. This i view was inherent in the actual practice of 
planning in Mozambique in the period 1977-1983. It derived its 
inspiration from the analysis of the role of money within the 
Soviet economy. A second view stresses the importance of a 
cautious monetary policy in the period of transition. Its main 
proposition is that financial orthodoxy should constitute a bind­
ing constraint on the rate of structural change within the 
economy. The latter view has been argued theoretically by 
Griffith-Jones (1981), and became a position which acquired 
prominence in Mozambique around the time of the Fourth Congress 
(April 1983) when the financial situation of the country began to 
assert itself as a binding constraint.
This study enters into a debate with both views oh grounds that 
both abstract from the process of transformation in the analysis 
of money. The former sees the process of transformation as a 
linear progression towards a given model without taking account of 
the specific context in which this transformation takes place and. 
of its nature. The latter view essentially boils down to an argu­
ment for disciplined demand management in the period of 
transition, but it does not investigate how the role of money 
itself is determined by the content and the corresponding or­
ganization of planning the process of transformation.
This is specifically important with respect to analysing the 
character of monetary imbalances within the process of transition. 
The argument is that they cannot always be avoided, or that they 
should in all situations. Indeed, it is hard to envisage a process 
of major social change which would proceed along a balanced path. 
The argument is that monetary imbalances have to be analysed with 
reference to the direction and content of the process of
transformation.
In this respect, it will be argued that the monetary imbalances 
of the early post-independence period (1975-77) were by no means 
destabilizing in view of the strategic aims of development. The 
imbalances which emerged in the subsequent period (1977-83) were 
different in nature inasmuch as they were a reflection of a 
process of state-centered accumulation which centralised resources 
onto the state sector and as such destabilized the wider transfor­
mation of the economy. As a result, the state sector did not 
assume the role of its dynamic intervention within the economy so 
as to allow for the socialisation of peasant agriculture.
Sixthly, the proposition is put forward that failure to trans­
form on the part of the state sector in terms of its interaction 
with the wider economy and of its own internal organization does 
not imply that the overall context remains static (i.e. that no 
transformations take place). Rather, it is argued that the process 
of state centered accumulation led to a separation between the 
official and parallel economies in which the peasantry became 
located in the latter. The development of speculative capital 
within the parallel economy enhanced the forces of differentiation
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within the peasantry and provided avenues of accumulation for 
private capital. This process weakened the control of the state 
over the economy, and entered in direct competition with it. As a 
result, the state sector could not maintain its own momentum.
Finally, the implication of the latter proposition is that the 
question of monetary imbalances is not merely one of distribution, 
but rather it needs to be analysed at the level of production. 
Hence, it is not merely a question whether the process of state 
centered accumulation and the monetary imbalances it entailed 
distributed the burden of adjustment unevenly between town and 
countryside or in terms of declining real incomes of consumers. 
Nor is it a question only as to whether this can lead to struggles 
over distribution brought about by the lack of incentives to 
producers. Rather, the argument is that such imbalances are not 
neutral in terms of the process of transformation of the social 
organization of production.
In developing these major propositions the analysis will 
proceed along two interdependent levels. Firstly, it involves an 
argument about the character of the transition period in 
Mozambique, and as such it enters in debate with various analyses 
which have been published on this issue. More specifically, the
analysis presented here is contrasted with the analysis presented
I  •  ■  ■
by J. Saul on the context and the content of the process of tran­
sition (1985). Secondly, it involves an argument as to the role of 
money in the transition to socialism and therefore aims to con­
tribute to the debate on this issue within the theoretical 
littérature.
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Outline of the Study
This study is organized of three parts along which the overall 
argument is developed.
Part I, THE COLONIAL LEGACY, which consists of chapter 2, is 
not concerned with history per se, but'rather with pinpointing 
the major forces within the development of colonial capitalism 
which shaped the terrain of struggles within the period of the 
transition to socialism.
Part II, TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY, aims to present an analysis 
of the character of the transformations which took place in the 
period 1975-1983 and of the context in which they took place. 
The analyses is structured over three chapters.
Chapter 3, The Immediate Tasks, looks at two aspects of change 
which characterised the early post independence period (1975- 
77). The period was characterised by economic crisis and
defensive nationalizations within the economy, as well as by 
strategic nationalizations of social services. The first aspect 
which will be analysed is the issue of economic policy within a 
crisis situation in which the state neither controlled the
economy nor had the organizational capacity to do so. The
second aspect which will be taken up is the transformations 
which took place within the health services after its
nationalizations. The health sector was singled out for 
analysis because the development which took place there high­
lighted the question of planning social change as a struggle 
over content and organization.
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Chapter 4, State-Centered Accumulation, constitutes one of the 
central chapter of this study inasmuch as it addresses the 
character of economic planning in the period 1977-83. It
analyses this question against the background of economic
development in that period.
Chapter 5, Regional Integration and Economic Dependence,
analyses Mozambique's strategy with respect to its external
relationships. The main objective of this chapter consists in 
analysing the issue of Mozambique's strategy towards its in­
tegration within Southern Africa: its dependence on South
Africa and the posibilities inherent in the struggle for 
economic emancipation through the SADCC alliance. 
part III, MONEY AND THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM, constitutes 
the core of the argument in which the main propositions on the 
relationship of money to the process of planning transition 
will be discussed.
Chapter 6, Monetary Imbalances in the Transition to Socialism, 
raises the general issues as they emerged within the specific 
experience of Mozambique, and relates them to the wider debate 
on money in socialist transition. This chapter contains there­
fore the central core of the arguments of this study.
Chapter 7, Money and Planning Rural Transformation, develops 
the argument that the failure on the part of the state sector 
to assume a dynamic role vis a vis the transformation of the 
rural economy does not imply that development within the rural 
economy remains static. Rather, the character of monetary
13
imbalances produced by state centered planning accentuated the 
social differentiation of the peasantry.
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Background to the research and its methods
The analysis presented in this study was based on extensive 
fieldwork carried out when I worked as a stafmember of the Center 
of African Studies and of the Faculty of Economics of the Eduardo 
Mondlane University during the period from July 1976 to December 
1983.
The analysis of the character of the Mozambican colonial 
economy and of the problems of transforming this economy in the
I ' -
post-independence period is rooted in two complementary 
activities: (1) my participation in collective research projects
of the Center of African Studies which concerned micro studies of 
issues of transforming production based on field work , and, (2) 
individual macro studies on the structure and development of the 
Mozambican economy in the colonial and post-colonial period, based 
on statistical data analysis, documentary research and interviews.
The analysis of the role of money within socialist transition 
was started in 1983 with an individual project which aimed to 
sketch the organization of money and finance in the colonial 
economy and study its restructuring in the post-colonial era under 
the impulse of socialist policies. This was done in preparation of 
a seminar with cadres from the banks and from the ministry of 
finance which I organized and carried out with the cooperation of 
M. Mackintosh. Subsequent research centered on the issue of money 
and the rural economy, and involved my participation in a collec­
tive research project on money and the parallel markets and its
15
impact on shaping rural differentiation in Marracuene district in 
Maputo province.
In 1986, more data which then had become available, were 
gathered on the macroeconomic evolution of the economy for the 
period 1977-83. In this year, the main part of the data analysis 
on macroeconomic aggregates as well as on money was carried out 
together with the theoretical analysis of the littérature on money 
in socialist transition.
16
PART I
THE COLONIAL LEGACY
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CHAPTER 2
THE COLONIAL LEGACY
Introduction
Frelimo’s socialist policy in post-independence Mozambique 
cannot be analysed and evaluated outside the concrete context in 
which it took place. The legacy of a colonial-capitalist develop­
ment which led to the close economic integration of Mozambique 
within the Southern African subsystem under the domination of 
South African capitalism does not only provide a background or 
starting point of this particular socialist experience, but rather 
it defines the terrain of struggles within which socialist 
policies needed to be mapped out, fought for, and defended. This 
chapter aims to identify the dominant aspects of this colonial 
legacy which set the stage for the specific context in which the 
transition to socialism takes place. The focus of the analysis 
within this chapter is not concerned with history per se, but 
rather with tracing the historical roots of the social forces 
which were operative in the struggle for socialism. Indeed, plan­
ning for socialist development is not a mere technical matter, but
18
rather it involves investigating class forces within society and 
the conditions for their transformation.
The structure of the colonial economy of Mozambique was the 
outcome of a double dependence. On the one hand, it was the 
product of dependence on a relatively backward capitalist economy 
constituted by the Portuguese colonial power, while at the same 
time it was subordinated to the needs of the Southern African 
economic complex (CEA, 1977:13). This double dependence of 
Mozambique inevitably produced tensions within its colonial 
development, but it was the economic integration of the colony
I
within Southern Africa which constituted the dominant aspect
I
within this contradiction.
In terms of the development of class forces within colonial
Mozambique two aspects of this double dependency relationship need
to be considered:
1. The principal characteristic of Mozambique’s economic
integration within Southern Africa was the export of labour
power within a migrant labour system. De facto, vast areas of
the country became transformed into home lands for a reserve
army of labour for capitalist development of the economically
more advanced areas of Southern Africa. This process therefore
involved the proletarization of the peasantry without however
completely divorcing wage labour from its basis in family
agriculture. ,
I  '
2. The interests of the colonial power with respect to
Mozambique proceeded along two complementary lines. Firstly, 
"Portugal played the part of rentier, deriving the major
19
source of income from invisible trade, and speculating on the 
sale of the labour power of its African workforce" (CEA, 
1977:13). Hence, Portugal strengthened the integration of 
Mozambique within Southern Africa upon condition that the 
colony should earn foreign exchange to finance capitalist 
development in Portugal. This involved strict financial con­
trol over the colony’s external economic relations. Secondly, 
with respect to the requirements of the Portuguese bourgeoisie 
in terms of raw materials and with respect to the interests of 
the settler bourgeoisie, the policy was one of accommodation 
to the integration of the colony within Southern Africa by 
relying heavily on state intervention within the allocation of 
and control over labour. The colonial state therefore assumed 
the task of the regulator of labour requirements within a 
context of persistent labour shortage due to the competing
demands for labour power from external and internal sources
and the need for the production of export crops by the 
peasantry.
Hence, the colonial economy was in many ways a strongly
’planned’ economy in which the colonial state exerted considerable 
control over the various labour regimes and over the allocation of 
labour power. Its cornerstone was the exploitation of the 
peasantry which was strongly integrated within the monetary
economy on terms shaped and regulated by the colonial state. It is 
this process which provides the context for the analysis of the 
character of this peasantry and of the processes of differentia­
tion inherent in the development of colonial capitalism.
20
The next section provides a brief sketch of the dominant 
moments in the development of colonial capitalism in Mozambique, 
and the subsequent section briefly maps out the main structural 
characteristics of the colonial economy at the end of the colonial 
era. Against this background, I shall analyse the role of the 
colonial state as the regulator of labour requirements and its 
impact in shaping the patterns of social differentiation within 
the peasantry.
21
The double dependence within colonial capitalism
At the time of the colonial division of Africa at the Berlin 
conference in 1885, Portugal was able to maintain its colonies not 
so much because of its strength, but rather, because of its 
weakness. Historically, Portugal had never managed to emancipate 
from the domination of English industrial capital, and hence its 
economic development remained relatively backward. Portugal was 
left with its colonies because the inter-imperialist rivalries 
between Britain, France and Germany would not allow the position 
of any of them to be strengthened with the possession and control 
of more territories (Serra et.al., 1983:59-83; Wuyts, 1980:12).
This did not imply however that in the case of Mozambique the 
old forms of colonial exploitation continued to persist, i.e. that 
the development of the colonial system remained basically mercan­
tile in character. The backwardness of the Portuguese bourgeoisie 
at the time revealed itself not by the continuation of forms of 
colonial exploitation which corresponded to an earlier phase, but 
rather by the development of the colonial economy in response to 
the needs of capital accumulation within Southern Africa
(especially, the development of the mining industry in South 
Africa as well as in Rhodesia) and by inviting foreign (non- 
Portuguese) capital to invest within the colony.
By opening up the colony to foreign capital, Portugal hoped 
to achieve three interrelated aims: (1) the economic development 
of the colony through investments in infrastructures, plantations 
and export-related industries (processing of raw materials); (2)
22
to establish Indirectly administrative control over the colony by 
delegating the political administration over vast areas of its 
territory to these private companies; (3) to derive an income from 
foreign investment by claiming a share of the profits as well as 
of taxes collected by these companies (Serra et.al., 1983:26-39).
As such, roughly two-thirds of the total territory Of 
Mozambique was leased out to a number of private companies, whose 
task it was to administer politically the area under their control 
as well as to develop it economically. The first company to be set 
up was the Companhia de Mocambique (1888), followed by the 
Companhia de Acucar de Mocambique (1890) - which later became the 
Sena Sugar Factory (1910) and then the Sena Sugar Estates (1920), 
the Companhia de Niassa (1891), the Companhia de Zimbesia (1892), 
the Companhia de Boror (1898), the SoCiedade de Madal (1904) and 
the Empresa Agricola do Lugela (1908) (Serra et.al., 1983:26).
Notwithstanding the fact that these companies controlled the 
larger part of the territory, it was nevertheless the integration 
within Southern Africa through the export of labour power and the 
provision of transport services which became the dominant aspect 
of colonial economic development. Both the colonial state as well 
as the chartered companies responded to this outward propelling 
pull exerted by capitalist development in the surrounding 
colonies.
In southern Mozambique it was South African mining capital 
which, through state-to-state agreements, acquired the monopoly 
over the direct recruitment of migrant labour. The sale of this 
migrant labour was made conditional on the use of the Lourenco
23
Marques port and linking railway system to the Rand area. As such, 
Portugal obtained income from the tax oh the export of manual 
labour as well as from transport services (CEA, 1977:Appendix I).
In northern Mozambique, the Niassa company undertook little 
or no productive investment, and soon settled down to sell con­
tract labour to surrounding territories (at first to South Africa, 
later to Nyassa land, Tanganyka, Kenya, etc.) as well as to com­
mercialise cash crops fron the peasantry (Serra et.al., 1983:109- 
130).
In the central areas of Mozambique, the context in which the 
integration within Southern Africa took place was definitely more 
complex. At first, the whole region - whether company controlled 
or controlled by the Portuguese state - massively engaged in the 
export of labour power not only to South Africa, but also to 
southern Rhodesia and Nyassaland as well as to Sao Tome. In fact, 
the emerging plantations made use of the income derived from the 
export of labour power fron the peasantry within the areas they 
controlled so as to finance the development of the plantation 
sectors. However, when the latter came of age and needed vast 
numbers of seasonal workers, the plantation economy sought to 
protect itself against the competition for labour from abroad. As 
such, in 1913 the export of labour power to the South African 
mines was restricted to the South of parallel 22. After that, 
labour use within Nampula (controlled by the colonial state) as 
well as in company controlled areas along the Zambezia became 
increasingly directed towards the development of the plantation 
economy (Wuyts, 1978:15; Serra, 1980:38-42).
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Notwithstanding the needs of the plantation economy in the 
Zambezia valley, economic development in Rhodesia and In 
Nyassaland became a powerful force in shaping the patterns of 
labour use in central Mozambique as well as in opening up oppor­
tunities for transport services. With respect to the former 
aspect, the export of labour power to Rhodesia was never as 
strictly regulated and controlled as was the case in southern 
Mozambique with respect to South African mining capital. In part 
this was due to the fact that the Portuguese colonial state did 
not directly control the whole of the territory, and partly to the 
fact that the Rhodesian mines and farmers benefitted from the 
cheapness of the labour power of workers who migrated illegally to 
escape the harsher conditions of forced labour in Mocambique. The 
main interest on the part of Rhodesian employers in regulating thé 
flow of Mozambican labour through state-to-state agreements was 
the continuous threat of competition for labour from the South 
African mining complex (Adamo et^al., 1981:59-72).
As to transport services, in 1897 the railway Beira-Umtali 
became operative and in 1922 Beira was linked with the border of 
Nyassaland through the construction of the trans-Zambezia railway 
(Serra et.al., 1983:255).
These developments which laid the foundations of Mozambique's 
integration within Southern Africa as well as of the plantation 
economy within the Zambezia valley constituted the first phase of 
the making of the colonial economy and took place within the 
period 1890-1926. As a result, the peasantry became forcefully 
integrated within the monetary economy principally as suppliers of
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labour power (within a context of a predominantly migrant labour 
system), and to a lesser extend, as producers of cash crops. The 
imposition of the hut tax, the use of labour rent in Zambezia and 
the extensive use of forced labour were the mecanisms through 
which this process of semi-proletarisation was enforced. The 
colonial state did not as yet exert a unified control over the 
regulation of labour, and hence the various labour regimes varied 
sharply in form as well as in intensity. The colonial state in 
this period promulgated general laws on forced labour as well as 
acted as a mediator in deliniating spheres of influence of various 
capitals competing for labour.
The installation of the new political order in the aftermath 
of the Portuguese coup of 28 may 1926 led to a redefinition of 
colonial policy from 1930 onwards. This new colonial policy found 
its legal expression in the Colonial Act of 1933» and was charac­
terised by a strong dose of economic nationalism on the part of 
the colonial power; i.e. the colonies were to serve the interests 
of Portugal's national development. This policy put its stamp over 
the period 1930-60, after which it gradually was eroded with the 
impact of the advance of the armed struggle within the colony
t
(Brito, 1980; 28).
At the political level, the new policy involved the abolition 
of the privileges of the large companies and their territories 
passed under the direct administration by the Portuguese state. 
For example, the territories of the Companhia de Niassa came under 
the direct control of the Portuguese colonial state in 1929 and 
those of the Companhia de Mocambique in 1942 (Ibid: 28). After
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this change in the political set up, these companies fell back on 
their economic activities as private enterprises. For example, out 
of and around the Companhia de Mocambique the Entreposto group was 
founded which ended up controlling more than 20 large-scale en­
terprises by the 1970s (Ibid:28). The established plantation
sector which included companies such as Sena Sugar Estates, 
Companhia de Borror and the Sociedade de Madal continued and 
developed their activities such that they were among the leading 
companies in the country at the end of the colonial era. It was 
the colonial state which actively assisted in this development by 
guaranteeing their supply of seasonal labour power under the 
system of forced labour (Head, 1980:54:61; Brito, 1980:28). Only 
the Ccxnpanhia de Niassa left virtually no trace in terms of con­
tinued economic activity after its abolition in 1929.
In this period the colonial state assumed the role of con­
trolling the various labour regimes as well as regulating the 
supply of labour power with respect to competing demands. The 
conditions under which labour power was provided as well as cash 
crops were produced by the peasantry were laid down in the incre­
asingly repressive labour legislation which implied the 
intensification of the enforcement of labour (Mondlane, 1969:91- 
92).
With respe ct to the content of economic development within 
this phase of economic nationalism, the most striking feature was 
that the colonial power actively enlarged the economic integration 
of Mozambique within Southern Africa. Hence, notwithstanding the 
rhetoric of nationalism as well as the aspirations of Portuguese
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settlers who were adversely affected by the competition for labour 
power from the neighbouring countries, Mozambique continued to 
supply its labour power to the Southern African region, even when 
this implied a chronic shortage of labour power within the colony 
(Brito, 1980:28-30).
Clearly, the Portuguese state had little alternative but to 
come to terms with the dominant position of the Southern African 
industrial complex in terms of shaping colonial development in 
Mozambique. Indeed, the economic integration of the colony within 
Southern Africa constituted a major source of foreign exchange 
income to the Portuguese state. Development in Portugal demanded 
that its colonies should achieve financial balance from their own 
resources as well as contribute foreign exchange to the Portuguese
state. In the case of Mozambique, the colonial budget as well as
the greater part of foreign exchange earnings depended on taxes on 
emigration and recruitment, and on income fron the use of the
ports and the railways for transit cargo to and from the
Transvaal, Rhodesia and Nyassaland (Brito, 1980:31).
Therefore, the policy pursued was not to close the frontiers 
for the export of labour power, but rather to increase the finan­
cial gains which could be obtained from Mozambique’s integration 
within Southern Africa. This principle was made explicit in the 
Colonial Act as follows:
’’The economic systems of the colonies are established in 
accord with the development needs, with fair reciprocity 
between them and neighbouring countries, with the rights and
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legitimate conveniences of the métropole and the Colonial
Empire..." (Brito, 1980:31).
Hence, the 1928 convention between Portugal and South Africa
established the system of deferred payment of a portion of the
miners’ wages to be paid to the Portuguese Trustee and to be 
remitted to the miners after competition of their contract period
and paid out in Escudos upon réturn to Mozambique (CEA,
1977:AI/v). Through this system the Portuguese state sought to 
increase the foreign exchange earnings of the colony by obliging 
Mozambican miners to spend a portion of their incomes within 
Mozambique (rather than importing commodities bought in South 
Africa) as well as to grant credit to the colonial state. From
1964 the colonial state was to derive éven more benefit from this
system of deffered pay thanks to the next gold clause included in 
the agreements with South Africa. This clause allowed Portugal to 
receive the sums of deferred payment in the form of gold. As the 
price of gold was fixed in terms of Rands^ the Portuguese state 
was able to obtain additional profit (in foreign exchange) by 
selling the gold at higher prices on the open market (CEA,
1977:AI/IX).
Similarly, with respect to the export of labour power to
Rhodesia the Portuguese state did not attempt to reduce its size, 
but rather it sought to increase the foreign exchange income 
derived from it. As was argued above, the colonial state in 
Rhodesia was less inclined to enter in formal agreements with the 
Portuguese state on the export of labour power since its mines as
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well as settler farms benefltted greatly from the illegal migra­
tion of Mozambican worker-peasants in search of better conditions 
than those prevailing at home. However, Rhodesian employers feared 
the potential competition for labour from the South African mining 
industry if the latter was to attempt to increase its sphere of 
influence beyond the parallel 22. The agreements of 1934 and 1947 
between Rhodesia and the Portuguese state reflected on the part of 
the former the desire to protect its supply of labour power fron 
Mozambique against possible competition from South Africa at times 
when the demand for labour power was increasing rapidly
(respectively the end of the great depression of the 1930s and the 
post-war boom). For Portugal, the main aim was to legalise the 
situation of clandestine workers so as to increase its income from 
taxes. The 1947 agreement was specifically successful in this 
respect inasmuch as recruitment in Tite district was to be for­
mally regularised by granting the ’Rhodesian Native Labour Supply 
Commission’ the right to establish the necessary infrastructures 
to recruit labour (on contracts of maximally 2 years), and fur­
thermore, the Rhodesian authorities would henceforth collect the 
Portuguese hut tax from all Mozambican workers present in 
Rhodesia, whether or not legally so. The financial gain of the 
latter measure can be seen from the fact that roughly 200,000 
Mozambicans were working in Rhodesia at that time, and only about 
20,000 of these were legally recruited in Tete district (Adamo 
et.al., 1981:64-68). It was only in the 1960s that the Rhodesian 
authorities actively pursued a policy Of phasing out the reliance 
on foreign migrant labour. The reasons behind this policy were the
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increased mécanisation within Rhodesian agriculture on the one 
hand and the increased supply of labour power from within Rhodesia 
(Ibid;68-71 ; CEA, 1979-d; 16-20).
The provision of transport services was the other major 
aspect of Mozambique's economic integration within southern 
Africa. With respect to South Africa, the export of labour power 
to the mines was consistently used as a trade-off against the use 
of the port of Lourenco Marques for imports of the Rand zone. The 
convention of 1928 reconfirmed the agreement that 50-55% of the 
imports by sea and rail to the Rand was to be channelled through 
the Mozambican harbour. This figure was lowered in subsequent 
agreements; to 47.5% (1940) and 40% (1964). Finally, in 1969 the 
requirement of a fixed level of transport to be routed through 
Lourenco Marques was lifted altogether (CEA, 1977:AI/V). However, 
after the second world war the harbour of Laurencd Marques 
gradually shifted from being a harbour specialised in importing 
cargo for the Rand zone, to becoming an export harbor for mining 
products. A major factor in this change-over was the construction 
of the railway which linked the harbour of Lourenco Marques with 
Salisbury in Rhodesia. In the sixties, the main activity of the 
harbour centered around the export of chrome (Rhodesia), coal 
(South Africa, Swaziland), some other mining products and steel 
(Rhodesia). To this effect, new facilities were built in Matola to 
handle the increased exports of these mining products.
Apart from the continuation and strengthening of Mozambique's 
economic dependence vis-a-vis the southern African subsystem, the
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new era of economic nationalism did bring about new developments 
propelled by Portuguese economic, social and political interests.
Firstly, there was the rapid expansion of cotton production 
by the peasantry within a system of forced cultivation. The need 
for cotton exports arose with the development of the textile 
industry within Portugal which required the supply of new cotton 
at prices below world market level so as to allow the industry to 
become competitive in the world market. The colonial state per­
suaded investors, many of whom foreign, to invest in the 
construction of ginning factories by means of special concessions 
to assure profitability. Commercial monopolies were granted within 
fixed zones in which the cultivation of cotton was enforced by the 
state on peasant small-holders (CEA, 1981 a:8).
Cotton cultivation was enforced in nearly all those areas of 
Mozambique unoccupied by plantations or settler farms and where 
the climate and soil permitted - as well as occasionally in un­
favourable areas. Cotton cultivation became the main means of 
exploiting the peasantry in the northern provinces which pre­
viously had acted as labour resources for the plantations. In the 
central and the southern areas, cotton cultivation was done by 
women or by men too old or infirm for wage labour, since the 
principal occupation of men was contract labour on the plantations 
or settler farms as well as migrant labour to the neighbouring 
countries (CEA, 198la;9). Started in 1936, by 1943 662,000
producers were integrated within this rapid drive towards the 
expansion of cotton production. The process went together with 
severe famines in the 1940s as peasants were forced to out back on
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food production. The colonial state attempted to remedy this 
situation by forced cassava cultivation in the cotton areas. Also, 
in the 1950s some attempts were made to introduce systematic crop 
rotation in concentrated settlements situated on the better areas. 
In the early 60s the number of cultivators had dropped to half a 
million while production doubled in comparison with 1943, and this 
on a total area only slightly larger than that of 1943 (CEA, 
198la:9-10).
Apart from cotton, rice production was also introduced as a 
crop under forced cultivation so as to cope with the growing needs 
of the towns (Wuyts, 1978:2). The post-war period also witnessed 
the rapid expansion of peasant production of cashew and copra as 
well as of marketed food crops such as maize, cassava, groundnut, 
etc.
A second feature of the economic development within this 
phase was the acceleration in immigration of Portuguese settlers 
within the colony. This resulted from deliberate policy measures 
undertaken by the Portuguese state so as to turn the colony into a 
province of Portugal. This was seen to be of special importance 
after the second world war when the colonial question became more 
prominent (Mondlane, 1969:79). While in 1920/30 the settler 
population grew at 4.5% annually, this growth rate increased to 
5.8% in 1940/50 and to 7.3% in 1960/70 (Costa et.al., 1973:37).
The settler population was mostly urban based and de facto 
monopolised all administrative and technical/skilled positions 
within the employment structure. This division of labour was 
further enhanced by an educational policy which segregated the
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access to education along racial lines: the state directly
provided educational facilities for the settler children while the 
Roman Catholic Church with state authorization and supervision 
provided primary school education for the African population 
(Marshall, 1985:158). Only a tiny proportion of the African 
population which managed to obtain the assimilado status could 
aspire to better education and better paid jobs (be it in a subor­
dinate position vis-a-vis the white settlers). In 1950, only 4,555 
Africans out of a population of 6 million had managed to obtain 
this status, while in 1960 only 1% of the African population was 
legally assimilated (Mondlane, 1969:50; Marshall, 1985:159).
The growth of the settler population with its higher income 
levels widened the scope of the internal market for food and for 
industrial consumer goods. With respect to the latter aspect, the 
period after the second world war witnessed the growth of in­
dustrial production for the home market. Up to I960, this 
industrial growth mainly centered on consumer goods, but at a 
later stage it also involved the production of intermediary 
products (Wield, 1978).
In response to the growing demand for food settler farm 
production developed mainly in the southern region of the country 
(Sahie, Incomati, Limpopo and Maputo valleys). These farms 
specialised in the production of rice, potatoes, vegetables as 
well as meat and dairy products (Wuyts, 1978:3). A specific aspect 
of this development was the colonato scheme of the Limpopo started 
in 1951, which reached a peak of 1146 white colonos in 1968 
(Hermele, 1986:8). Initially designed as a scheme to settle
30
Portuguese peasant families as small holder producers relying
principally on their own family labour for cultivation, the ven­
ture proved financially unsatisfactory and in the longer run 
unattractive to settlers (Ibid:3~8).
Finally, the period of economic nationalism witnessed the 
growing influence of Portuguese capital (as well as of larger 
settler based capital) in the colony. After the second world war 
industrial development and the accelerated centralisation of
capital in Portugal led to the formation of monopoly groups which 
also moved to establish a foodhold in the colonies. Hence, in this 
period Portuguese capital would partake in the investment in 
commercial ventures for marketing cotton (Companhia dos Algodoes 
de Mocambique and the group of Joao Ferreira dos Santos), in sugar 
plantations (Sociedade Agricola de Incomati), in tea , and at a
later stage in insurance and banking (CEA, 198la;11; Brito, 
1980:27-28; Head, 1980: 66)).
The implication of the development process in this period of 
Salazar's economic nationalism was that the peasantry was sub­
jected to enormous pressures to supply its labour power to 
neighbouring countries, to the expanding plantations and settler 
farms, to the public sector for road building and the construction 
of railways as well as to the ports for cargo handling. The 
peasantry was obliged moreover to cultivate cotton, tobacco and 
rice under a system of forced cultivation as well as sought to 
improve its lot by producing cash crops such as cashew, copra and 
marketed surplusses of various food crops. Apart from these 
demands imposed on it, the peasantry also had to produce most of
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Its own requirements in terms of food. The use of force by the 
colonial state was the mecanism through which peasant labour was 
kept cheap notwithstanding the chronic shortages of labour power 
which characterised this period. The fact that extra-economic 
coercion was used does not imply however that the peasantry was 
not dependent on the money economy to assure its subsistence 
requirements. Income frcxn wages or frcxn the sale of cash crops had 
become a matter of economic necessity, not only for acquiring 
necessary consumer goods, but also for sustaining and developing 
the level of family agriculture itself. This process of com­
moditisation and prolétarisation contained the seeds of forces of 
differentiation within the peasantry which were to determine the 
character of the peasantry at the time of independence (Wuyts, 
1978).
The early 1960s constituted a critical point in the develop­
ment of the colonial economy. The wave of decolonization in Africa 
placed increased pressure on Portugal to decolonize, and its 
refusal to do so increasingly isolated Portugal within the inter­
national arena. The development of the . armed struggle by the 
newly emerging nationalist movements in the colonies became an 
Irresistable force for change. The regime’s response was to ’turn 
the native into citizen* and to legally abolish forced labour and 
forced cultivation of crops in 1961. Although these changes were 
to a large extend intended to be merely formal in nature rather 
than changes in substance, the advance of the armed struggle 
forced the regime into making concessions (Wuyts, 1980:20-22).
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To enlist the support of its western allies, Portugal adopted 
an ’open door’ policy with respect to foreign investors at home 
and in the colonies. The Escudo Monetary Zone was created in 1961 
so as to ensure that all foreign exchange earnings were to be 
centralized in the Bank of Portugal. (Wuyts, 1983b:part 1).
The main purpose for setting up the monetary zone was that 
Portugal wanted to make sure that the colonies continued to con­
tribute to its own development by providing foreign exchange
surplusses. Table 2.1 shows how Mozambique normally had a surplus 
with the rest of the world (outside the escudo zone) and a deficit
with Portugal. With respect to the rest of the world, income from
transport services and from migrant labour were the main foreign 
exchange earners which accounted for the large surplusses on 
invisible trade.
Another institutional change brought about by the 'open door' 
policy was the liberal law on foreign investment as well as the 
new banking law of 1963. The former provided incentives to foreign 
investors to invest in Portugal or in its colonies. The latter 
opened up the colonies for Portuguese commercial banks which were 
allowed to establish branches. Prior to 1963, the Banco Naclonal 
Ultramarino (BNU)— a commercial bank controlled by the Portuguese 
state and charged with issuing the colonial escudo— was the only 
Portuguese commercial bank in operation in the colony along with 
two branches of foreign banks.
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After 1965, all major Portuguese commercial banks (which were 
linked to the major monopoly financial groups in Portugal) opened 
branches in Mozambique. Apart from normal commercial banking ; 
activities, these branches also financed the specific joint- 
ventures or other Investments of the financial groups to which 
they were linked (da Costa, 1973:112-118).
The latter period of the colonial era (1960-1973) witnessed 
scxne major investments within energy (Cabora Bassa project), 
within the ports (the development of the new facilities for ex­
porting mining products, steel and sugar and the refinary for 
imported oil) and within industry (mainly intermediary goods and 
import substituting Industries) (Wield, 1978; Mondlane, 1969:93- 
98).
Within the rural economy the abolition of forced labour and 
n was initially hardly enforced and in many 
ce continued up to the end of the colonial 
era. With the advance of the armed struggle however, the system 
was forced into retreat and new alternatives had to be explored.
One aspect which was directly linked to the war situation was the
attempt to accelerate the development of settler agriculture with 
the intention to stem the advance of the armed struggle. Hence,
the shift toward settler farms in cotton production in Nampula
(CEA, 1981a:15-21) as well as in food crop production and cattle 
rearing in areas such as Angonia and Alto Molocue (CEA, 1983&.8 
17; Mackintosh, 1986:5-8). Also, more scope was given to the 
emancipation of the richer peasantry both within the context of
of forced cultivatio 
instances the practi
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these settlement schemes as well as outside it. In the latter case 
however the richer peasants faced the ever present threat of being 
evicted from their land to make room for settler agriculture (CEA, 
1981a:15-21; CEA, 1983a:8-17; Hermele, 1986:3-8; Mackintosh,
1986:5-8).
Finally, with respect to the employment structure low level 
administrative and skilled jobs were made available to African 
workers, a process which led to an extremely complex wage struc­
ture as white labour always received better wages even if situated
within the same category of work (CEA, 1982c:Appendix).
Corresponding to this development was the emergence of technical 
schools in the 1960s which progressively allowed more Africans to 
enrol (Marshall, 1985:162).
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The Structure of the Colonial Economy
The structure of the colonial economy as it emerged out of 
the historical processes sketched in the previous section can be 
briefly summarized by the following three basic features:
1. The economic integration within the Southern African sub­
system under the domination of South African capitalism led to 
a situation in which Mozambique became to a large extent a 
service economy dependent upon the provision of transit 
transport services (ports and railways) for the South African 
and Rhodesian economies as well as of the supply of migrant 
labour to the South African mining sector and, to a lesser 
extent, to South African and Rhodesian settler farms.
To show the relative importance of thes services in terms of 
labour utilisation and of foreign exchange earnings about 25 
per cent of total wage labour consisted of migrant labour to 
the Southern African region (and this is more likely to have 
been an underestimate) while employment in the ports and 
railways amounted to nearly half as much as total employment 
in the manufacturing sector (respectively five per cent and 
ten per cent of total wage employment which itself amounted to 
between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of the active population) 
(CEA, 198lb:unit 2). With respect to foreign earnings, the 
ports and railways sector was consistently the major foreign 
exchange earner with a relative importance of approximately 30 
per cent of total income on current account of the balance of 
payments, which was considerably more than the income from the
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major cash crops - cashew (roughly 15 per cent of income oh 
current account) and cotton (about 14 per cent). Income in 
terms of foreign exchange coming from migrant labour is more 
difficult to assess since no precise statistics are available. 
However obligatory, deferred payments of miners' wages 
amounted to about four per cent of current foreign exchange 
receipts in the latter phase of the colonial period (its share 
rising in the 1970s due to the increase in wages on the mines 
in that period) (CEA, 1981 brunit 5).
In terms of regional configuration with respect to the 
transport sector, 75 per cent of the total tonnage handled 
through the Mozambican ports was transit cargo. Of the total 
tonnage transported by rail, 39 per cent were exports and 
imports from South Africa, 18 per cent from Rhodesia and 18 
per cent from Swaziland (14%) and Malawi (4%). In terms of 
income however, 57 per cent of revenue came fron transporting 
Rhodesian cargo (due to the longer distances), 23 per cent 
from South Africa and 9 per cent from the remaining foreign 
transit transport, while the remaining 11 per cent accounted 
for internal transport (CEA, 1981 brunit 2).
Finally, the harbour of Lourenco Marques accounted for 77 per 
cent of all tonnage handled by Mozambican ports, 17 per cent 
through Beira and 6 per cent through Nacala and the other 
minor ports (CEA, 198lb:unit 2).
2. The production of primary commodities destined for exports: 
cashew, cotton, sugar, copra and tea as the major products 
(respectively 23 per cent, 21 per cent, 11 per cent, six per
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cent and four per cent of the total exports of goods). Sugar, 
copra and tea were mainly produced by the plantation sector 
located in and around the Zambezy valley in the centre of the 
country. Cotton, initially exclusively a peasant cash crop
produced under forced cultivation, was increasingly produced 
by the growing sector of settler agriculture toward the latter 
end of the colonial period (in the early 1970s more than half 
of the output came from this sector). In terms of location 
cotton was produced mainly in the northern and the central 
region of the country (CEA, 1981a: 9). Finally, cashew was 
produced exclusively by the peasantry along the whole coastal 
area (Wuyts, 1978). Linked to this process of production of 
primary commodities was the development of elementary process­
ing industries (cotton ginning, sugar extraction, tea 
preparation as well as some vegetable oils production), des­
tined primarily for exports. Together with the only other
major export-oriented industry - the petrol refinery (oriented 
towards the South African and Swazi markets), these in­
dustries accounted for about 40 per cent of the total 
industrial output and were spread over the four provinces of 
Maputo, Sofala, Zambezia and Nampula with roughtly equal 
relative importance with respect to output (CEA, 198lb:unit 
2).
3. A colonialism based on settler immigration which implied a 
relatively significant development of the internal market 
centred oh the consumpion pattern of the growing settler
community. Hence, in industry 60 per cent of total output was
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geared to the internal market and included apart from the 
production of consumer goods (including certain durables like 
refrigerators, radios and other electrical equipment, etc.) 
also a significant level of production of intermediary goods 
(mainly linked to construction and transport industries). This 
industry was virtually wholly concentrated on three towns: 
Maputo (66 per cent of the output destined for the home 
market), and the remainder in Beira and Chimoio. It depended 
heavily on the proximity of the South African industrial 
complex on which it relied for spare parts, inputs and techni­
cal expertise in servicing equipment (CEA, 1981b:unit 2). 
Within the rural areas settler production concentrated on the 
supply of food (rice, potatoes, vegetables, dairy products) to 
the towns; an activity mainly concentrated in the Southern 
region - the Limpopo, Incomati and Maputo valleys. Rural trade 
was also largely in the hand of settler shopkeepers (often 
combined with agrarian production) (Wuyts, 1978:13-17).
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 provide us with a summary view of the 
regional structure of rural production as well as of the structure 
of wage employment in the country.
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Table 2,3 The Structure of Wage Employment in 
Colonial Mozambique around 1970
Sector Percentage of total 
Wage Employment
External migrant labour 24
Agriculture 17
Fishing 3 :
Manufacturing 10|
Construction 3
Commerce and finance 11
Ports and railways 5
Public administration 7
Domestic servants 11
Other sectors 9
Source; IV Plano de Fomento, Parte III, Relatorio Sectorias, 
Vol. 8, Mao de Obra e Formacao Profissional, pp. 5-6 
(adapted).
*
Note: Statistics on employment were generally of very poor
quality and often inconsistent as to data sources. More 
specifically, large discrepancies existed with respect 
to data on agricultural employment depending on whether 
or not seasonal labour was taken into account. As a 
rough estimate, wage employment accounted for between 20 
percent to 30 percent of the active population (which is 
high relatively to countries such as Tanzania with +/- 
15 percent and Zimbabwe with 18 percent), the main 
reasons being the dominant feature of external migrant 
labour as well as the considerable demand for labour 
coming from plantations and settler agriculture. Since 
wage labour was mainly (but not exclusively) male 
labour, it follows that probably +/- 50 percent of the 
male active population was well integrated in wage work 
(although in agriculture the intensity of wage work 
varied weekly).
*To arrive at the picture provided by this table the informa­
tion of the reference data source was cross checked with the 
1970 census data, agricultural and industrial statistics, 
data on migration, etc.
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The State as Regulator of the Colonial Labour Regimes
The colonial economy was rooted in the exploitation of the 
peasantry which not only produced a significant share of the 
export crops as well as marketed sur plusses of food to feed the 
town population, but also supplied its labour power in accordance 
with the needs of capitalist production within the country and in 
the wider region. The integration of the peasantry in the monetary 
economy did not leav^ it as an undifferentiated mass of producers, 
but rather propelled forces of differentiation in the rural 
economy which were to become increasingly more prominent in the 
later days of the colonial era. To understand these processes of 
rural differentiation it is necessary to analyse the role of the 
colonial state in * planning' labour requirements for the develop­
ment of colonial capitalism.
Indeed, the colonial economy was by no means a 'laissez- 
faire* economy. Rather, it was a strongly regulated economy within 
a context characterised by chronic labour shortages for most of 
the era of colonial rule. It was the main task of the colonial 
state to ensure that the supply of labour power by the peasantry 
as well as the production of cash crops by them would meet the 
needs of capitalist development, and to do so under conditions
' I
which guaranteed the provision of cheap labour power. The colonial 
state assumed this role right from the start of the development of 
colonial capitalism, but the scope and the extent to which it 
carried out this task widened and intensified significantly from 
the 1930s onwards. In fact, the enforcement of labour is quite
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common to all colonial regimes and specifically in the process of 
the formation of the colonial economic structures. However, the 
salient feature of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique was that 
the enforcement of labour under strict state supervision inten­
sified and widened over time and continued virtually unabatedly up 
to the end of the colonial era. It was only the advance of the 
armed struggle by Frelimo which eroded this practice by forcing 
concessions from the colonial regime. The colonial labour regimes 
in Mozambique were characterised by the following specific and 
interrelated elements:
1. The migrant labour system: the key feature of this system is 
that wage labour remains organically linked to family agricul­
ture, and hence the process involves only partial 
proletarization. Hence, "migratory labour systems assume that 
a substantial part of the cost of family reproduction are met 
through subsistence agriculture by the migrant’s family, and 
that migrants ’retire’ to their rural areas of origin when 
they are no longer needed by capitalist employers. In this 
situation, the social category of the ’reserve army of labour’ 
corresponds to the population of particular geographic areas" 
(Johnson H. and Bernstein H., 1982:260). It would be incorrect 
however to categorize such reserve areas as regions charac­
terized by an undifferentiated mass of labourers supported by 
subsistence production in agriculture since such view would 
neglect the dynamic features of migrant labour systems with 
respect to rural development within such areas. Rather, 
migrant labour systems acquire distinctive features by the
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fact that they contain processes of internal differentiation 
which are conditioned by their dominant function as supply 
areas of labour power. It is therefore of utmost importance to 
investigate the nexus between wage labour and peasant agricul­
ture so as to identify the specific dynamic features of each 
system. I
Within the context of colonial Mozambique, the export of 
labour-power to South Africa, Rhodesia and Nyassaland as well 
as the supply of labour power to the plantations and to set­
tler farms were all rooted within migratory labour systems. 
The terms and the conditions of contracts varied considerably 
and so did the impact of these systems on the dynamic 
processes within family agriculture (the processes of dif­
ferentiation, including the impact on the gender division of 
labour ).
2. The use of forced labour; although extensively used in the 
period before 1930, the practice of forced labour became 
rationalized and centralized under the control of the colonial 
state with the development of a country-wide repressive and 
administrative machinery of the state in the 1930s. The system 
which emerged contained two distinct types: (1) compulsory 
contract labour of adult males for a period of six months per 
year in cases where such workers were not otherwise gainfully 
employed. The definition of gainful employment was determined 
by the colonial state and included migrant workers to the 
neighbouring countries (if legally contracted), cotton 
producers, workers in wage employment in industry or in
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government service, etc. Forced labour was recruited by the 
colonial state and subsequently allocated to public works, to 
the ports and railways for manual tasks of cargo handling and 
to other state institutions who needed labour as well as to 
plantations and settler farms (Mondlane, 1969:91-93; Penvenne, 
1980:99-26). The legal wage for contract labour was always 
related to the ’native* tax in force and the state laid down 
the proportion to be maintained between the two. Furthermore, 
wages were paid at the end of the contract period after the 
tax had been deducted. There was therefore a direct financial 
interest for the state to recruit labour for private en­
terprise, and not surprisingly, taxation of the African 
population was the single most important source of direct 
revenue in the colonial budget (Head, 1980:56-61).
(2) forced cultivation of cash crops was the second type of 
compulsory labour exerted from the peasantry. In the case of 
cotton, the colonial authorities designated the areas for 
forced cultivation, fixed the producer prices as well as 
specified the area to be cultivated by the household with 
reference to family size and composition, and granted absolute 
monopoly on the purchase of seed-cotton to commercial com­
panies within their zones of influence (determined by the 
location of their ginning factories). Cotton cultivation was 
directly supervised by the local administration as well as by 
the capatazes employed by the concessionary companies. In 
zones characterised by migrant labour of adult males, the 
forced cultivation of cotton was imposed on women, while in
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other zones both men and women were made to produce cotton 
(CEA, I98la:9-14).
3, The fragmentation of labour markets: within an overall context 
of labour shortage it was the deliberate policy of the 
colonial state to limit the competition for labour power as 
between different employers. The policy rested on two related 
sets of measures : (1) the legal determination of zones of
influence over labour reserves, and, (2) the distribution of 
contract labour over competing demands through direct ad­
ministrative allocation by the colonial state machinery in the 
context of the forced labour system (Wuyts, 1978).
Hence, for example, the parallel 22 constituted a borderline, 
as between the zones of influence of South African mining 
capital on the one hand, and of the plantation econoy in the 
Zambezy valley as well as of Rhodesian mining and agriculture 
on the other hand. The various agreements with Rhodesia sought 
to regularise the flow of labour power as well as to designate 
the areas from which such labour was to be recruited. 
Similarly, commercial companies each obtained their zone of 
influence with respect to the marketing of peasants’ cash 
crops in the system of forced cultivation.
Both aspects blended together at various points so as to 
assure that labour power was not only cheap, but also that a 
differential wage structure for the same type of labour could 
be maintained. In general, a three tier wage structure for 
unskilled labour power prevailed with wages being highest in 
South Africa followed by those in Rhodesia and with wages paid
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by plantations and colonial settlers in Mozambique constitut­
ing the lowest tier (Adamo et.al., 1981:59-72; Brito, 1980:23- 
32; Wuyts, 1978). It was the forced labour system which 
structured this lower tier and hence provided the framework in 
which capitalist accumulation within the country could be 
accommodated within a context of regional dependence on 
economically more advanced countries.
4. Political repression by the colonial state which prohibited 
any form of organisation of the producing classes to further 
their own interests. It was only in the latter days of 
colonial rule that the state was obliged to make some conces­
sions and allow the development of limited trade unions 
(sindicados). The dominant practice remained however the 
brutal repression of workers and peasants in cases of strikes 
or revolts (Alexandrino, 1981:57-64; Habermeier, 1981:38-40; 
Manghesi, 1981:27-36; Mondlane, 1969:35-57).
It is the interplay between these characteristic features of 
the colonial labour regimes which determined the processes of 
social differentiation within the rural economy. In what follows 
an attempt is made to sketch some key features of the development 
of class forces within the rural economy.
In the case of migratory labour systems the key element in 
analysing patterns of differentiation consists in investigating 
the nexus between wage income and the organisation of household 
production (with family agriculture as its principal component). 
Indeed, the relation between them is not merely one of additivity 
(i.e. the wage being supplemented by subsistence production), but
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rather one of interaction and interdependence (i.e. the organisa­
tion and development of family agriculture, and of household 
production in general, becomes dependent on wage income and in­
volves changes in the division of labour within the household 
economy). Furthermore, this interdependence cannot be analysed 
merely at the level of household units only (e.g. changes within 
the gender division of labour within the household) but needs to 
be analysed also at the level of the rural economy of the reserve 
area as a whole (e.g. the division of labour between households 
with respect to agricultural work as well as off-farm activities 
such as small-scale industry, crafts and trade). The latter aspect 
is particularly important inasmuch as the dominant process of 
proletarization of the peasantry may bring about increased com­
moditization through the establishment of exchange relationships 
within the rural economy which are financed by the influx of 
income frcxn wages and which result from the fact that labour is 
withdrawn from family agriculture. These processes of wage- 
dependent commoditization within the peasant economy foment the 
social differentiation of the peasantry.
In Mozambique, those areas in which the incidence of the 
export of labour power to neighbouring countries was more 
pronounced (Southern Mozambique, and the border regions with 
Rhodesia and Nyassaland), this relationship between partial 
proletarization of the peasantry and the intensification of com­
modity relations within the peasant economy was most marked. 
Generally, contracts abroad were better paid, but also involved 
longer duration in comparison with local contract labour (1-2
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years as compared to 6 months contracts). The high intensity with 
which adult men were involved in such labour over their livetime 
meant that the majority of these men became affectively divorced 
from agricultural work (CEA, 1977:56-69).
Clearly, the burden of agricultural work shifted to women, but 
this change did not take place in static conditions. Three aspects 
need to be considered with respect to the dynamics of change. 
Firstly, income from wage labour did not only pay for consumer 
goods, but also it financed agricultural inputs such as seeds, 
fertilisers, etc. as well as allowed in some cases for the ac­
quisition of oxen and plough, water pumps for irrigation, and 
tractors. Secondly, certain tasks which previously were performed 
by men within the household became commoditized. Hence, a large 
proportion of households would cultivate with oxen and plough 
without actually owning them by renting this service from those 
peasants who did. Similarly, house building and the construction 
of water wells and tanks would be paid for out of remittances. 
Finally, also within consumer demand a certain proportion of the 
money spent would go to locally supplied commodities. Hence, for 
example, those families who did not produce sufficient food crops 
for their own consumption would buy from peasants with marketed 
surplusses for sale. Similarly, remittances frcxn wages would be 
spent on furniture made by local carpenters and on clothes made by 
local tailors (CEA, 1977:106-112).
As a result of this process of deepening commodity relations 
household production became more differentiated and a more complex 
rural division of labour developed around it. Within these rural
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communities a strata of richer and middle peasants developed 
which relied on income from wage labour to invest in agricultural 
means of production as well as in small-scale craft, industry or 
trade, and as such stabilize their position within the rural 
economy without having to rely further on wage labour unless in 
exceptional circumstances (illness in the family, loss of cattle 
due to drought, etc). Hence, through a combination of a more 
developed agricultural base and other off-farm activities, these 
peasants managed to establish themselves within commodity produc­
tion by producing food surplusses for sale to the towns or within 
the local community, by renting the services of ploughing the 
plots of other households with their oxen or tractor, by engaging 
in petty trade (which in border areas often involved smuggling), 
or by undertaking various crafts such as house building, brick 
making, carpentry or tailoring, as well as milling. This strata 
within the peasantry was heavily dependent on the dominant process 
of proletarization (within the context of the migrant labour 
system) as a condition of its formation and its reproduction . On 
the other hand, there emerged the poor 'proletarianized’ peasants 
for whom wage work was a continuing necessity to provide the 
family with day to day basic consumer goods. Its family agricul­
ture was also wage-dependent inasmuch as it relied on the purchase 
of seeds, etc. as well as on paying for ploughing the family plot 
by oxen and plough, etc. These families would often be deficit 
producers of food and had to rely on wage income to purchase food 
in the local markets (CEA, 1977:106-112; CEA, 1983a:8-l6; Hermele, 
1986:3-8; Wuyts, 198la:2-5).
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Within the areas which constituted the zones of influence of 
the plantations the patterns of differentiation within the 
peasantry were somewhat different but nevertheless quite 
pronounced. Seasonal contract labour to the plantations consisted 
of six months contracts and hence the separation of adult men from 
participation in family agriculture was not as drastic as was the 
case for migrant workers to neighbouring countries. However, this 
labour was recruited under the system of forced labour and hence 
was left with a much smaller margin of cash income over the pay­
ment of taxes. It was therefore not surprising that many peasants 
fled from forced labour by going to work in Rhodesian mins as 
illegal migrants (Dolny, 1985:218-220).
The specific feature of the plantation economy was that it 
generated a double demand with respect to its zones of influence: 
a demand for seasonal labour power as well as a demand for food to 
feed this labour force. It was the surrounding peasantry which 
supplied both the labour power and food, but the intensity as to 
which each element predominated varied with respect to region as 
well as to different strata within the peasantry. The peasantry 
who lived in regions bordering the plantation and who had been 
evicted from their land with the formation and/or expansion of the 
plantation sectors were generally more proletarianized and depend­
ed on wages for their subsistence. Their base in family 
agriculture often was insufficient even to feed the family. 
Further-off areas would have more compex patterns in which some 
became more specialised in supplying food and others in supplying 
labour power, but never exclusively so. Within such areas the
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relative importance of t#th elements would vary with the pattern 
of differentiation within the peasantry, but it was mostly within 
the food supplying areas that a strata of rich and middle peasants 
emerged based on food production to service the demand from the 
plantation sector (CEA, 1982d:24-43; Mackintosh, 1986:5-8).
The emergence of a stratum of rich and middle peasants within 
the supply areas of labour power was by no means an unproblematic 
process. In fact, up to the early 1960s the colonial state showed 
little interest in furthering the development of this process of 
social differentiation within the peasantry. Firstly, the 
peasantry as a whole was subjected to the labour legislation which 
required every adult male to work for at least six months a year 
for either the state or private companies and entrepreneurs. The 
rich and middle peasantry was by no means exempted from this law, 
although they could have relied on support from the regulos (the 
colonially appointed tribal chiefs) to escape the measure. 
Secondly, the peasantry faced the constant threat of being evicted 
frcxn their land by the colonial state so as to make room for 
settler agriculture or the expansion of plantations. Thirdly, the 
overall context of chronic labour shortages made it difficult for 
the rich peasants to accumulate on the base of a stable supply of 
labour power. Finally, one cannot over-estimate the extent to 
which colonial policy, which was rooted in a doctrine of racial 
superiority, left little room for the advancement of the African 
population beyond the hardships of manual labour (Mondlane, 
1969:Chapter 2).
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It was due to the development of the armed struggle of Frelimo 
that the colonial authorities were forced to make concessions and 
began to look upon this stratum of rich and middle peasants as an 
element which could stem the tide.of radicalism. However, its 
policy still remained ambivalent. Settler agriculture remained the 
dominant priority and its expansion threatened the peasantry with 
eviction. Nevertheless, in this period the richer peasantry 
managed to stengthen its position in a variety of ways. So, for 
example, in the Limpopo colonato some Mozambican peasants were 
incorporated alongside Portugues settlers, be it usually on proba­
tion (Hermek, 1986:3-8). In Alto Molocue in Zambezia, the richer 
peasantry managed to acquire the status of agricultor alongside 
Portuguese farmers, and as such they were exempted from forced 
labour as well as formally allowed to employ labour (Mackintosh, 
1986:7). In Angonia, Tete district, the peasantry faced eviction 
from their land with the expansion of settler agriculture, but 
notwithstanding this threat (which was sharply opposed and led to 
often violent conflicts), many richer peasants developed their 
agricultural base by buying seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, etc. 
from colonial settlers (CEA 1983a: 14). Agricultural credit 
provided by the agricultural credit bank (which became the 
Institute de Credito de Mocambique in 1970) concentrated virtually 
exclusively on financing settler agriculture (Wuyts, 1983b:9-10), 
and hence the rich peasantry had to establish its base in agricul­
ture by investing money derived from wage labour.
Turning now to the areas characterised by forced cultivation 
of cotton, the extreme exploitation of the peasantry limited
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severely the scope for differentiation within the peasantry up to 
the early sixties (Habermeier, 1981:38-40; CEA, 1981a:8-14). After 
that, producer prices rose and the practice of forced cultivation 
was somewhat slackened although the majority of the peasantry 
continued to be subjected to it up to 1969/71. However, groups of 
peasants began to use advanced techniques and specialised in 
cotton production. Many of these were regulos and overseers who 
used their privileged positions within colonial society to estab­
lish themselves as agricultores (Habermeier, 1981:4l-42< CEA, 
1981a:15-21). But also in this case, the thrust of development 
went towards the formation and expansion of settler agriculture in 
cotton production aided by the active support of the colonial 
state. This led to the eviction of the peasantry from the cotton 
settlement schemes in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The sur­
rounding areas became transformed into supply areas of labour 
power within the process (CEA, 1981a:15-21).
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Conclusion
The analysis presented in this chapter provides a basis for 
the analysis of the terrain of struggles for socialism in the 
post-independence period as it was shaped by the context of the 
colonial legacy.
A first conclusion which can be drawn from this analysis is 
that Mozambique’s economic integration within the Southern Afriban 
sub-systemm and its dependence vis-a-vis South Africa would con­
stitute a critical area of struggle in the post-independence 
period. De facto, the struggle for socialism in Mozambique formed 
an integral part of the struggle for the political liberation and 
for economic emancipation within the Southern African region.
There exists a basic unity between both elements and advances on
one front will inevitably condition the developments on the other. 
In comparison with this major aspect, disengagement from economic 
dependence on Portugal was in fact a less significant (although 
not unimportant) factor since it involved breaking with the 
’rentier’ relationship of Portugal vis-a-vis Mozambique.
A second conclusion of this analysis is that the peasantry
constituted the cornerstone of colonial capitalism. It was a 
peasantry which was deeply integrated in the monetary economy and 
dependent on it for its subsistence. Partial proletarization
within the context of the migrant labour system was its dominant 
characteristic. It was also a differentiated peasantry in which a 
stratum of rich and middle peasants which had acquired a stronger 
foothold in agriculture accounted for the greater share of the
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marketed surplusses produced by the peasantry. This process of 
differentiation had developed as a product of colonial-capital ism 
notwithstanding the fact that the colonial state never effectively 
backed the emergence of this stratum of better-off peasants. At 
the time of independence therefore, the peasantry did not con­
stitute an undifferentiated mass of rural producers nor were they 
mainly subsistence producers with only marginal linkages with the 
monetary economy. Socialist policies would need to come to terms 
with the character of the peasantry.
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PART II
TRANSFORMING THE ECONOMY
CHAPTER 3
THE IMMEDIATE TASKS
Introduction
After 10 years of armed struggle Frelimo conquered political 
power as a result of the collapse of the Portuguese fascist regime 
under the strain of its colonial wars. The Coup d’Etat of the 
25the of April 1974 brought home the impact of the colonial ques­
tion on the internal situation in Portugal. In the aftermath of 
the coup the attempts 6n the part of the more reactionary factions
of the Portuguese state to engineer a form of neo-colonial settle-
I
ment wa^e thwarted due to Frelimo’s rejection of a cease fire and 
the advances made in opening up new fronts in a generalized offen­
sive of the armed struggle. The unconditional transfer of power to 
Frelimo was agreed upon in Lusaka in September 1974 and led to the 
formation of a transitional government under Frelimo majority 
jointly with Portuguese administrators. This transitional govern­
ment was to lay the basis for the final transfer of power on the 
25th of June, 1975.
The 10 years of armed struggle had not merely been a period of 
struggle against Portuguese colonialism, but had also involved an
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internal struggle within the liberation movement itself. Indeed, 
the emergence of the liberated areas brought with it the question 
of the political and economic organization of society within these 
areas under Frelimo control. The basic question was whether 
liberation meant the substitution of Mozambicans for Portuguese 
within essentially the same structure of society, or whether 
society and the form in which it organizes production as well as 
shapes political power needed to be radically reorganized. It was 
the latter view which gained the upperhand in this struggle and as 
such mere nationalism became transformed into a perspective of 
revolutionary nationalism. Thus the movement which conquered power 
in 1974 had internalized already a revolutionary socialist posi­
tion which sprang from its struggles and practice within the 
liberated areas.
This chapter addresses two issues which characterised the 
period 1974-76 and which were seen to be of immediate importance; 
one out of necessity, and the other as an expression of deliberate 
policy. The former concerned economic policy, which in this period 
had to confront an intense production crisis provoked by the 
impact of the massive emmigration of the Portuguese settler com­
munity within a context of economic sabotage and capital flight. 
The policy involved defensive interventions within the economy 
which led to ad hoc nationalizations. The salient feature of this 
period was that Frelimo succeeded in mobilizing broad sections of 
the population within the political set-up of the Dynamising 
Groups behind an economic policy which aimed to counteract the 
impact of the crisis.
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The second aspect of this period was strategic in nature and 
concerned the nationalizations of the social services (health, 
education, the provision of legal services and of funeral service- 
s) as well as of housing and of land ownership. Clearly, the aim 
in this case was to alter radically the access to these services 
as well as to housing and Iandownership. The event of these 
nationalizations and the explicit policy to transform the provi­
sion of social services along socialist principles set the stage 
for initiating a process of their socialisation. In this chapter, 
the case of planning the nationalised health services will be
discussed because of the insights it provides as to the character
'
of planning in transition.
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Combating Economic Sabotage
The period starting with the event of the transitional govern­
ment and which continued into the immediate post-independence era 
did by no means signal the end of conflict and struggle. On the 
one hand, the independence of Mozambique and Angola could not but 
intensify the struggle for the liberation in Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
South Africa. Indeed, the downfall of Portuguese colonialism and 
the victory of Frelimo and MPLA— both committed to a socialist
strategy— radically altered the balance of forces within the 
Southern African region.
On the other hand, also internally the struggle intensified
when the old economic order came into sharp contradiction with the 
new political power committed o building socialism. Indeed, the 
colonial bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie jointly with factions 
of the administrative and technical labour force consisting of 
Portuguese settlers had tried already in the aftermath of the coup 
d ’Etat to impede the transfer of power to Frelimo. First, by 
attempting to engineer a neo-colonialist settlement. And, when 
that failed to materialize, they tried to grasp power by force in
an aborted coup immediately following the Lusaka agreements
(Frelimo, 1977a; 53).
After that, economic sabotage within a context of massive 
emigration from Mozambique set the scene of the early years of 
Frelimo government. Even before the defeat of the Portuguese 
fascist regime, the 250,000 settlers had begun to desert the
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colony. Forty thousand left between 1971 and 1973. In the after- 
math of the coup d’Etat up to independence in June 1975 at least 
another 100,000 left. The greater number of those who remained 
left within one year after independence (Wield, 1983; 85).
This flight of the settler community affected all sectors of 
the economy. Construction virtually came to a complete standstill. 
High-rise blocks were left half-finished as monuments to an old 
era which had suddenly collapsed. Small and medium industrial 
enterprises ranging from garages, carpenters, electrical workshops 
to brick producers and various types of import substitution 
’finishing touch’ enterprises, were abandoned by their owners. 
Tourism and tourist-related activities stopped all together since 
it relied mainly on South African and Rhodesian tourists. In the 
rural areas settlers abandoned their farms and shopkeepers their 
commercial enterprises. Road transport of passengers and of cargo 
dropped sharply as settlers fled with their trucks or busses or 
left them behind in a state of destruction. The larger plantations 
and bigger enter prises--mainly owned by foreign investors— had to 
keep on going with decreasing numbers of managerial staff and of 
technical workers. As settlers left, most domestic workers lost 
their job. Domestic work was the single largest employment sector 
embracing an estimated 300,000 workers (Wield, 1983; 86).
Economic sabotage was widespread and took all possible forms. 
The mentality of many settlers was that what could not be taken 
out, had to be left destroyed. Hence, the large scale destruction 
of equipment, of cars and trucks, the killing of cattle stock and 
the attempts at destroying economic and social infrastructure.
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Capital flight was rampant and difficult to control: commodities 
were exported but the foreign exchange never reached Mozambique, 
imports were paid for in foreign exchange, but the actual com­
modities never materialized. Since most banks were still private, 
funds were transferred abroad without any control. Finally, often 
equipment, trucks, cars, cattle, etc., were simply driven across 
the border to South Africa or Rhodesia to allow settlers to start 
up business there (Frelimo, 1977a: 61-64).
Clearly the Portuguese owners of productive and commercial 
enterprises had lost all interest in organizing production. The 
colonial economy was collapsing rapidly. Large scale dismissal of 
workers from enterprises and complete production stoppages were 
the weapons which the colonial bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie 
tried to employ to create the maximum economic chaos (Ibid).
Faced with this crisis of the colonial economy and society, the 
transitional government (and subsequently, the post-independence 
government) had to adopt immediate economic policy measures aimed 
at combating sabotage and preventing total chaos in production and 
exchange. The immediate tasks of economic policy were defined as 
those of maintaining the level of employment, preventing the 
collapse in production by keeping enterprises going as well or 
poorly as possible, and assuring stable prices of consumer goods 
to prevent the crisis of production to express itself in a massive 
inflationary pressure (Wuyts, 1983b: 20).
No organized state apparatus existed to direct the restructur­
ing of the economy in the face of crisis. In fact, the colonial 
state apparatus was collapsing rapidly in this period, and Frelimo
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cadres at the level of government were few and thinly spread 
throughout the state apparatus operating often in a still hostile 
environment. The political and social forces which carried the 
thrust of the struggle against economic sabotage were the dynamiz­
ing groups— popularly elected groups of 8 to 10 people set up both 
residentially and at the workplace. They existed in every village, 
in every suburb of the towns and in factories, commercial and 
banking institutions, schools, hospitals, and administrative units 
of the public services. The CD’s were the principal vehicles 
through which class forces expressed themselves (Wield, 1983; 88- 
91).
Their tasks were extremely complex; mobilizing the population 
behind the line of Frelimo as well as administering the practical 
organization of society since the colonial state apparatus no 
longer did so. Hence, a variety of issues such as marriage and 
divorce, settling conflicts, organizing vigilance against economic 
sabotage, mobilizing and organizing literacy campaigns, and or­
ganizing mass meetings to discuss political issues were all taken 
on by these groups (Ibid).
The dynamizing groups themselves were quite heterogeneous with 
respect to their class composition, and often sharp conflicts 
would erupt among their members or between some of their members 
and the population. These groups gathered within themselves all 
patriotic forces in he struggle against the remnants of colonial 
society, but the class position of the various social groups 
represented in them could be widely diverging (Wield, 1983; 91),
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Regular meetings were organized at the national and regional 
level to unify the political strategy of these dynamizing groups 
and to organize their action around concrete tasks. So, for ex­
ample, in the national meeting of May 1975 it was decided that the 
leadership of the CD’s had to draw from the lower income strata of 
the population so as to avoid that the GD’s became dominated by 
local traders, state functionaries or the intelligentia~groups 
which tended to be more literate and articulate.
The main function of the GD’s organized at the level of produc­
tive or commercial enterprises consisted in combating economic 
sabotage and in assuring that production continued as well as 
possible. The legal instrument which gave force to the action of 
the GD’s was the law on ’state intervention’ of early 1975 
(Frelimo, 1977a: 64-65 > Wuyts, 1983b: 20). This law allowed for 
the take-over of firms by the government in cases where acts of 
economic sabotage were detected. The latter included not only 
destruction of equipment or capital flight, but also the large 
scale dismissal of workers and any action which brought about the 
deliberate stopage of production. Upon discovery of such actions, 
the government would intervene, dismiss the management and con­
stitute an administrative council composed of workers and (often) 
individual members of the old management. Enterprises thus inter­
vened were left to be managed by these councils with the explicit 
goals not to dismiss any workers and to keep production going as 
well as possible . The state-controlled banks were instructed to 
finance the deficits of these enterprises to keep them running 
(Wuyts, 1983a: 20-23).
70
In early 1977, 319 commercial and industrial enterprises had
been taken over in this manner. Of these 141 had less than 20 
workers and 131 had only between 20 and 100 workers. Only 47 had 
more than 100 workers (Wield, 1983: 89). Small and medium scale 
enterprises were indeed the material basis of the colonial bour­
geoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, and it was here that the problems 
were most acute. Big enterprises were only taken over if abandoned 
or after particularly bad sabotage. Some of the larger cashew 
factories and 80% of the tea plantations (mainly Portuguese 
capital) were taken over. Cifel, the large steel rolling mill was 
another case of government intervention (Ibid; 90).
The available cadres within government spent considerable 
energy in coordinating and combating the worst effects of the 
abandonment of these enterprises. In fact, as the Third Congress 
would subsequently analyze it, government policy in this period 
was very much akin to the action of a fire brigade: going where 
the fire burns hardest. It left the key sectors of the economy 
largely untouched and involved a considerable dispersion of effort 
(Ibid: 90).
In the rural areas the CD’s played a large role in avoiding 
that abandoned settler land would be seized by private interests. 
The policy pursued here already contained a definite strategic 
interest with respect to rural transformation. In general, aban- 
donded settler land was not redistributed to the peasantry, but 
rather it was quickly consolidated into state farms and coopera­
tives to keep production and employment going (Dolny, 1985: 224). 
However, in the case of the Limpopo colonato, Hermele argues that
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although the policy may have been to freeze any further develop­
ment until a decision was to be taken, in actual fact the exodus 
of Portuguese settlers was accompanied by a steep rise in the 
number of Mozambican peasants who entered the scheme on probation 
(from 2600 at the end of 1974 to 6000 in 1976) (1986: 9).
Another aspect of the role played by the CD’s in the 
countryside was the widespread mobilization of the peasantry for 
production in collective fields. Each peasant household would 
contribute its labour to work in these fields to produce a social 
surplus in the tradition of the organization of production in the 
liberated areas during the armed struggle (Ibid: 226).
In fact, agrarian policy remained still somewhat undefined 
within this period. For example, in February 1976 a Central 
Committee meeting decided that the main emphasis of rural develop­
ment was to be the creation of communal villages which would 
constitute the backbone of development in the countryside. These 
villages were to be based in collective production which would 
provide a surplus for village development (social infrastructure, 
schools, stores and health posts) (Dolny, 1986: 224-5). However, 
in April of the same year, the ministry of agriculture reorganised 
itself, and the most significant shift was the creation of a 
National Directorate for the Organization of Collective Production 
(DINOCPROC) which consisted of two branches: one dealing with 
state farms and consisting of a team of 14 agricultural 
specialists or economists, and one dealing with cooperatives with 
a team of only 3, whose skills were mainly in political organiza­
tion and preparation of propaganda material (Ibid: 225).
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The impact of this crisis of the colonial economy on production 
was considerable. As will be shown in the appendix to chapter 4, 
production in all sectors fell within a range of 25 to 35%. The 
downward trend tapered out in the 1976-77 period as far as in­
dustrial output was concerned, and continued at a lesser rate with 
respect to monetary production in agriculture.
The policy of stabilizing employment while production and
productivity were falling sharply obviously resulted in monetary 
imbalances. The policy to cope with this imbalance was not to rely 
on the price mechanism, but to ration the available supplies
(Wuyts, 1983b; 23).
The breakdown of private trade was countered by setting up 
people’s shops (i.e., state shops) and the formation of consumer 
cooperatives. The former operated on a system of selling out the 
supplies which they received by rationing the quantity each con­
sumer could buy and by organizing sales on a first come, first 
served basis (i.e., the queue). On the part of consumers, this 
system involved quite a substantial process of searching and 
queuing. Not surprisingly therefore was the emergence of more 
complex rationing schemes in the consumer cooperatives. Here,
available supplies would be rationed with respect to family size 
among members and an accounting system based on ration-cards would
I
assure that each member got his or her share. As such, a fair
amount of uncertainty involved in searching and queuing could be 
eliminated, although the various systems experimented involved 
more or lesser bureaucratic problems. All in all, an important 
practice of base level accountancy and control developed within
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these consumer cooperatives, and their system of distribution 
became considerably more superior than the erratic 
searching/queuing system of the people's shops.
In fact, it was on the basis of the experience gained in the 
practice of the cooperatives that it became possible to set up the 
generalized rationing system for the towns at a later date. On the 
other hand, in 1980 retail state shops were privatized due to 
their inefficiency in coping with distribution in a situation of 
goods famine (Machel, 1980: 73-84).
In summary, this period of transition was characterized by an 
intense struggle against economic sabotage. Productive and commer­
cial enterprises were de facto taken over not because the state 
had developed the capacity to run them efficiently, but because 
the state was compelled to intervene. The task of developing the 
capacity to manage these enterprises could not as yet be taken on 
at this juncture.
The most interesting aspect of this period was the process of 
interaction as between party and mass organizations (the G.D.'s) 
in rallying the population within a broad front behind the 
economic policies of the party.
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Transforming Health Care
Colonial Mozambique was a society sharply differentiated along 
racial lines. So, for example, Laurenco Marques was not one, but 
two towns; an affluent cement town and the surrounding 'canico' 
town (i.e., shanty town). With respect to health care, the follow- 
ing quote describes the reality of colonial rule in a nutshell:
"What was the state of health before independence? For the 
majority, who lived in the rural areas, it was poor. Over 
one-quarter of all children died before they reached five 
years of age. Deaths were largely caused by common infectious 
diseases and malnutrition. Health services were almost non­
existent outside the towns. As one health planner noted on 
his first visit to Mozambique, * I remember how surprised I 
was...to see in so under-developed a country— in which some 
70 per cent of the population lived out of reach of modern 
health care— the size and sophistication of the major city 
hospitals’. He went on to point out that in the last year of 
colonial rule, a third of the government’s health budget was 
spent on the capital’s main hospital within physical reach of 
perhaps 6 per cent of the population. The settler community 
living largely in the towns and receiving privileged and 
segregated treatment benefited the most. More than two-thirds 
of the country’s doctors worked in the capital and nearly all 
doctors in civilian practice were in the three main cities
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where not more than 10 per cent of the population lived" 
(Wald, 1983;).
Immediately after independence, health care, education, hous­
ing, legal services as well as land ownership were nationalised. 
These nationalisations were strategic in nature inasmuch as they 
were the expression of a deliberate policy to end with the 
colonial practice in which access to social services as well as to 
landownership was segregated along racial lines, and to reorganize 
their availability on the basis of socialist principles
(Frelimo,1977: ).
Transformation of social services does not end with its
nationalization. Rather, the act of nationalization merely con­
stitutes a starting point which sets the stage for their
transformation. This process of transformation is a protracted 
process which poses questions as to the nature of planning within 
transition. The case of the transformation of health care in 
Mozambique provides a clear illustration of planning as a social 
process. In many ways, the relationship between planning and
social change was much better understood and acted upon within
this sector than in the case of planning production in the economy
at large. As such, the experience of the health sector was not
only important in its own right, but also it provides important 
lessons as to the character of planning in general.
It is the latter aspect which I shall focuss on in this 
section. It is not the purpose of this section therefore to 
present a worked-out analysis of the transformation of health care
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in Mozambique. Up to date, a set of excellent analytical texts 
on this matter already exist, and it is not the purpose here to 
add to it nor to summarise its content (Walt and Melamed, 1983; 
Walt and Wield, 1983; Hanlon, 1984:55-71; Barker, 1985:316-346). 
Rather, the aim of this section is to put forwards a few proposi­
tions about the relationship between planning and social change as 
the emerged out of the experience of the health sector.
Firstly, although the health services were nationalized in 
1975, people initially continued to pay for the services provided 
as had been the case in colonial times. Only some exceptions were 
made for the very poor (Walt and Wield, 1983:25). The
Socialization of Medicine Act in 1977 ended this practice and 
introduced a plan for an integrated service which would be vir­
tually free of charge (Ibid:25). It is this act, and not the mere 
fact of nationalization, which radically altered the character of 
the health services, although nationalization of health care was a 
necessary prerequisite for it.
Secondly, the act made possible the convergence of the demand 
for health care with needs (Thomas, 1974: 250-253), the fact that 
health care is provided free of charge at the point of delivery 
does not imply that it involves no social cost. Services can only 
be provided within the limitations of the available resources. 
Choices will have to be made, and this involves both the defini­
tion of priorities as well as rationing within priorities. Hence, 
intensity of need rather than ability to pay becomes the guiding 
principle in determining access to health care.
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The desease pattern in Mozambique, as is the case for most less 
developed countries, arises principally out of poverty, which 
leads to malnutrition, unsanitory or overcrowded living condi­
tions, pôluted and insufficient water (Walt and Wield, 1983:21). 
Hence the importance of a proper balance between preventive and 
curative health care. The main priorities were therefore twofold: 
the main emphasis of the health services was to be shifted towards 
preventive measures, while basic curative services had to be 
extended to permit wide coverage of the country as a whole, and 
specifically of the rural populations (Ibid:29-32). Within this 
broader framework specific priorities need to be defined and at 
each level principles of rationing need to be laid down. The 
following quote illustrates the question of rationing with respect 
to the provision of medical drugs:
"In Mozambique an early decision was made to control the 
laissez-faire situation that had existed during colonialism 
and immediately after independence and to cut the number of 
products that could be imported from 13,000 to 2,600. This 
was further cut by introducing a new National Formulary (the 
list of essential drugs that doctors in the health service 
may prescribe) with only 640 products, and by only importing 
drugs which were in that formulary. This restriction was 
aimed to save foreign exchange but also to nationalize the 
sector. For example, an antibiotic, ampicillin, can cost 
seven times more for a course of treatment than a similar 
antibiotic (tetracyline) and could be used Just as effec­
tively for many adult infections. Tablets or capsules are
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cheaper to prescribe than injections. Finally, drugs were 
purchased by international tender with more than 200 com­
panies offering to sell drugs to Mozambique. This pushed down 
prices of drugs substantially. Efforts were made to educate 
health workers to use drugs sensibly, to keep costs in mind 
when prescribing" (Walt and Wield, 1983:32).
Thirdly, planning health care is not merely a question of 
laying down priorities and rationing rules on paper, but it 
involves restructuring the social organization of the provision 
and the coverage of such services. Planning is about organizing 
people and involves working with people.
For example, to provide a basic curative service with extensive 
coverage within a context of limited resources involved setting up 
a four-tier system of health care was set up from health post up 
to the sophisticated central hospital. This involved elementary 
care being administered at the lower levels and screening of 
patients from one level to the next. This also involved training 
health workers at the intermediary levels such as the tecnicos and 
the agentes de medicina which involved types of general medical 
assistants who required less training than doctors. At all levels 
preventive as well as curative medicine formed an integral part of 
the training and practice (Walt and Wield:25-27).
Fourthly, and directly related to the previous point, the 
provision of health care is not merely a question of organizing 
the state-run health services only, but rather it involves plan­
ning the interaction as between state and community. Stated
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differently, the state-run health services obviously constitute 
the dynamic force in reorganizing health care, but its succès 
depends on the specific way in which the state sector interacts 
with community organization. Indeed, an important difference 
between preventive health care and curative medicine is that the 
former requires the mobilization of whole communities to be effec­
tive, while the latter normally treats individuals (Walt and 
Wield: 22). In Mozambique, the organization of preventive health
care involved working together with mass organizations such as the 
women's movement, the youth organization, etc (Bell,1983).
Furthermore, to be able to reach down to the village level in 
providing health care, it was necessary to decentralise its opera­
tion outside the state sector by training village health workers. 
The latter were persons above seventeen years of age and with at 
least 4 years of schooling who were given a training of six months 
before returning to their villages. These workers were not paid by 
the health services, and it was left to the village to support its 
own health workers (Walt and Wield, 1983: 27). The latter measure 
was in keeping with the general character of the society which 
consisted of a majority of peasant communities which needed to be 
incorporated within the general process of transformation. This 
policy therefore constituted an strategic element in a policy of 
the socialization of the country side. However, this element of 
transformation can only find root if it is supported by an overall 
process of economic and social transformation within the country 
side.
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The main lesson which could be learned from this experience was 
that, within a context of a predominantly peasant society, the 
process of social change depends to a great extend on the way in 
which the state sector plans its intervention within society so as 
to mobilize those social forces which can carry the success of its 
policies. Therefore, the state sector has to assume a dynamic role 
which can never be exclusively defined within its own boundaries, 
but needs to propel the wider transformation of society.
Finally, the question of the content of health care and of its 
social organization is not merely a technical and administrative 
matter, but is the subject of sharp political struggles. Health 
matters to people, and struggles over health policies will reflect 
the material interests of various groups within society. But 
furthermore, the health service is not a neutral instrument which 
will merely carry out priorities and policies transmitted to it. 
The health services traditionally were organized along strict 
hierarchical lines, and its restructuring will involve struggles 
over content and organization in which political positions are 
often presented as technical matters (Bell,1983). Form and content 
cannot be seperated from one another, and often struggles about 
content would appear as issues of formal organization.
Much of the debate centered around the issue of quality. The 
medical elite, trained in the tradition of sophisticated curative 
care of the colonial hospital, would refer back to the quality of 
such services in colonial times and quote Frelimo's commitment to 
maintain and increase the quality of medicine provided in the 
hospitals (Hanlon, 1984:67). Bitter struggles took place in the
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central hospital over this issue, and major transformations took 
place which involved setting up workers’ councils in wards as well 
as involving greater patients' participation (Cliff,1983).
However, the hospital speech of the President in 1979 stressed the 
need for hierarchy and made no mention of workers' councils and 
hence vested power more firmly back in the medical elite (Hanlon, 
1984:67). Clearly, these struggles were about form and content, 
and not merely about the form in which a given content was to be 
realised.
This debate was not merely specific to the health services. 
Also, within economic development the issue of quality was central 
to the content and form of economic planning. Quality was often 
defined as preserving the productive forces as developed within 
colonialism and therefore led to the concentration of effort on 
the so-called modern sector within the confines of the newly 
emerging state sector. Unfortunately, within economic policy there 
was hardly any equivalent for the shift towards preventive care 
and the widening of coverage within curative care, and as such the 
struggles over health posed issues of real planning much sharper 
and clearer than economic planning would even manage to do.
CHAPTER 4
STATE-CENTERED ACCUMULATION
Introduction
The Third Congress of Frelimo, held in February 1977, laid down 
the strategy for socialist development rooted in a worker-peasant 
alliance. The Congress called for the establishment of centrally 
planned economy based on a strong state sector which was to con­
trol the key sectors of the economy. This state sector was to play 
a dynamic role in transforming the economy as a whole.
In chapter 3 it was argued that the nationalization of the 
health services constituted a prerequisite for their subsequent 
transformation. The struggle for the socialisation of health care 
was a political struggle over the content and the organization of 
planning health services.
In this chapter I shall argue that similar struggles arose with 
respect to economic planning in the period 1977-83. More specifi­
cally, it will be shown that the period was characterised by a 
process of state centered accumulation in which planning both in 
terms of content and in terms of its organization became virtually 
exclusively preoccupied with the quantitative expansion of the
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state sector, and as such failed to address the centrality of the 
agrarian question. The latter argument will be developed further 
in chapter 7.
The question of the content and the organization of planning is 
not merely a technical or administrative issue, but rather the 
terrain of political struggles. Before embarking on the analysis 
of content and organization of economic planning in this period, 
it is necessary to briefly comment on the political processes 
through which such policies were forged.
Saul identifies the main tension within the political 
process as that of the dialectic of leadership and mass action, or 
stated differently, of the vanguard and the people (1985:85). 
Hence, within his analysis Saul points at the tendencies towards 
centralization and bureaucratization of the party as well as the 
counter-veiling forces towards 'mass action' and 'learning from 
the people'. With respect to the latter, Saul points at the broad 
based discussions which proceeded each congress as well as to the 
practice to submit party cadres to popular criticisms. This ten­
sion, according to Saul, was central to the political process in 
Mozambique, and it contained contradictory forces between which a 
unity needed to by established:
"It was precisely this dialectic between leadership and mass 
action which continued to be the core of Mozambican politics 
up to the very moment of Frelimo's Fourth Congress" 
(1985:88).
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"The speech of March 18 (1980) was important, yet it pointed 
in two different directions, directions which were poten­
tially compatible but not automatically so. One lay its 
emphasis on 'iron discipline' and reiteration of a theme 
related to that of the hospital speech; the central impor­
tance of "management", of the 'concentration of power', of 
the clarification of responsibility. As noted, that was 
certainly understandable enough at one level. Yet where were 
the ProductionjCouncils, pushing from below to guarantee the 
commitment to ^evolutionary practices by administrative and 
political 'responsibles'? And when were the party cells in 
facilitating such a push from below? True, Machel did speak 
forcefully of the need to revitalize this other form of the 
leadership— mass action dialectic" (1985:85).
The key concept to articulate this unity was 'popular power' 
and the specific process through which this unity was to be ar­
rived at was a 'dialectic' of criticism and synthesis. The role of 
the party was to construct the synthesis out of a broad based 
process of learning from the people. This synthesis therefore 
represented the 'pensamento comun' (the common viewpoint) which 
would provide the basis for unity in action.
Within this conception the key problem is indeed the tension 
between the leadership and the people as Saul pointed out. 
However, Saul poses a question which he does not really answer 
since he situates his analysis totally within the conceptual
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framework of 'popular power' as a dialectic of criticism and 
synthesis:
"The result? The leadership's 'correct line' on 'popular
power' has not always given rise to vibrant political life at
the base. Perhaps too, we should add--albeit much more 
tentatively— one further consideration: a query regarding the 
degree of 'correctness' of the line itself" (1985:102).
I
But surely, the people are not a homogeneous entity. Rather, 
class forces are at work within the 'people' and the level of 
criticisms brought forward will reflect these class forces and the 
contradictions they imply. Hence, it cannot be merely a question
of arriving at a synthesis through a process of learning from the
people. Nevertheless, this notion of a fundamental synthesis based 
on the people was a key feature of Frelimo's thinking, and 
definitely posed problems as to the place of class analysis within 
political practice.
Indeed, the concept of class struggle often was riddled with 
moral overtones as is clear from the following passage from the 
President's speech at a rally in Maputo:
"On September 25, 1964 we declared war on the foreign enemy—  
Portuguese colonialism. Here today, March 18, 1980, we
declare war on the internal enemy... . It is a battle in the 
class struggle...to open and consolidate the wide road to 
socialism... . Our state is a workers' and peasants' state.
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It is not a state of the useless, the lazy and the
I
reactionary" (as cited by Saul, 1985:84).
The organization of political decision making based on the 
concept of popular power gave the specific process of developing a 
political practice some singularly positive as well as negative 
aspects. First, the repeated reliance on learning from the people 
through a broad based discussion on policy certainly provided an 
important impetus to learn from past mistakes and to correct for 
such errors. Secondly, the notion of a fundamental synthesis to be 
obtained from this process of learning from the people implied 
that party politics did not proceed through open confrontation of 
different positions on strategy and tactics as deduced from dif­
ferent interpretations of the balance of class forces in society. 
Rather, a common platform which objectified the synthesis obtained 
from learning from the people was seen to be the outcome of the 
political process. The result was that such platform often boiled 
down to an addition of parts with lesser attention given to the 
cohesion and interconnectedness of various policies within an 
overall strategy.
Furthermore, due to this notion of the fundamental unity of the 
'people*, class analysis acquired a strong moral flavour inasmuch 
as it often boiled , down to pinpoint areas of action which went 
against this unity. Hence, quite diverging class positions were 
often lumped together as one, and class forces were seldom distin­
guished from the individual actions through which such forces' 
express themselves.
87
Finally, areas of contention which remained within the bound­
aries of the common platform were left vague and provided a 
terrain for further struggles over actual policies. As such, party 
documents lend themselves to quite diverging interpretations 
depending on which element was stressed in a particular context.
The latter point was specifically important in relation to 
economic policy since struggles over content and organization of 
planning were cast in various interpretations of the same basic 
party documents which tended to be vague on these issues precisely 
because they were contentious.
In the next section a brief analysis will be made of the 
strategy as laid down in the Third Congress of Frelimo. In a 
subsequent section , the period 1977-83 will be analysed as a 
period characterized by state centered accumulation. Finally, in 
the last section a brief analysis will be made of the significance 
of the Fourth Congress in defining a new terrain for struggle over 
the content of the transition process.
88
I The Third Congress;
Defining the Strategy of Socialist Transition
The Third Congress defined the strategic lines of the task of
constructing a socialist society and economy as well as. it adopted
a program of immediate tasks to be carried out towards the
realization of this strategy. In this section a brief synthesis
will be made of the major characteristics of this program of
1
socialist development.
The strategy was to be rooted in a worker-peasant alliance. 
Indeed, the congress recognized the uneven development inherent in 
colonial capitalism which implied that a majority of producers in 
the country were small-holder peasant producers. Peasant producers 
jointly with artisans were referred to as the popular sector of 
the economy. The latter element was seen as the dominant element 
within the economy, while the proletariat in industry, transport 
and agriculture was , to constitute the determining force. The
strategy for socialist development needed to embrace both forces
I
as constituent elements of the process of transition (Frelimo, 
1977a; 72-78).
Hence, with respect to the reorganization of the economy the 
strategy entailed both (1) the consolidation and expansion of the 
state sector based on a strong and expanding proletariat as the 
cornerstone of socialist development, and, (2) the transformation 
of the popular sector through the cooperative movement towards
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more socialized forms of production which would allow the trans­
formation of productive forces in this sector. (Frelimo, 1977a: 
118)
The task of the initial popular-democratic phase was to lay the 
foundations of an economy capable to engage on socialist 
transition. The prerequisite for socialist development was seen to 
be the sufficient development of productive forces— laying the 
foundations for heavy industry and raising productivity in 
agriculture through mechanization (Frelimo, 1977b: 18-20).
However, as noted above, this task of developing productive 
forces involved the transformation of the organization of
production. Hence, the key notion was : develop productivity and 
production while transforming the social basis of production. 
Within this process of transformation the state sector was to 
constitute the determining element and was to become dominant 
within production over time. However, the strategy did not imply 
the exclusive concentration on the state sector. Rather, this 
sector was supposed to play a dynamic role in propelling the 
transformation of the popular sector as well.(Frelimo, 1977a: 117- 
118)
In summary, the process was to involve the transformation of 
the economy on a broad front with the state sector spearheading 
the movement of change, both propelling its own development and 
aiding the transformation of the wider popular sector. This way, 
productive forces could be developed throughout the whole of the 
economy.
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As a precondition it was seen necessary that the state sector 
would control the key sectors of the economy: large scale agricul­
ture, major industries, wholesale trade and financial institutions 
(Frelimo, 1977a: 118), Room was left for private initiative in­
sofar as it inserted itself in the overall objectives of this 
process of change (Ibid: 121).
The state would not only be a major producer, but had to assume 
the direction of the economy through the development of planning. 
The overall process of transformation was to be organized by the 
state through central planning and this required the reorganiza­
tion of the economic apparatus of the state (Frelimo, 1977a: 117- 
118).
With respect to the immediate tasks of economic policy, the 
Congress stressed the importance of recuperating production and 
productivity to the 1973 levels. Hence, the immediate task was 
seen to be one of consolidation. However, consolidation while 
transforming. That is, to consolidate productivity, it was neces­
sary to transform the organization of production (Frelimo, 1977b: 
22-32).
In this first phase, agriculture was to be the main source for 
accumulation as a producer of food for the towns and as an export 
earner. Hence, the concentration of effort was to be situated in 
this sector. Industry was to recuperate the production levels of 
1973 and to concentrate on the production of basic necessities.
I
Hence, industries geared toward the production of luxuries were to 
be restructured if possible. Only at a subsequent stage would 
investment be centered on the development of the foundations of
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heavy industry, the development of which was seen as the fundamen­
tal condition for raising long term productivity (Frelimo, 1977b: 
20-21).
In fact, the basic notion that productivity and production 
could only be recuperated and further developed within a process 
of transforming production on the broadest front constituted a key 
and powerful elanent of the overall strategic vision of the 
congress. Consolidate while transforming and transforming while 
consolidation productivity and production requires to formulate a 
strategy within a concrete context shaped by the inherited or­
ganization of the colonial economy.
However, the Congress documents were not without vagueness with 
respect to the concretization of this strategy. This was specifi­
cally the case with respect to rural development. There was a 
marked difference in emphasis as between the "Report of the 
Central Committee to the Third Congress" on the one hand, and the 
"Social and Economic Directives" on the other, although both 
constituted basic documents of the Congress.
The Report stressed the central importance of the peasantry as 
the fundamental ally of the working class. It refered to the role 
that the peasantry played in the struggle for liberation. And it 
concluded that the strategy of the construction of communal vil­
lages based on collective production was to constitute the 
cornerstone of the socialisation of the countryside (Frelimo, 
1977a: 74-75). In its discussion of the development strategy
further on in the report, this emphasis is repeated in the opening 
paragraphs:
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"Our development strategy is rooted in agricultural 
production. The Communal villages are the fundamental 
instruments for the liberation of people in the 
countryside" (Ibid: 117; my translation)
The Report then continues to stress the importance of a planned 
economy and the role of the state sector as the dominant and 
determining force of development. This is followed however by the 
Statement that ;
"The cooperative sector, the other basic form of col­
lective production, has to be actively supported by 
the Party and the state" (Ibid: 118; my translation). ' 
-gOQlal and Economic Directives the opening paragraphs of 
the section on general directives quickly lead up to the following 
statement :
" The construction of the material basis for the passage 
to socialism is a long and difficult process which 
requires the planning of the development of productive 
forces, within a popular perspective" (Frelimo, 1977b: 
19; my translation and underlining).
With respect to the social organization in which this policy is 
to be situated, the Directives subsequently stress the development 
of the state sector as the determining aspect, the development of 
a planned economy, the development of the cooperative movement , 
and the construction of the communal villages (in that order)as 
the elements of the overall strategy.
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However, in discussing the immediate tasks up to the Fourth 
Congress, the Directives squarely put the emphasis on the develop­
ment of the state sector and of state planning (Ibid: 24-28). With 
respect to the development of the cooperatives and of the communal 
villages, the following passage reveals some of the conceptions as 
to how the Directives envisaged their development:
"It is the task of the Party to mobilize and organise 
the population in the formation of collective mashambas 
which constitute the basis for production cooperatives 
which will permit the consolidation of the communal 
villages.
It is the task of the State to plan at the national 
level the movement of the formation of communal vil­
lages and, to the extend of its possibilities, to 
provide technical aid to the organization of collective 
production and the construction of the communal
villages"
In the development of communal villages it is essential 
to apply the principle that the people rely on their 
own resources" (Ibid: 29; my translation and
underlining).
This emphasis is further confirmed inasmuch as the elabora­
tion of specific tasks for the rural sector is concerned virtually
exclusively with the state sector (Ibid: 32-48).
Clearly, the differences between both documents are not so much 
a question of sharply diverging contents, but rather differences 
in emphasis within a broader content. Yet, this left a terrain for 
struggle as to the concrétisation of this content.
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Finally, a remarkable feature of both documents was that within 
the discussion of the development strategy no reference is made at 
all to the character of the peasantry with respect to its integra­
tion within production. The extend of the prolétarisation of the 
peasantry, its dependence on migrant labour abroad and within the 
domestic economy, and its patterns of differentiation within 
commodity production are not in any way analysed with respect to 
its implications for the development strategy. Yet, the state 
sector which was to emerge on the basis of plantations and of 
settler farms was still based on seasonal labour from the 
peasantry, and any strategy of transforming peasant agriculture 
would need to come to terms with its dependence on wage labour and
p
its patterns of differentiation.
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State-Centered Planning
In the immediate aftermath of the Third Congress of Frelimo, 
economic policy concentrated on the task of building up the in­
stitutional apparatus for state planning and for establishing the 
control by the State over the key sectors of the economy.
With respect to the latter task, in 1977 and 1978 the key 
sectors of the economy in agriculture, industry, commerce, 
transport and finance were brought under the direct control of the 
state and formally constituted as state enterprises. In many 
cases, the process merely involved the formal set-up of state 
enterprises on the basis of the reorganization of colonial en­
terprises which had been intervened already in the period 
immediately following independence (Hanlon, 1984: 75-75). In some 
other cases, like the banks, the petrol refinery and a few others, 
the process involved the actual nationalization of the sector. The 
formal structure of state enterprises was laid down in a decree of 
April 1977, and at a later stage finalized in the law on state 
enterprises of September 1981 (Wuyts, 1983b: 34-35). Under this 
law, state enterprises were to produce in accordance with the 
targets laid down in the material plan, as well as to contribute 
surplusses to the state budget. In principle, all financial 
surplusses were to be transferred to the state budget. Fulfillment 
of targets was made obligatory by law, and exchange relationships 
between state enterprises were to be laid down in formal contracts
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so as to be able to check on accountability for plan fulfillment
(Ibid: 35).3
As to the institutional set-up for state planning, the 1977-78 
period was characterized by the formation of the National Planning 
Commission (NPC) to which all economic ministries were subor­
dinated and which was responsible for planning. Economic 
ministries were to be responsible for the state enterprises within 
their sector of economic activity (Ibid: 30).
The state budget became the principal instrument of financial 
planning and was to be restructured accordingly. Its income was
: A
Streamlined through the introduction of a direct income tax along 
a single progressive scale and of a turnover tax (Ibid: 27). 
Furthermore, the reorganization of the banking system turned the 
banks into controllers of the execution of the plan as well as 
into financiers of the state budget and of state enterprises. As 
will be shown in chapter 6, credit provision became essentially 
endogenous with respect to the requirements of the state sector.
Along with this process of institutional change came a shift in 
focus from a policy of merely keeping production going as well as 
was possible considering the circumstances of the immediate post 
independence period, to a policy of consolidating productivity 
within new forms of production. To this effect, production 
councils were set up in all enterprises and their principal tasks 
were defined as striving for higher productivity, transforming the 
organization of production and maintaining workers discipline 
(Frelimo, 1977a: 71-72). In industry and transport, these councils
97
became the focus of struggle with respect to the task of reor-
I4
ganizing production. In agriculture, their role was much less 
pronounced since most state enterprises continued to rely on 
seasonal labour and did little to organize this labour within the 
enterprise (Hanlon, 1984: 102).
Consolidating productivity requires both the reorganization of 
the labour process and supporting investments in material means of 
production. Indeed, the immediate aftermath of Independence had 
witnessed a sharp reduction in the stock of capital goods (due to 
sabotage or to illegal exports), and hence the recovery of produc­
tion would need to be backed up by investments geared towards 
recuperating the existing productive capacities. However, the 
concentration on the state sector and the untransformed nature of 
that sector made that often solutions to problems of production 
and of productivity were sought in expanding investment, and 
therefore, in expanding the scale of the problem.
Hence, the effort came to concentrate on the expansion of fixed 
capital, and therefore the nature of the process of consolidation 
basically became a leap into expansion of the state sector. Low 
productivity/high cost conditions in the state sector were seen as 
problems of learning to manage, and hence only needed time to work 
themselves out into higher productivity.
Therefore, transformation basically came to be seen as a ques­
tion of investment in fixed capital within the state sector. The 
development of the planning process reinforced this tendency since
planning became state sector centered on the one hand and con­
centrated on accumulation (in this sense of the expansion of fixed 
capital formation) on the other.
Hence, investments were stepped up steeply, as shown in table 
4.1.
Table 4.1 Actual Public Investment 1979-82 
(millions of meticais— current prices)
1978 and 79 1980 1981 1982
Total investment 8,010 9,916 13,962 14,255
GDP -- 66,200 70,400 73,000
Investment/GDP (%) 15 20 20
Source: NPC, 1984
Although this table demonstrates the steep ascent of invest­
ment, the actual pressure exerted by this investment drive on the 
economy cannot fully be captured by these figures. Indeed, in­
variably, planned investment was far in excess of actual
investment. So, for example, for the year 1980, actual public
investment only amounted to about two-thirds of the planned level. 
Often, the reason was that no foreign finance could be found for 
investment projects, but in other cases the discrepancy was due to 
the fact that the plan overestimated the rate at which investments 
could be carried out. The actual gestation periods were longer 
than projected, frequent standstills would inflate costs and 
freeze the process, etc., and therefore, the weight of the rate of
investment on the economy was in actual fact much higher.
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The sectoral allocation of investment is shown in table 4.2:
Table 4.2 Sectoral Allocation of Investment 1978-83 
(millions of meticias)
1978 and 79 1980 1981 1982 1983
Economic sectors 7,290 8,027 11 ,827 12,291 8,803
1. Agriculture 1,095 2,271 4,181 4,826 2,560
2. Industry and energy 561 1,227 3,349 3,493 2,769
3. Transport and
communications 177 155 345 468 1,012
4. Construction 5,457 3,346 3,270 2,424 1,969
5. Other 1,028 682 1,080 484
Social sectors 188 567 458 401 219
State administration 311 660 753 184 179
Local investment 24 127 312 463 306
Other (including military) 197 535 612 91 6 690
Source: NPC, 1984
If we take account of the fact that construction includes a 
range of Infrastructural projects directed to agriculture 
(irrigation projects, dams, etc.), we can see from the table that 
agriculture was a major area for investments.
In the period 1977 to 1981, the state sector grew rapidly. 
Within agriculture, the state sector came to account for about 50% 
of total monetary output, although this estimate may have been an 
overestimate. Table 4.3 shows the share of state sector production
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in marketed output for selected crops.
Table 4.3 The Composition of Marketed Output 
With respect to Various Forms of Production (%)
Private
1 970 
Peasant State
1980
Private Peasant
Total 69 31 52 1 0 38
Cotton 35 65 45 10 45
Sugar 100 — 85 15 —
Cashew 10 90 -- — 1 00
Tea 100 90 1 0 —
Sisal 100 —— 30 70 - -
Copra 80 20 20 40 40
Rice 60 40 80 — 20
Tobacco 80 20 55 40 5
Sour ce : Hanlon, 1984:1 00
The emphasis was on expansion, rather than consolidation, and 
with respect to the latter, problems of productivity were mainly 
dealt with through relying on increased mechanization. By 1978 
100,000 hectares had been put under state farm cultivation and 
this expanded to 140,000 hectares by 1982. Investment in agricul­
ture basically meant investment in the state sector: more than 90/6 
of agricultural investment went to this sector as against 2% for 
cooperatives and family agriculture received nil (Frelimo, 
1985a:27-28).
So, for example, in the four years after the congress 3,000 trac­
tors and 300 combine harvesters were imported along with other
1 01
agricultural machinery. To a large extent, this importation merely 
offset the depletion of stock due to wear and tear and as a result 
of sabotage, although the degree of mechanization was definitely 
stepped up. However, during this period no hoes were imported and 
production of hoes had fallen by more than half. (Hanlon, 
1984:100).
The development of the state farm sector on abandoned settler 
land also sharpened the land question. Indeed, as shown in chapter 
2, the development of settler agriculture had led to the eviction 
of the peasantry fran their land and the privatisation of this 
land under settler ownership. In many cases this process had taken 
place in the latter days of colonialism. The state farm sector 
emerged by nationalising this land which had only recently been 
privatised. As such, the state farm sector entered in direct 
competition with the peasantry over land, and threatened to do so 
in its further expansion.
The land issue became most sharply posed in the case of the 
Limpopo Valley. After the floods of early 1977, a special commis­
sion was set up to implement the decisions of the Third Congress. 
As a result, the population was resettled in communal villages on 
the high lands, and state farms and cooperatives had priority 
access to the colonato lands. All land which was considered to be 
suboptimally used could be transfered to the state farm sector or 
to the cooperatives, and even those peasants who cultivated their 
land in an acceptable way could face eviction from their plots if 
these were needed for the expansion of state farms or cooperatives 
(Hermele, 1985: 10-11).
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In June 1979, further measures were issued concerning the ex- 
colonos of the colonato and peasants on probation:
" the following categories lost their fields : peasants 
who did not cultivate their land, or who cultivated 
less than 1 ha, peasants in debt to the state, ir­
respective of the amount, peasants whose debt were 
unknown because they have not declared their produc­
tion, peasants who do not live exclusively from 
agriculture, peasants who are outside the district 
even if their wives cultivated the lands, workers or 
even former workers at CAIL or at any of the produc­
tion cooperatives;
peasants who cultivated only part of their farm get 
their farms reduced to the area cultivated (if it is 
more than 1 ha)
farms must not be inherited" (Ibid: 11-12; my
underlining).
Apart from the rather drastic measures this policy entailed, 
the above quotation shows very clearly the complete lack of under­
standing on the part of the 'planners' of the character of the 
peasantry in Southern Mozambique. The combination of wage work 
(especially mine labour) with family agriculture was fundamental 
to the subsistence of this peasantry.
Furthermore, as shown in a CEA case study of the Lower Limpopo 
(1979), the practice of a predominant monoculture of rice growing 
implied that the pattern of seasonality in recruitment had been 
accentuated: most seasonal workers only worked for two to three
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months on the state farms. As a result, while the state farm 
sector became dominant in terms of area and in terms of produc­
tion, it did not do so in terms of assuring a sufficient 
livelyhood for the majority of population in the area: the com­
munal villages had de facto become labour reserves for the state 
farms.
In the other sectors of the economy, the state sector also 
became dominant: 65$ of total output in industry, 85$ in transport 
and communications, 90$ in construction and 40$ in commerce 
(Frelimo, 1983a:33/37/39/42).
As stated, the planning mechanism reinforced this tendency to 
concentrate on the state sector and on investments. Initially, the 
planning framework was still more a question of coordination, 
rather than strict guidance of the allocation of resources. Plans 
were made by coordinating sectoral plans coming from different 
ministries. Foreign exchange was not as yet a binding constraint 
which would require more centralization of the allocation of 
material resources. At this juncture, the planning process did 
involve quite considerable involvement from direct producers 
(especially in industry and transports) since plans were discussed 
at factory level meetings of production councils (Wuyts, 
1983b:part 2.2).
The actual practice of central planning through material 
balances became operative in 1979 in preparation of the plan for 
1980. This was the first plan aimed at directly allocating 
resources to sectors and specifying targets to each sector and 
enterprise. Annual plans became obligatory by law, and their
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specific aims and targets were to be set within the context of the 
long term (10 year) indicative perspective plan which would con­
tain the strategic options (Hanlon, 1984: 82-85).
The year 1979 is therefore of particular interest to understand 
the terms in which the role of planning was seen in relation to 
the economy. The perspective plan was to lay down the concrete 
investment strategy to realize the aims set by the Third Congress. 
In a major policy statement by the president, an analysis was made 
of the situation already attained and of the organization and 
content of the planning system. Two aspects of this statement are 
of importance with respect to the content of planning. First, the 
issue of the balance between big and small projects, and secondly,
I
the question as to how accumulation was to be financed (Machel, 
1979).
The question of the balance between big and small projects 
concerned the question as to the balance between the development 
of the state sector and the popular/private sectors. Big projects 
were the preserve of the state sector and consisted of large
infrastructural investments as well as large scale investments in 
industry and agriculture (Machel, 1979; 23-26). These projects 
were mostly defined as investment projects and in the case of
agriculture little or no reference was made as to the specific
forms through which these investments in state farms and planta­
tions were to restructure the patterns of labour use within this 
sector (Ibid: 23-24). Mostly, the state sector continued to rely
on seasonal labour power supplied by the peasantry as the
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principal source for its consolidation and its expansion (CEA, 
1979b; 1980b; 198lc; 1982b; 1983b).
In fact, the specific use of the term big projects already 
indicated that the principal function of the state sector was to 
develop productive forces for subsequent socialist transition. 
Hence the emphasis on investment as the motor of change within the 
state sector.
While big projects refered to investments to expand the 
nationalised sectors of the economy, the concept of small projects 
was left much vaguer.
At one level, small projects were defined as the solution 
towards the transformation of peasant agriculture through the 
cooperative movement (Machel, 1979; 22-23). In many ways this
process was seen to be mainly a question of transforming produc­
tion relations through the mobilization and organization of the 
peasantry within the cooperative movement and the communal vil­
lages (Dolny, 1985; 225-226). Small therefore cannot but refer to 
the dimension of state effort both in terms of material resources 
and in terms of organizing state cadres behind this effort, since 
the supposed dimension of this process of cooperativisation was by 
no means small on any count.
At another level, the question of small projects seemed to 
refer to supporting family agriculture (and not necessarely its 
transformation) as well as small-scale private enterprises 
(Machel, 1980: 104-105).
Although the importance of furthering the development of ’small 
projects’ was repeatedly stressed, the actual development laid the
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emphasis squarely on the state sector. Clearly, this reflected 
political struggles as to the content of planning, and it involved 
the dismissal of the minister of agriculture during the 4th ses­
sion of the Central Committee in 1978 for neglecting family 
agriculture and the cooperative movement. However, the basic 
pattern of state centered accumulation intensified over the whole 
period of 1977-83.
In fact, the real weakness of a strategy of balanced develop­
ment as between small and big projects was that it is rooted in a 
conception of a dual economy: a modern sector which Aas to become 
the state sector and the traditional sector which was to transform 
principally on its own steam through the mobilization and or­
ganization of the peasantry. The strategy was therefore perceived 
as additive rather than being interdependent.
As a result, the question of balance between both parts was 
subject to interpretation with respect to its sequencing in time. 
Hanlon argues that the Third Congress saw state farms as the 
quickest way to carry out socialist transformation, and hence the 
emphasis within the short term was to be placed on this sector 
(1984: 119; Frelimo, 1977a: 125). The implicit assumption of this 
view is that the popular sector can manage on its own in the short 
term, and that the development of the state farm sector is somehow 
unrelated to this sector.
In chapter 2, I have argued that the colonial rural economy was 
by no means a dual economy, but rather that capitalist development 
in the country as well as within the wider region was based on the 
exploitation of the peasantry. The peasantry was deeply integrated
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in the monetary economy and depended on wage labour for its 
subsistence. It was also substantially a differentiated peasantry. 
O’Laughlin argued that the question of the development of the 
state sector and of the cooperative movement needed to be ad­
dressed simultaneously, and not sequencially due to the nature of 
this interdependence (1981 : 9-32)
In fact, the development of the state sector in agriculture 
would require that the system of migrant labour on which it is 
based is restructured through the complete proletarization of part 
of the peasantry and the emancipation of family agriculture from 
its subordinate position through the cooperative movement (Ibid: 
13-17).
Moreover, as will be argued in the next chapter, the Mozambican 
peasantry was heavily dependent on wage income from migrant labour 
to the region, and the post independence situation quickly changed 
from one of labour shortage to one of rural unemployment. This 
eroded the basis of peasant agriculture and would require an 
organized response which the state failed to produce. In this 
respect, the planning practice thread in the shoes of colonial 
planning inasmuch as it started from the assumption that the 
peasantry could survive on its own steam. Failure to analyse the 
patterns of labour utilization of the rural econcxny lay at the 
basis of this lack of comprehension that the survival of the 
peasantry was dependent on its integration within the monetary 
economy.
A second issue which arose in this policy statement of the 
President was the incompatibility as between material planning and
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financial planning. This was not merely a technical point, but 
rather one of crucial importance (Machel, 1979; 8)1.
What then was the conception as to how accumulation should be 
financed? First, foreign borrowing was seen to be a major com­
ponent of investment finance on grounds that the future expansion 
of the state sector would pay-back the costs incurred in the 
investment (Hanlon, 1984: 84-85). Secondly, the internal source to 
finance investment was seen to be the issue of ’tightening the 
belt’: i.e., to reduce consumption to be able to finance a growing 
volume of investment.
Strangely enough, to consolidate and to recuperate the existing 
capacity of production so as to raise productivity and to set free 
a larger accumulation fund springing from production was hardly 
considered as an option worth considering. This was indeed 
surprising inasmuch as this was the specific tactics laid down in 
the Third Congress: to consolidate and recuperate production to 
1973 levels by 1980 and subsequently to engage in a broader 
process of accumulation. In fact, the issue of the need to
recuperate production by 1980 became blurred within the drive
i
towards expansion, and little attention was paid in 1980 whether 
the targets had been reached;
ÀS such, development came to be seen as an issue of an ac-
. 1'
cumulation drive,; in which accumulation was in many ways viewed as 
delinked from thL actual organization of production. That is, the 
future expansion of production was seen to bear little relation­
ship to the prepent organization of production. Rather, the link 
with the present was the sacrifice which needed to be made in
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terms of consumption. This view was definitely dominant within the 
NPC, but not only there. In a pamphlet issued by the ideological 
department of the Party the need for big projects was expressed as 
follows:
"[Such projects] involve the expenditure of enormous sums by 
the State, sums which could have been used instead to pur­
chase rice— we have a shortage of rice— sugar, milk powder, 
meat, etc. But here there is a question of choice. If we buy 
these products which we need (it's true, we need them), then 
the money we spend is merely used up and is not going to be 
productive.
If, on the contrary, we make a sacrifice in this phase, 
such that instead of buying rice, meat, fish, flower, we use 
that money for the construction of factories, then four or 
five years down the road the sacrifice we're making today is 
going to permit the production of all the material goods that 
we have mentioned. We think that to escape from poverty and 
underdevelopment, such sacrifice is necessary" (as cited in 
Saul, 1985:108).
The incompatibility between national planning and financial 
planning was a reflection of how this accumulation drive was to be 
paid for. Formally, the financial plan was balanced through the 
credits obtained from the banks to finance the budget. Money 
creation paid the surplus of investment over savings (net of 
foreign loans). However, this begs the question as to the real
no
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counterpart of this money creation in order to finance 
accumulation. In chapters 6 and 7 the argument will be put forward 
that this policy of exacting a sacrifice in terms of consumption 
by financing a high rate of accumulation through money creation 
had not only adverse distributional implications, but also it 
seriously hampered the process of transforming production within 
socialist transition.
Turning now to the question of planning and the organization of 
the economy. In the above mentioned policy statement of 1979, the 
president stressed the importance of the concentration of power in
I
economic management (Machel, 1979: 12-14). The plan required the 
subordination of each enterprise and of each sector to the overall 
requirements of economic development as coordinated by the plan. 
This required clear cut definition of tasks, the allocation of 
responsibilities and accountability. A series of measures were 
introduced to allow for a better organization in planning.
Firstly, there was the question of 'authority'. One-person 
leadership became operative at all levels of the decision-making 
process. The director was responsible for the decisions made, 
although it was required that such decisions were discussed with 
workers within the enterprise.
However, the basic issue was not merely that of fudging 
responsibilities. Often, important struggles took place with 
respect to the content of new relations of production at the level 
of the workplace. The issue often came to the fore as a question 
of "lack of directing power". In a way, this is normal since the 
revolutionary process has weakened the old forms of organizing
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labour without as yet developing alternative ones. This reflects 
itself in problems of productivity and workers' discipline, which 
then become expressed as a question of lack of authority on the 
part of management (CEA, 1982c).
A tension therefore develops as between attempts to restore the 
conditions of productivity and of profitability on the basis of 
the old forms of organizing production, and the opposed tendency 
to encounter new forms of raising productivity by reorganizing the 
labour process along new lines (Ibid > CEA, 1983b >0'Laughlin, 
1981 : 15-17>).
This process is of key importance not only because of its 
political context, but also because it relates.directly to the 
issue of accumulation and productivity. Indeed, the state sector 
emerged within a situation of high cost/low productivity condi­
tions, often accentuated by very low levels of capacity 
utilization. An important source of increased consumption and of 
accumulation therefore has to be found in the better utilization 
of existing productive capacity^. The latter indeed guarantees not 
only increased production, but also reduced unit costs of 
production.
Within agriculture, this issue was of critical importance in 
order to understand the problem of low productivity in the state 
farm sector. Low productivity in this sector was often ascribed to 
the irregularity in the labour supply which provoked shortages at 
critical moments in the agricultural season. This was seen to be 
due to the lack of discipline and the low 'consciousness' of
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seasonal workers because of their inherent peasant mentality (CEA,
1983b). However, as O’Laughlin argued:
" Take for example the problem of the shortage of labour
on the state farms. It is not a question of a general
shortage, but a problem of seasonal recruitment: to
pick the cotton, to harvest rice, or to cut the cane.
Several tea plantations have in fact more workers than
is necessary during those periods in which activity is
at its lowest ebb, and experience shortages of labour
during those months that labour is most needed because
this period also coincides with the peak season in
family agriculture. This is not a question of a
generalised withdrawal of wage labour, but a
withdrawal of seasonal labour to the extend that it
enters in conflict with production in family
agriculture. In colonial times, this withdrawal of
labour was avoided because of the different forms of
//
relying on forced labour (1981: 15).
De facto, the state farm sector assumed that the supply of
seasonal labour power was somehow infinitely elastic, and failed
to take account of the fact that these peasant-workers were
heavily dependent on their base in family agriculture to secure
their subsistence since short contract were not sufficient to
provide the necessary income for the family. This dependence on 
family agriculture was further accentuated by the tendency of
state farms to accentuate monocropping (CEA, 1979b; CEA 1980b; 
CEA, 1983b).
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As a result of these periodic labour shortages, the answer was 
often sought in increased mécanisation of production, rather than 
in transforming the pattern of labour utilization (O’Laughlin, 
1981: 15-16; CEA, 1983b). In fact, in sane case recourse was taken 
to obliging the peasantry to provide the necessary labour power 
for the critical periods of the agricultural season (Hermele, 
1986: 16).
This issue was also sharply raised in a different context at a 
round table discussion of political and managerial cadres of the 
ports and railways cooperations^. Here, it was observed that the 
issue of organization was directly linked with that of investment, 
and if that link got lost, investment often ended up by covering 
up for lack of organization. As such, investment may increase 
production, but does so only under low productivity conditions. 
Implicit in this argument was the whole issue of reorganizing 
production as a condition for raising productivity and for expan­
sion of production through investments which strengthen 
productivity. Again, also within this debate, the issue whether 
organization was merely a question of ’authority’ or whether it 
constituted a much more broader issue was central to the dis­
cussion. However, the investment drive inherent within the 
planning set-up often ditched this fundamental question, and 
sought the answer to production in investment (CEA, 1982c).
Secondly, as the plan became obligatory by law in its execu­
tion, accountability required that all exchanges between 
enterprises became regulated through formal contracts. As such, it 
was hoped that enterprises could no longer escape responsibilities
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in deliveries of goods and services by claiming that necessary raw 
materials, etc., had not been furnished. The contract systen 
allowed for a clearer definition of responsibilities and furnished 
the basis for greater accountability within the state sector 
(Wuyts, 1983b).
Thirdly, the political and organizational offensive of March 
1980 called for the privatization of retail trade as well as of a 
multitude of small scale activities such as hotels, restaurants, 
and small scale artisan and industrial activities (Machel, 1980: 
91-120).
The rationale behind this measure was that the State would be 
able to concentrate its efforts on the key sectors of the economy 
and would no longer be burdened with a dispersal of effort into a 
multitude of activities:
"The state has to preoccupy itself with the direction of 
the economy, with the realization of the big projects" 
(Machel, 1980: 103)
Within this same speech, the importance of private enterprise was 
stressed with respect to undertaken these small-scale activities 
(ibid: 102).
Therefore, along with a conception of concentrating resources 
on the state sector, there was also a strong notion of centraliza­
tion of state activity on big projects.
The privatization of retail trade and small scale productive 
activity was not seen to be an investment question. It appears as 
if the underlying notion as between the balance between state and
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private/popular sectors was to be dynamically determined by the 
accelerated growth of the state sector.
One exception can be made with respect to investment policy 
and the public/private sector balance. Joint ventures with foreign 
capital as well as some larger scale private investments were seen
to be important for development inasmuch as they could by in­
tegrated within the plan (Hanlon, 1984: 77). In agriculture,
large-scale private farmers could obtain additional resources and 
credit insofar as they were willing to integrate their production
within the plan (CEA, 1983a: 63-72).
In summary, the 1977-83 period was characterized by the expan­
sion of the state sector and the operation of a central planning 
system which concentrated and centralized resources into the 
development of the state sector. The solution to low productivity 
was not seen to be a question of consolidation and transformation 
of the existing organization of production, but rather a question 
of investment into building up a strong state sector. The result­
ing investment drive far exceeded the surplus generated in the 
government budget and the gap was to be financed by borrowing 
against the future growth of the.state sector and by ’tightening 
the belt’, i.e., reducing consumption. The specific mechanism 
through which this ’sacrifice’ was imposed on the economy was 
money creation without a corresponding material backing within the 
state sector. The consequences of this type of forcing the pace of 
development will be analyzed further in chapters 6 and 7.
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The Fourth Congress: Revision of Economic Policy
The Fourth Congress took place at a time of severe economic 
crisis. The escalation of the war waged by South Africa against 
Mozambique combined with the drought which swept the country in 
1982-83 had led to severe famine and hardship within the country. 
As will be shown in the next chapter, foreign exchange reserves 
had run out and imports had to be cut drastically at a time that 
financing the war was of paramount importance. As shown in the 
appendix, production fell dramatically in this period.
The congress, as well as the preparatory discussions which led 
up to it, was characterized by wide ranging and sharp criticisms 
against the economic policy pursued by the party after the Third 
Congress. More specifically, the neglect of family agriculture and 
of the cooperative sector, the question of the place of private 
enterprise in economic development and the over concentration on 
the state sector were raised as major problems. The preoccupation 
of the planning system with big projects, and the consequent 
neglect of the role of small projects in sustaining and expanding 
the production of basic necessities was raised as a major issue. 
The focus on mechanization and the neglect of the centrality of 
the producer within the process of production was another way in 
which the problem was brought forward (Frelimo, 1983a; 1983b).
As a result, the economic policy of the party was drastically 
altered. The state sector would need to consolidate itself before 
it could engage in any further expansion. Family agriculture as
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well as the cooperatives were to be supported in terms of material 
resources. The role of private enterprises was to be realized and 
inserted into the development effort. Small projects geared 
towards the production for the immediate needs of the people were 
to be promoted vigorously.
In the interpretation of J. Saul the fourth congress heralded a 
victory for what he called "the socialist reproductionists" over 
the 'primitive accumulationists'. According to him, the former 
position entails that accumulation and mass consumption are being 
seen as less contradictory than the 'sacrifice' theory would have 
it:
"far from being opposites, one of them— accumulation— can be 
driven forward precisely by finding outlets for production in 
meeting the growing requirements, the needs, of the mass of 
the population. An effective industrialization strategy would 
thus base its 'expanded reproduction' on ever increasing 
exchanges between city and country, between industry and 
agriculture, with consumer goods and producer goods...moving 
to the countryside. Collective saving geared to investment 
can then be seen as being drawn essentially, if not ex­
clusively, from an expanding economic pool" (1985:21).
This somewhat confused statement could probably be restated as 
follows. It appears that Saul understands a process of expanded 
socialist reproduction as one in which a proper balance is main­
tained between accumulation and the growth in the supply of
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necessities, since accumulation implies consumption through the 
expansion of the wage component within the growth process. 
Furthermore, underlying Saul’s conception is a notion of maintain­
ing a proper balance between sectors within the process of growth. 
The confusing element is that he projects this as a source for 
accumulation rather than a condition imposed on the process of 
accumulation. It might constitute a condition to increase the 
accumulation fund insofar as it induces a better utilization of 
existing productive forces (through its consolidation within 
transformed productive relations), but this is not explicitly 
stated.
To return to Saul’s interpretation of the Fourth Congress, the 
importance of the congress is seen to be a reappraisal of policy 
within the boundaries of socialist development. The crucial point 
to him was that the congress moved decisively towards a policy 
which would reaffirm the alliance with the peasantry as a fun­
damental condition of socialist development. As such, the agrarian 
question was put on the center of the stage:
"For under very real pressure from the peasantry itself the 
party was also inching its way towards a greater acceptance 
of the ’economics of expanded socialist reproduction’ as key 
to defining other aspects of the industrial mix, in par­
ticular the balance between heavy industrial and 
infrastructural development on the one hand and consumer 
goods industries on the other.
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...These emphasis bore the promise— other things being 
equal--of closing crucial gaps in Frelimo's post-independence 
economic policies. Moreover, this was a premise which built 
upon historic precedent: the precedent of Frelimo’s close
links with the peasantry, links which had premises in the 
movement’s victory in the guerrilla war. For anyone in atten­
dance at the Fourth Congress it was hard to escape the 
feeling that a fundamental aspect of Frelimo’s practice was 
reasserting itself" (Saul, 1985:112-113).
Up to a point this was indeed the case, but the salient feature 
of this argument as well as of the congress was that no analysis 
is made of the class forces at work in the rural area. The 
peasantry appears as a homogeneous mass firmly behind a socialist 
policy. However, the peasantry was far from being homogeneous and 
this in part as a result of the economic policy pursued by the 
state.
Indeed, in chapter 7 I shall argue that the process of state 
centered accumulation did not remain neutral with respect to the 
dynamics of social change within the countryside. The state sector 
did not provide an answer to the deepening crisis within the 
peasant economy since its pattern of priorities and rationing in 
allocation of resources created chronic commodity shortages within 
the rural economy. The result was not inaction, but the inten­
sification of the processes of differentiation of the peasantry 
through the operation of the parallel economy. The interests of 
the rich peasantry and of the larger private farmers were quite
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different than those of the poor peasantry whose standard of 
living was eroded by the operation of the parallel economy.
Hence, although the fourth congress asserted that the agrarian 
question was the central question confronting Mozambique at that 
time, the balance of class forces was never subjected to an 
analysis which could aid in formulating a socialist strategy. 
Thus, the fundamental issue of the class character of rural 
development was left vague and this defined a terrain for further 
struggle after the congress. Here, the policy of raising produc­
tion as speedily as possible so as to find a way out of the crisis 
quickly strengthened the demand for deregulation and greater 
reliance on private initiative and hence propelled the process of 
differentiation further under the general policy of supporting the 
’peasantry' and assigning a greater role for private initiative 
(Hanlon, 1984: 119-120).
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Footnotes
1. The documents which laid down the strategy and tactics of 
socialist development are to be found in Frelimo, 1977a and 1977b.
2. See O’Laughlin, 1982.
3. The institutional set-up of planning is analyzed in more 
detail in Wuyts, 1983b. This analysis was based on interviews as 
well as on the budget and other financial laws.
4. See, for example, Sketchley, 1985:253-278.
5. See, for example, Hanlon, 1984:82-85. Hanlon underestimates 
the importance of the perspective plan in shaping the actual 
planning practice.
6. Round Table discussion of the Railways Cooperative April/June, 
1981.
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Appendix;
A Statistical Note on the Trends of Economic Development
In the context of Mozambique, the analysis of basic trends in 
macro-economic aggregates is by no means an easy task, and this 
for three reasons. First, few data are available and often it is 
difficult to link them up in a meaningful pattern over time. 
Secondly, the categories of macro aggregates do not correspond to 
those which are more commonly used and which are basically derived 
from Keynesian economic analysis. Finally, it is necessary to have 
some idea of the relative accuracy of the systems of date collec­
tion upon which the macro series are based in order to draw any 
conclusions with some confidence as to their exactness.
For these reasons I shall briefly discuss the data which exist 
and analyze them so as to turn inferences made from them more 
explicit. By doing so I hope to avoid the all too common error 
which exists in drawing inferences from data which have not been 
subjected to any analysis as to their sources in data collection, 
their precise meaning and to the conceptual framework used in 
aggregation.
The Evolution of Aggregate Output
No consistent series of data exists for the period 1973 to 1983 
with respect to evolution of production and of its distribution 
over sectors (agriculture, industry, etc). However, some pattern 
can be constructed if different sources are employed and carefully 
related to one another. Clearly, as is not uncommon in developing 
countries, the most problematic area consists of the dat^ on 
agricultural output, and hence special care needs to be taken with 
respect to this.
The study by Pereira de Moura and Fernanda Amaral (1977) is 
definitely the best statistical reference for the pre-independence 
period. For 1970, 1973 and 1975, Gross Material Product and its
components are estimated. These estimates provide an indication of
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the extent of the production crisis in the period shortly before 
and shortly after independence.
Table 4.A1 Gross Material Product in 1970 Prices 
(000 million meticais)
Sector 1970 1973 1975 % change 1973-75
Agriculture 5.8 6.3 5.6 -11
Industry 5.6 7.4 4.6 -38
Services 13.1 12.6 9.1 -28
GMP 24.5 26.8 19.3 -27
Source: de Moura and Amaral, 1977
In the table only the estimates of the Gross Material Product 
are included and not those of GDP. The reason being that the 
former concept provides a better idea of the evolution of produc­
tion since it includes only agriculture, industry (i.e., mining, 
manufacturing, construction, and energy), and productive services 
(i.e., transport and storage, as well as trade). The services 
constitute the dominant share since it includes the commercial 
margins on domestic trade as well as on the import/export trade. 
Apart from trade which constitutes the lion’s share, the other 
significant component is the transport sector, of which the rela­
tive importance reflects the economic integration of Mozambique 
within the Southern African region.
At a first glance it appears as if the crisis in production was 
considerably worse in industry as compared with agriculture. 
However, this is not the case in reality. The reason is that the 
agricultural output as recorded in table 4.A1 includes both 
monetary output as well as subsistence production in full force, 
while the impact on subsistence production would not be as impor­
tant, at least not in the short run. Indeed, the breakdown of the 
trading networks in the period 1974-75 sharply affected the sale
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of marketed surplusses of the peasantry. Furthermore, the massive 
abandonment of settler farms as well as the production problems of 
plantations compounded in both cases by acts of economic sabotage 
were bound to have a significant impact on production. Initially, 
subsistence production was not affected as much, although in the 
medium run one would expect a feedback effect of the crisis in 
monetary production and exchange on the production for own con­
sumption since the latter in part depends on the cash income of 
the peasant household.
Turning back to the quality of the data with respect to the 
different components of agricultural output. In fact, no consis­
tent series of data existed which would provide us with the 
evolution of monetary and subsistence production. A survey carried 
out in 1970 covered settler farm and plantation output as well as 
total peasant production. Subsequent data covering the period 1970 
to 1975 were based on recorded statistics of monetary production 
and some extrapolation of the 1970 data on the production of 
subsistence foodcrops. In this respect, data on the output of 
settler farms and of plantations as well as on the production of 
export crops by the peasantry are definitely much more reliable 
than those on the marketed surplusses of peasants' foodcrops. 
Hence, the data as presented in table 4.A1 include a sizable 
component which cannot be determined any other way than by 
'intelligent guesswork'.
In a study of the structure of agricultural output based on the 
colonial data, I estimated the share of subsistence production in 
total output for 1970, and subsequently used these estimates and 
the available data on monetary production for the period 1970 to 
75 to arrive at separate estimates of the evolution of monetary 
and subsistence production. The relevant data are summarized in 
table 4.A2.
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Table 4.A2 Growth Rate of Agrarian 
(constant prices)
Production
% change 1973-75
Subsistence production +12
Monetary production -43
Total agricultural output -13
Note: "agrarian production" does not 
forestry, meat and dairy products. 
Source: Wuyts, 1978:29-33.
include
These results confirm the hypothesis that the impact of the 
crisis in the immediate pre and post-independence period was 
not significantly different with respect to monetary agriculture 
as against industry. Both dropped by about an equal rate of 
change; respectively, 43^ for agriculture and 38% for industry.
As for data covering the later period, two sets of data exist. 
On the one hand there are the national accounts data compiled by 
the National Planning Commission, and published for the years 
1975, 1977, and 1980 to 82. Apart from these data, two other
series are available: One for monetary agricultural output, and
one for industrial output, both at constant prices. The data are 
also compiled by the National Planning Commission, and cover the 
period 1973 to 1983. As will be shown, these data are not always 
compatible with the national accounts data so that care should be 
taken with the interpretation thereof.
Apart from these statistical sources on production, exports at 
constant prices will be used as well since their evolution also 
reveals some aspects of the patterns in production. The latter 
data also tend to be more reliable than some production data with 
respect to accuracy.
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To start with the national accounts data, table 4,A3 summarizes 
the relevant information.
Table 4.A3 Global Social Product at Constant Prices of 1980
(000 million meticais)
Sectors 1975 1977 1980 1981 1982
percentage change 
1975-77 1977-81 1981-82
Agriculture 26.1 30.6 33.4 33.3 32.5 +17.2 +8.8 -2.4
Industry 26.4 27.8 30.7 31.6 27.2 +5.3 +13.8 -13.9
Transport 9.1 7.8 8.1 9.0 8.4 -14.4 +1 5.4 -6.6
Other 9.5 8.8 1 0.0 9.8 9.8 -7.4 +11.4 0
GSP 71 .1 75.0 82.2 83.7 77.9 +5.5 +11.6 -6.9
Note: "Other", includes construction, commerce and unspecified
others 
Source: NPC, 1984 ,
To interpret these data, some clarification on concepts and 
content is necessary. First, the concept of Global Social Product 
(GSP) is not identical to that of GDP or GMP. The concept of GSP 
is more frequently used in centrally planned economies where the 
allocation of resources is organized by material balances. Targets 
of production are set in terms of gross output which in monetary 
terms corresponds to the gross value of production. The income 
derived from such production equals the value added which in its 
material form refers to final output (i.e., for consumption, 
investment or exports). Hence, GSP is the aggregate gross value of 
production as distinct from the aggregate gross value added. In 
more technical terms, in aggregating GSP the value of the produc­
tive consumption of raw and . auxiliary materials as well as 
intermediary products is not netted out. The object of the concept 
does not consist in arriving at a measure of national income, but 
at a measure of the gross value of all commodities produced.
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Second, the categories are not comparable to those of the study 
of Pereira de Moura and Amaral. Not only since it concerns dif­
ferent concepts of aggregation, but also since the coverage of the 
different items is not the same. Industry is here defined in more 
narrow terms: it does not include construction and probably
neither energy or mining, although this is nowhere explicitly 
stated. Finally, services are a much lesser component in the 1984 
data, but since no reference is given to the manner in which they 
were arrived at, it is not possible to specify any reasons for 
this. However, since our major interest lies with production 
(industry and agriculture), this does not constitute a major 
problem.
Again the key problem lies with agriculture. From table 4.A3 
it is clear that the evolution of agriculture is different from 
the other components. The reason again appears to be the problem 
that these data include an estimate of subsistence production, or, 
more broadly, of peasant production of foodcrops. However, no 
agricultural survey was carried out in the post-independence 
period, and the data on marketed surplusses of the peasantry are 
of poor quality. These data are obtained from information given by 
traders to the Ministry of Internal Commerce, and are furthermore 
poorly collected and aggregated. Finally, it is much more dif­
ficult now to make any inferences about the evolution of peasant 
production of foodcrops since a prolonged period of stunted ex­
change relationships with the peasantry characterized by goods 
famine as well as in the later years under the impact of drought, 
make it impossible to assess the dynamic of production in this 
sector.
Table 4.A4 compares the evolution of real GSP with that of real 
GSP of all sectors except agriculture and real agriculture GSP.
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Table 4.A4 Evolution of Real Global Product 
Excluding and Including Agriculture 
(000 million meticais at constant 1980 prices)
GSP GSP (excl agri) GSP (agri)
Value Growth(%) Value Growth(%) Value Growth(%)
1975 71.1 45 — 26.1
1977 75.0 +5.5 44.4 -1.1 30.6 +17» 2
1981 83.7 +11.6 50.4 +13.5 33.3 +8.8
1982 77.9 -6.9 45.4 -10.0 32.5 -2.4
Source:
The growth is agricultural production in the 1975-77 period ap­
pears excessive given the extent of the production crisis at that 
time. Also, the slight drop in production in the 1981-82 period 
seems an underestimate of the actual drop provoked by the escala­
tion of the war, the disorganization of exchange and the drought.
To get a better feel of the evolution of agricultural produc­
tion, we can now turn to the second data set for an analysis of 
the time series on monetary agricultural output. The series is 
plotted in graph 4.A1 . The picture presented here is quite dif­
ferent from the picture of the national accounts data on
agriculture. Before turning to this, there is another peculiarity 
of these data which needs to be pointed out. In order of mag­
nitude, the data do not tally at all with the national account 
data. Table 4.A5 gives us the respective values of both series ^nd 
the percentage coverage for corresponding years.
GRAPH
THE EVOLUTION OP MONETARY AGRIOULTORAL OUTPUT
(constant prices of 1980 — index 1973 ■ 100 )
too
73 75 83
Source j NFC 1984
I
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Table 4.A5 Agricultural Output According to National Accounts 
Data and monetary Agricultural Output 
(NPC time series)
(000 million meticais at constant 1980 prices)
1 975 1977 1980 1981 1982
1. Global Product 
in agriculture 26.1 30.6 33.4 33.3 32.5
2. Monetary agricul­
ture output 
(NPC series) 5.5 4.6 4.3 4.3 4.0
Row 2 as percentage 
of row 1, (%) 21 15 13 13 12
Source; NPC, 1984
Now, I estimated that in 1970 monetary agricultural output con­
stituted about 45% of total agricultural output. Clearly, in the 
1973-75 production crisis, monetary output fell drastically and 
definitely much more pronouncedly in comparison with subsistence 
production. Hence, the share of monetary output in the total would 
have fallen in this period, but not down to 21%. In fact, we would 
at most put the share down to 30% given the information of Table
4.A2. The subsequent decline in the share seons highly unlikely.
Taking a closer look at the elements included in the computa­
tion of the series on monetary output does provide part of the 
explanation of this discrepancy in order of magnitude between both 
series. The serie of monetary output does not include the produc­
tion of major agro-industrial sectors such as sugar, tea and
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sisal. The reason for this is probably'that the series is compiled 
from data provided by the Ministry pf Agriculture which is not 
responsible for these sectors (which fall under the Ministry of 
Industry)è Sugar, tea and sisal acpppnted for p^out 12$ of tPtBl 
agricultural output in 1970, and hence for about 25$ of monetary 
output in that year. Its omission from the series obviously pulls 
down the share of monetary output as calculated in Table 4.A6. But 
again, this does not yet explain why this series on monetary
output only covers 15$ of the global product data in the period
1980-82. The problem again lies with the estimation of peasants" 
production: both marketed and subsistence. The likelihood is that
marketed production was underestimated in the data on monetary 
production since no estimates are made of that part of production 
channeled through the parallel markets, while the national ac­
counts data are probably over-optimistic as far as subsistence
production is concerned.
Whichever may be the case, it seems clear that the agricultural 
data need to be handled with extreme care and better no inferences 
are to be drawn from it without scxne more supportive evidence. In 
fact, for the years in which both series overlap (1975, 1977, 1980 
and 1982), the coefficient of correlation equals -0.95.
As far as industrial output data are concerned, it is useful to 
take account of the fact that the global product in industry 
measures the gross value of production, and not merely the gross 
added. Hence, the industrial global product contains a sizable 
proportion of monetary agricultural output. Indeed, it includes 
sugar, cotton ginning, cashew, tea, sisal and the production of 
vegetable oils. In 1973, industrial output geared towards exports 
constituted 40$ of total industrial output, and with the exception 
of the oil refinery, all this consisted of agro-industrial 
commodities. Hence, as a first approximation, we can take the 
evolution of the global product of industry as a proxy for 
monetary output in industry and agriculture.
Quite unlike the case of the agricultural data, the industrial 
time series for the period 1973-83 tallies well with the cor­
responding data from the national accounts. In order of magnitude.
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the former series covers in between 85$ to 90$ of the national 
accounts values for the years in which both overlap. The simple 
coefficient of correlation between both series for the 5 overlap­
ping years equals 0.97. This confirms that the industrial data are 
generally more accurate and of better quality than the agricul­
tural series.
With the exception of prawns and oil (reexports), all commodity 
exports are all agricultural products. The evolution of exports at 
constant prices provide therefore another indicator of the evolu­
tion in monetary production in agriculture. However, it would be 
misleading to identify the movement in the volume of exports too 
closely with the movement in the production of export products. 
The reason is that it is necessary to assess the pattern of inter­
nal consumption of some of these commodities: more specifically, 
for sugar and cotton (as well as for oil as a non-agricultural 
product). Sugar consumption rose considerably after independence 
up to 1978. In 1979, the internal market was squeezed to allow 
room for more exports, similarly, for cotton there was the need to 
provide for the internal requirements of the textile industry. The 
need to supply the home demand meant that exports fell more 
sharply than production in the aftermath of independence. Hence, 
the downward fall in exports was much more pronounced than the 
corresponding fall in output (Wuyts, 1980a).
Graph 4.A2 plots the evolution of the series on industrial 
output as well as on the volume of exports. Finally, Table 4.A6 
provides the comparative growth rates for monetary agricultural 
production, industrial output and the volume of exports.
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Table 4.A6 Comparative Growth Rates of Industrial Output, of 
Monetary Agricultural Output and of Exports ($)
(at constant 1980 prices)
1973-75 1975-77 1977-81 1981-82
Industry -33 -1 +12 -13.5
Agriculture -23 -16 -6.5 0
Exports -34 -39 +6.5 +2.5
Source: Time series data of the NPC (1984) for agriculture 
and industry, and export data (1984)
Looking at the graph it appears that the fall in exports was 
due to the underlying crisis in production as well as to increased 
absorption in the home market. Sugar virtually ceased to be an 
export crop up to 1979, and so did cotton. At the other end, 
exports did not show any recovery in the 1978-81 period, which may 
be an indication of the fact that agricultural monetary production 
stabilized in the 1978-81 period but did not really manage to turn 
upwar ds.
In conclusion, the period 1973-75 was characterized by sharp 
falls in the levels of output for all sectors within a probable 
range of 25 to 35 percent. This movement tapered out in the 
period 1976-77 as far as industrial production is concerned, but 
probably continued downwards at a lesser rate in the case of 
monetary agricultural output. In this period transport dropped 
more sharply because of the closure of the border with Rhodesia. 
From 1977 to 1981 production recovered in all sectors except 
agriculture, and this at the time that the foreign exchange situa­
tion rapidly deteriorated (see chapter 5). Monetary agriculture 
probably stabilized somewhat in this period without really partak­
ing in the process of recovery. After 1981, the situation worsened 
considerably due to the escalation of the war and the event of the
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drought compounded by the acute shortage of foreign exchange in 
1983.
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CHAPTER 5
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION
Introduction
In this chapter I shall trace the evolution of the external
I
balance in the light of the economic policy pursued by the govern­
ment in order to restructure its foreign exchange dependency.
A characteristic feature of the Mozambican economy was its 
dependence on foreign exchange income from services— transport and 
migrant labour. Towards the end of the colonial period services 
accounted for about half of the current foreign exchange earnings. 
Once more, this confirms to what extent the Mozambican economy 
became integrated within the Southern African region under the 
domination of South African capitalism. For Portugal, the 
Mozambican colony performed mainly two functions: supplier of raw
■ ; I
materials for industry (mainly cotton) and foreign exchange 
earner. Within the jEscudo Monetary zone— which centralized all
I
foreign exchange in 1 the Bank of Portugal and left the colonies 
only with escudo balances— Mozambique typically had a large
surplus on international payments vis-a-vis the rest of the world
I .
(i.e., outside the escudo zone) and a deficit vis-a-vis Portugal
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(mainly as a result of income transfers of settlers and en­
terprises and to a lesser extent as a result of a negative trade
balance).
Hence, when analyzing the question of external balance, it is 
important to consider the regional context in the light of the 
balance in earning income as between exports of commodities and 
the provision of transport services as well as the export of 
migrant 1 abour-power.
In terms of economic policy, two aspects are of specific 
relevance. First, it was an explicit policy after the Third 
Congress to try to re-direct trade dependence (both in terms of 
exports and imports) towards the CMEA countries by seeking as­
sociation with the CMEA. Secondly, after the independence of
Zimbabwe, the formation of SADCC was seen to be a crucial element
in reducing economic dependence on South Africa by restructuring 
regional integration within the SADCC alliance. With respect to 
the latter, the transport sector as well as energy provision were 
seen to be possible areas of expansion and consolidation (harbours 
and railways, the Beria-Umtali pipeline and Cabora Bassa energy 
complex).
In the next section an analysis will be made of the evolution 
of exports and imports of commodities and of the attempt to re­
direct this trade towards the CMEA countries. Subsequently, the 
question of services will be analysed in the light of the struggle 
for political and economic independence within the region. 
Finally, the last section will deal with the foreign exchange 
crisis which became acute in 1983.
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Export Stagnation and the Re-direction of External Trade
In the immediate post-independence period exports dropped 
dramatically as was shown in the appendix to chapter 4. Clearly, 
the fall in exports was due to the production crisis witnessed in 
that period. Imports fell equally dramatically: 54$ in the 1973-75 
period and another 13$ in the 1975-77 period, both in real terms 
(NPC, 1984). The drop in imports was the combined result of two 
factors: (1), the massive emigration of the settler population
implied a considerable drop in luxury consumption, and (2), the 
crisis of production lowered the demand for imported raw material 
and auxiliary products.
Table 5.1 gives the composition of exports over the period 
1973-82 as well as the evolution of exports in current prices.
Table 5.1 The Composition of Exports in Selected Years 
($ of total exports--main products only)
1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1982
Cashew kernels 18 15 30 17 19 19
Cotton 20 9 . 6 9 9 8
Sugar 10 11 5 12 9 4
Tea 4 4 8 8 5 11
Prawns 2 5 7 9 19 17
Petroleum products 5 7 7 15 19 16
Total exports in
current prices
(000 million meticais) 5.5 5.1 4.9 8.3 9.9 8.7
Source: NPC, 1984
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Prawns and petroleum products (which implies a reexport to 
South Africa after processing at the refinery in Maputo) gained in 
relative importance. Agricultural exports remained problematic 
throughout the whole period as can be seen from Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Evolution of Main Agricultural Exports 1973-83
(in 000 tons)
1973 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Cashew 30 21 21 17 18 17 16 12 17 6
Cotton 50 18 16 6 13 16 6 15 14 13
Sugar . 179 51 72 37 25 119 64 63 29 25
Tea 18 11 13 12 14 23 30 16 25 13
Copra 48 31 41 37 34 29 19 12 12 6
Source: NPC, 1979 and 1984
In fact. Mackintosh shows that in the period 1980-84 the fall 
in the production of export crops was specifically dramatic in 
family agriculture (1985:32). No doubt, the escalation of the war 
was a main factor to account for this fall in cashew and cotton 
production, but as I shall argue in chapter 7 part of the reason 
resulted from the fact that monetary imbalances within the state 
sector were offloaded onto the rest of the economy, and as such, 
produced a severe decline in the real incomes of peasant producers 
of export crops.
Turning now to the question of the redirection of foreign 
trade. Table 5.3 shows the evolution of the export and import 
trade with respect to countries of origin and/or destination.
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Table 5.3 Trade Balance by Countries of Origin/Destination
(million meticais)
Regions 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1982
OECD countries
exports 4,166 3,200 3,706 5,861 5,167 3,453
Imports 7,874 6,550 6,445 7,646 12,382 12,352
CMEA countries
exports 3 0 1 2 773 2,040 1,154
imports 5 56 117 3,339 3,982 7,202
Other countries
exports 1,372 1,850 1,209 1,677 2,720 4,047
imports 3,536 4,139 4,259 7,590 11,954 12,020
Total
exports 5,541 5,050 4,923 8,311 9,926 8,655
imports 11,415 10,745 10,821 18,575 28,318 31,573
Source:
As can be seen from the table, a concerted attempt was made to 
redirect trade towards CMEA countries. By 1982, 23$ of imports and 
13$ of exports were traded with the socialist countries. However, 
Mozambique did not succeed in joining the CMEA formally, although 
it received the strong backing from the GDR and Bulgaria. The USSR 
however rejected the bid on grounds that it was not prepared to 
subsidize Mozambique to the extent that it was doing so for Cuba 
and Vietnam. This definitely was a heavy blow for the Mozambican 
leadership who looked towards the USSR to find assistance to
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bridge them over the financial crisis provoked by the war (Hanlon, 
1987:234-238).
Relationship with socialist countries therefore remained con­
strained to bilateral aid from the GDR and Bulgaria, usually 
through barter agreements, as well as military aid from the USSR.
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The Regional Context
The exportation of labour-power and the provision of transport 
services were the two main characteristics of Mozambique’s in­
tegration within the Southern African region.
With respect to the exportation of labour power, Table 5.4 
gives the evolution of the number of Mozambican workers at the 
South African mining sector:
Table 5.4 Number of Mozambican Workers at the 
South African Mines
1 970 113,293
1973 99,424
1975 118,030
1977 41,364
1980 45,824
1981 41,288
1982 45,491
Source: NPC, 1984
As can be seen from this table, recruitment fell drastically after
1975. The latter year itself was a year of peak recruitment due to 
the withdrawal of Malawian labour-power (First, 1983:55). 
Furthermore, the strikes of 1973 had led to considerable increases 
in wages on the mines : "the rise in the price of gold made it
possible, and workers unrest made it necessary, to pay higher 
wages to African mines, especially those drawn from within South 
Africa" (ibid:50). Minimum wages (per shift) rose from R0.50 in
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1972 to R2.50 in 1976, while average wages (per shift) rose from 
R0.81 to R3.00 (ibid;53).
As a result of this evolution, income from mine labour boosted 
in ; the early post-independence years: "mine wages earned by
Mozambicans in 1975 are reflected In deferred payment sums for
1976. For that year the total of deferred pay was 1652 million 
escudos. The deferred payments for 1975 and 1974 were 1200 million 
and 711 million escudos respectively" (ibid:56). Within the rural 
economy of Southern Mozambique incomes boosted as a result of this 
increased inflow of wages, and as such the impact of the produc­
tion crisis was cushioned over.
However, in 1976 recruitment of Mozambican miners fell drasti­
cally to 32,803 as against 115,309 for 1975 and 94,525 for 1974. 
Thereafter recruitment levels remained low. As First argued: 
"changes within southern Africa (the independence of Mozambique, 
the defeat of the South African army in Angola, and the escalation 
of armed struggle in Zimbabwe being the high peaks of this change) 
were causing the mines once again to review their dependence on 
external sources of labour supply. In 1973, it will be recalled, 
foreign labour had reached its peak of 80 percent of the mine 
labour force, but after this it began to fall rapidly, until by 
March 1977 it was only 52 percent" (ibid:50). Increased mechaniza­
tion and rising unemployment in South Africa were two other 
factors which led to this shift in recruitment policy.
Hence, from 1976 recruitment fell drastically and moreover, 
only those Mozambican workers who possessed a valid re-employment
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certificate could continue to go to the mines (ibid:59-66). The
impact on the rural economy in the South was bound to be dramatic;
"Due to the time lag involved in terms of the long contracts 
of Mozambican workers (on average 15 to 16 months), the full 
impact of the drying-up of cash income was fully felt only 
towards the end of 1977.
The impact on the peasantry varied. The hardest hit are
the young peasants for whom wage work is not only indispen- 
sible to earn a living, but it is only through wage income 
that they can establish themselves in agriculture. It is the 
wage which pays lobolo (or bride-price), a wife being the 
major ' productive force in peasant agriculture in Southern 
Mozambique. Wages also pay for implements, cattle, and house 
building. The poor peasants, whose day-to-day living depends 
heavily on income from wage work, are suddenly cut off from 
their principal source of income. Finally, the middle 
peasants are also affected since (1) they often rely on 
artisan activities to supplement their incomes, and/or (2) 
they earned extra income by renting ox-ploughs to miners’ 
families or by selling their food surplus. The drying-up of
the cash inflow from the mines obviously reduced the internal
circulation of money within the peasantry, and its impact was 
therefore wider than just the miners’ families.
The disintegration of South Africa now reinforced the 
existing crisis of peasant agriculture, rather than compen­
sating It as was previously the case. Income from mine labour
145
and from sale of crops both underwent reduction; the two 
moments hence reinforced one another and created a severe 
payments crisis among the peasantry. The possibility of mine 
labour being cut off, most worker-peasants turn to the towns 
to seek wage work. The center of gravity in the dynamics of 
unemployment thus shifted from the town to the countryside, 
manifesting itself in an increasing flow to the towns in 
search of wage work.
Thus, what might appear to be a pr obi an that only concerns 
miners is in fact the result of the combination of the two 
moments which characterized the crisis of the colonial 
economy in Southern Mozambique, i.e., the disintegration of 
the colonial bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie and the 
breaking-up of Mozambique's integration within the South 
Africa economy--with the latter as fundamental movement over 
the former. Indeed, the drop in mine labour recruitment does 
not imply that the worker-peasant can fall back on his 
agricultural base because the latter, apart from being eroded 
in the first moment in the crisis, is for its very reproduc­
tion dependent on wage labour to finance essential inputs. It 
follows that the drop in labour recruitment directly rein­
forces the crisis of agricultural production already 
initiated by the disintegration of colonial structures (as 
well as by the natural calamities which affected the area in 
the post-independence period" (Wuyts, 1981:7-8).
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The policy of concentrating investments on the state sector 
implied that family agriculture was left to cope when facing a 
severe income crisis. The failure to realize the extent of this 
crisis effectively meant that 'disinvestment' took place within 
household agriculture and rural unemployment aggravated 
considerably:
"The concrete conditions of the present phase, however, 
are not constituted by the necessity to release labour from 
agriculture so as to enable industrialization, but rather to 
cope with a severe crisis of the colonial economic structures 
which manifests itself in the disintegration of the peasant 
economy, either through breakdown of commercialization net­
works, or through the crisis of the worker-peasant, or both. 
The question today is not to 'release' labour but to 'absorb' 
it within agriculture so as to prevent the deepening of the 
crisis of the peasantry. Failure to realize this may imply 
that 'short-run' policies which seem to conform to 'long-run 
requirements actually hamper the realization of such goals. A 
policy of concentration of resources in agriculture today may 
well imply that the controlled transfer of labour from 
agriculture to industry is counteracted by the crisisjof 
employment created by the immediate implementation of such a 
policy. If one is serious about releasing labour from 
agriculture to build industry in the longer run, one may have 
to start with absorbing labour within agriculture so as to 
stabilize and control the rate at which labour can be
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released fran agriculture to be transferred to industry 
without creating unemployment in the process" (ibid:14).
However, this also induced the development of differentiation 
among the peasantry. Only a limited number of peasant-workers were 
able to continue working on the mines. These workers had access to 
commodities (consumer goods and producer goods) on the South 
African market. Initially, miners were reluctant to invest at home 
due to the cold attitude of local government structures to this 
type of investment. However, after the speech of the president in 
March, 1980, miners felt more confident to invest in trade, 
transport or production (1980). In fact, from 1980 onwards, posi­
tive incentives were given to miners to do so. While previously 
heavy import duties were levied on commodities brought in by 
miners, these were abolished after 1980. Also, miners could obtain 
unused settler land for cultivation if they could show that they 
had sufficient investment capacity to operate such farms. The 
impoverishment of the large majority of the peasantry meant that 
labour power was cheap and readily available.
Also in the central regions of Mozambique, the situation of 
labour shortages had already begun to change during the 1960s and 
early 1970s as a result of the reduction in the demand for foreign 
labour in Rhodesia (Adamo et al, 1981 : 68-71 ). Hence, Mozambique 
inherited at the time of its independence a situation of growing 
rural unemployment of a peasantry deeply dependent on wage labour 
for its reproduction within family agriculture. The closure of the 
border with Rhodesia in 1976 accentuated this trend even further.
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Agricultural policy was largely oblivious to this sharpening 
crisis within family agriculture since itwas not based on an 
understanding of the dynamic of class forces in the rural economy. 
It was assumed that the peasantry could subsist on its own 
resources, while de facto considerable disinvestment took place 
within family agriculture as a result of the cut in the demand for 
migrant labour abroad. Rural unemployment rose steeply and 
reflected itself in an increased migration to the towns. Hence, 
the need to invest in the 'zones verdes' (green zones) and sub­
sequently, the need for forceful and definitely more brutal forms 
of forced emmigration from the towns to rural production with the 
'operacao producao' (operation production) in 1983 (CEA, 1978; 
Saul, 1985:98).
Turning now to the contribution of migrant labour to foreign 
exchange earnings. Table 5.5 compares the income from the deferred 
payments from mine labour with total earnings from the exports of 
commodities:
Table 5.5 Foreign Exchange Income from Deferred Payments of 
Mine Labour as compared with Export Earnings 
(000 million meticais)
1975 1976 1977 1 978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Deferred 
Payments (1) 1.2 1.7 n.a. 1.1 1.5 1.7 2.3 2.3 2.9
Exports (2) 5.0 4.5 4.9 5.3 8.3 9.1 9.9 8.7 5.5
1 as % of 2 24 38 -- 21 18 19 23 26 56
Source: NFC, 1984
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Table 5.5 underestimates the contribution of income from 
migrant labour to foreign exchange earnings on two counts. First, 
the deferred payments constitute 60% of miners earnings from the 
sixth month of their contract period onwards. Cash (or 
commodities) brought directly by miners from South Africa and 
either exchanged at the border or in the case of commodities 
directly imported added significantly to the country's capacity to 
import. Clearly, after the liberalization of border controls on 
miners in 1980 the greater part of this cash increasingly found 
its way into the parallel foreign exchange market.
Secondly, the 1964 agreement between Portugal and South Africa 
on migrant labour stipulated the conditions under which the 
deferred payments were to be transferred to Mozambique and 
provided for a secret clause which allowed that, "the Portuguese 
government could receive deferred pay in gold, the amount being a 
fixed price in Rands despite later increases on the world market 
(the gold would be sold by South Africa on the world market and 
the profit handed over to Portugal)" (First, 1983:220). Hence, the 
deferred pay in Rands could be converted into gold at the official 
gold price of R29-75 per ounce. This clause continued in operation 
after independence, and hence, the Banco de Mozambique realized 
the profit on gold equal to the difference between the free market 
price and the official price. This source of income allowed 
Mozambique to bridge the production crisis without any accompany­
ing foreign exchange crisis. Rather, considerable reserves were 
accumulated during the first years of Independence.
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In April 1978 South Africa officially revalued its gold price 
by setting the official price as a moving average of the world 
market price. As such, Mozambique lost its access to the profit on 
gold, and this indeed was the explicit aim of this monetary 
measure (CEA, 1979:23).
With respect to transport services, Mozambique relied mainly on 
income from the use of railways and harbours (Maputo and Beira) by 
South Africa and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Table 5.6 provides an overview 
of the evolution of transit transportation with respect to South 
Africa and Zimbabwe.
Table 5.6 International Railcargo in 000 tons
South Africa Zimbabwe
1973 6,824 3,384
1974 5,665 2,790
1 975 5,639 2,277
1976 4,974 89
1977 4,248 — —
1978 4,055 — —
1979 4,155 —
1980 3,428 275
1981 3,024 930
1 982 2,217 1,044
1 983 1,468 553
Source: NPC, 1984
Note that as distances are longer for Zimbabwe traffic, the income 
derived from this transit was proportionally more important.
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Two aspects need stressing with respect to the evolution of 
transport. First, the definite downward trend in cargo handling 
for South Africa. This reflects the fact that South Africa was 
consciously reducing its reliance on the Maputo harbour, and 
furthermore, it relegated the lower value/higher tonnage cargo to 
the Maputo harbour. Hence, the two main products handled through 
Maputo became the export of coal and imports of sulphur 
(:f ic Ic-Im o èei 1331 ).
I
Secondly, the closure of the border with Rhodesia in 1976 as a 
result of the imposition of the UN sanctions by the Mozambican 
government led to a severe cut in income from transport. However, 
the independence of Zimbabwe and the formation of SADCC provided a 
basis for Mozambique to re-assert its role as outlet to the sea 
for the landlocked countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi. 
Initially, transit transport increased significantly, but the 
advance of the war and the fact that the transport system was 
specifically signalled out as a target for South African des­
tabilization led to its collapse in 1983. Table 5.7 shows the 
evolution of income from international transport over the period 
1978-83.
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Table 5.7 Income from International Transport 1978-83 
(000 million meticais)
1 978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Transport income 2.7 
Transport income as 
% of exports of
2.2 3.0 2.9 3.2 2.7
commodities 51 27 33 29 37 49
Source; NPC, 1984
Hence, in 1983 income frcxn transport dropped by 16% and further­
more, it became heavily dependent on south African traffic. 
Moreover, most of the transport of Zimbabwe to Mozambique was 
rerouted through South Africa in 1983 as a result of the war.
In summary, through SADCC Mozambique hoped to establish a basis 
of expansion for its transport sector which would be increasingly 
independent from South Africa. The destabilization policies of the 
latter country concentrated particularly on undermining this 
alternative road for Mozambique. As we shall see in the next 
section, Mozambique became extremely vulnerable by 1983 since most 
of its foreign exchange income derived from South Africa.
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The Foreign Exchange Squeeze
On the basis of the previous sections it is possible to trace 
the evolution of foreign exchange income over the 1975-83 period.
in the 1973-75 period exports dropped drastically, while income 
from services increased rapidly. The latter evolution was due to 
the rise in income from mine labour (net of the additional profit 
on the sale of gold on the free market) and to increased earnings 
from transport services resulting from an increase in the rates 
charged on transport. Hence, income from services became the 
dominant element in foreign exchange earnings. After 1975 the
situation changed.
In 1976 both the closure of the border with Rhodesia and the 
drop in mine-labour recruitment from 115,000 down to about 40,000 
brought about a reduction in foreign exchange earnings from serv­
ices. However, with respect to the mine labour the effect on
income lagged behind the drop in recruitment since the average 
length of a contract on the mines is about 15 months. Therefore, 
the impact was only felt from 1977 onwards.
In the 1977-81 period exports started recovering and increased 
in relative importance vis-a-vis services. In 1978 the revaluation 
of the South African official gold price to the free market price 
level implied the loss of the profit on gold as well. Table 5.8 
shows the evolution of current foreign exchange receipts (exports 
of commodities + invisibilities) and the proportion of in­
visibilities in this total for the period 1976 to 1983.
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Table 5.8 Current Foreign Exchange Income 1976-83 
(current prices in 000 million contos)
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Current receipts 
Exports 4.5 4.9 5.3 8.3 9.1 9.9 8.7 5.5
Invisi biles 8.0 6.6 6.5 6.6 7.2 7.9 9.2 8.9
Total 12.5 11.5 11.8 14.9 16.3 17.8 17.9 1 4.4
Invi si biles as 1» of 
current receipts 64 57 55 44 44 44 51 62
Note 1 : invisibles includes grants
Note 2: the profit on gold is not included in invisibles since
technically this concerns a revaluation of gold reserves. 
Hence, effective foreign exchange income was higher than 
stated for the years up to 1978.
Source: NPC, 1984 (the figures for 1983 are estimates of the NPC)
Nevertheless, 1981 signalled the turning point towards the 
escalation of open military and economic aggression against 
Mozambique. The stage was set by the increased struggle (and armed 
struggle) within South Africa itself, the formation of the SADCC 
alliance as a counter strategy against the regime's attempt to 
create CONSAS, and last but not least, the election of Reagan as 
the U.S. president whose policy of east-west polarization and of 
'constructive engagement' with South Africa allowed for greater 
room of manouver on the part of south Africa in destabilizing the 
region.
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The Matola attack on ANC refugees in January 1981 marked the 
beginning of this phase of escalating aggression and economic 
destabilization. Gradually, the activities of the MNR began to 
spread throughout the country at large, such that by 1983 vir­
tually no province was left untouched.
The MNR attacks, apart from their ferocious killing, maiming 
and loating of the population, centered firstly on the transport 
links within the SADCC context (the Beira railway link to 
Zimbabwe, the pipeline, the Northern link from Nacala and the 
southern link from Maputo to Zimbabwe). Secondly, the attacks 
concentrated on the big projects which were being undertaken: the 
Ifloma wood project in Manica, state farm complexes in various 
parts of the country as well as on major economic infrastructure 
(roads, bridges, electricity links, etc.). Finally, the attacks 
aimed at systematically destroying social and economic infrastruc­
ture destined for servicing the rural economy and society: shops, 
health centres, schools, and especially in the communal villages.
The drought which hit the country in those years agravated the 
economic situation up to the point of famine and starvation. The 
investment fund of the country was tied up in larger scale under­
takings which became the targets of the MNR. The relative neglect 
of family agriculture and related small scale activities in the 
rural economy (fishing, crafts, small workshops, etc.) left the 
economic situation of the peasantry extremely fragile.
In 1982 exports declined, although income from services could 
still manage to stabilize foreign exchange income as shown in 
Table 5.8. The gap on the balance of payments widened due to the
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increased import needs (as well as costs). The drop in exports 
made Mozambique to become more dependent on income from services 
which depended on South Africa for the greater part.
I '
By 1983 the situation worsened considerably. Exports,dropped to 
63  ^ of the already lower 1982 level. Income from services dropped 
as well as a result of the reduction in Zimbabwe and South 
Africa's transit transport. By now, invisibles accounted for about 
62$ of all foreign exchange income, and apart from grants, this 
income was directly or indirectly dependent on South Africa. Table 
5.9 and Graph 5.1 map out the evolution of the foreign exchange 
gap over time.
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Table 5.9 The Growing Foreign Exchange Gap 
(millions of contos)
Balance on 
Visible Trade
Balance on 
Invisibles
Current
Surplus/
Deficit
Percentage 
of Import 
Coverage
1973 -5.9 3 -2.9 75
1974 -4.1 4 -0.1 95
1975 -5.4 5.4 0 100
1976 -4.5 4.9 0.4 103
1977 -5.7 3.6 -2.1 80
1978 -11.1 4 -7.1 54
1979 -10.3 4.2 -6.1 67
1980 -17.2 4.7 -12.5 53
1981 -18.1 5.3 -12.8 54
1982 -23.0 6.6 -16. 4 48
1983 -16.5 6.1 -10.4 53
Note: Import coverage « ratio of (export earnings + balance on
invisibles) over total imports of commodities.
Source: NPC, 1984
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Conclusion
In terms of economic policy in the post independence period, 
Frelimo had three broad aims in mind with respect to international 
relationships:
1. To recover and expand export production of agricultural crops 
so as to make agriculture the base for industrialization;
2. To strengthen the economic relationships with socialist 
countries by becoming a member of CMEA;
3. After 1980, to struggle for economic independence from South 
Africa by strengthening the SADCC alliance in which the 
transport sector would assume a crucial role.
In actual fact, export production of agrarian crops stagnated 
(with the exception of tea). Specifically, peasant production of 
cash crops fell consistently during the period and especially so 
after 1980. Trade relations with CMEA countries increased sig­
nificantly, but Mozambique did not succeed in becoming affiliated 
with CMEA. Especially, in 1983 when foreign exchange resources 
were depleted, the USSR was unable or unwilling to provide assis­
tance to Mozambique in sufficient quantity.
The policy of destabilization of the South African regime 
undermined the objective of seeking new avenues of accumulation 
through the SADCC nexus as well as it considerably aggravated the 
crisis of production within the country. As such, in 1983,
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Mozambique became heavily dependent on South Africa in terms of 
its foreign exchange earnings.
The 'opening to the West' in the second half of 1983 sought to 
enlist support from Western countries to excert pressure on South 
Africa to discontinue its policy of destabilization. Furthermore, 
it reflected a search for alternative sources of finance. These 
provided the background for the Komati agreement as well as the 
association with the Lome convention, and for seeking membership 
of IMF and the World Bank. In chapter 6, I shall return to discuss 
some of the consequences of this policy in terms of the limita­
tions it may impose on domestic economic policy.
PART III
MONEY AND THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM
CHAPTER 6
MONETARY IMBALANCES IN THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM
Two Views on Money
This chapter constitutes the central part of this study inas­
much as it puts forward the main propositions on the role of money 
in the context of planning the transition to socialism. More 
specifically, this chapter deals with the question of monetary 
imbalances within the economy in the process of transition.
Hence, the main concern of this study is to investigate how, 
within the concrete context of the Mozambican experience^, 
monetary imbalances arose within the transitional period, and to 
what extend they influenced the dynamics of change within the 
economy.
To start with, I shall engage in a debate with two polar views 
on the role of money in the transition to socialism. One view 
argues that money ceases to be important in terms of the social 
dynamics of change as soon as the economy beccxnes reorganized 
within the framework of central planning. Money becomes en- 
dogeneous with respect to the requirements of material planning, 
and as such, monetary policy becomes passive with respect to
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economic activity. The dynamics of change are therefore determined 
by central planning, and not by monetary processes.
A second view argues however that financial orthodoxy in the 
sense of the need for strict demand management should act as a 
binding constraint on the rate at which structural transformation 
of the economy can take place.
The first view effectively underscored the actual practice of 
monetary policy in Mozambique in the period between the Third and 
Fourth Congress (1977-83). Its theoretical justification was the 
Soviet theories on the role of money and its context was a period 
in which the economy was being restructured with the establishment 
of a strong state sector within a framework of a centrally 
planned economy.
In essence the basic argument in this view is that money ceases 
to be important rather quickly as the economy becomes reorganized 
within a framework of central planning. Planning by means of 
material balances becomes the principal force directing the al­
location of material resources and of labour power within the 
economy, and money becomes passive with respect to the plan.
To elaborate this point more precisely it is necessary to 
review briefly the basic premises of the traditional monetary 
theory of the USSR (Garvy, 1972; Lavigne, 1978). Monetary policy 
within the context of a centrally planned economy involves plan­
ning two assumedly distinct and separate circuits of money. The 
distinction between both circuits finds its origin in the division 
of the economy into two broad sectors. The state sector consists
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of the socialized sector of the economy and is completely planned 
in physical quantities through material balances. Here, monetary 
relations are said to be significant only for accounting purposes. 
The incompletely socialized sector (kolkhoz agriculture in the 
Soviet Union) and the non-socialized sector (the exchange with the 
population) is only partly planned in terms of aggregate flows 
since a margin of choice continues to exist as to expenditure 
patterns (Lavigne, 19 :30).
Hence, essential to the distinction as between both circuits of 
money is the divide between public and cooperative/private sectors 
within an overall context of central planning. The latter implies 
that non only the exchanges within the public sector are subject 
to material planning, but also the exchanges with the rest of the 
economy in which planning aims to balance the aggregate flows at 
regulated prices.
Clearly, within the context of the Soviet economy the extent of 
the non-socialized sector is virtually limited to consumer incomes 
and demand due to the predominance of the state sector.
The two circuits are planned separately, and are seen to repre­
sent two distinct forms of money which are distinguished by their 
functions. Fiduciary money is the means of circulation within the 
circuit which articulates the exchanges between the state sector 
and the partly-socialized or non-socialized sectors. Scriptural 
money is the means of payment and operates within the exchange of 
the state sector. The planning of the former involves regulating 
the aggregate flows of incomes and expenditures of the population 
so as to avoid disequilibria within these exchanges. However, this
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planning obviously does not control individual movements of money 
from one holder to another. On the other hand, individual payments 
with scriptural money is strictly related to plan execution and 
determined by it (ibid;31).
Clearly, various soviet scholars have pointed out that the two 
circuits cannot be neatly separated and that in fact an objective 
unity exists between them. A central premise of Soviet thinking on 
money is however that all the money issued by the state bank is 
essentially endogenous with respect to the requirements of 
economic activity which itself is directed by the process of 
material planning (ibid:32-36).
Hence, within the process of economic activity the state bank 
will create money through its advances to the econany, and insofar 
the material plans were de facto feasible, these credits will be 
backed by material resources and therefore no 'inflationary* 
pressures will ensue within the economy. Hence, imbalances may 
occur in the economy if there exists a discrepancy between the 
planned utilization of resources and their actual availability, 
but these imbalances originate within real planning, and not 
within the financial sphere (Kornai, 1971:329-331).
The question arises now as to what extend this model of Soviet 
money is relevant for the organization of money and planning 
within the context of transition. Clearly, within the Mozambican 
experience this assumption was definitely made (Wuyts, 1983b: 26- 
31), but the question arises as to its appropriateness.
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Two important differences need to be considered with respect to 
the context of planning in Mozambique and in a developed Soviet 
type economy:
(1) The state sector in Mozambique was formed on the basis of 
the nationalisations of key sectors of the economy and came 
to account for a large share of production within the 
economy (see chapter 4). However, due to the uneven 
development of colonial capitalism and the incompleteness 
of its processes of proletarization, the popular sector 
remained the dominant basis of the larger proportion of the 
population. Hence, the balance as between the public sector 
on the one hand, and the popular/private sector on the 
other was of a completely different nature as in the case 
of the developed Soviet-type economies.
(2) The main task of planning within the transition period is 
concerned with planning social change : i.e. the question of 
transforming the economy and society is of central 
importance. In the case of Mozambique, the question of the 
socialisation of production cuts accross the state/popular 
sectors divide, and hence the process itself requires a 
broad front of action.
Hence, the state sector is located within a wider economy (also 
in terms of production) and is itself only partially transformed 
(or as yet largely untransformed). Within this context, planning 
constitutes the dynamic intervention of the state within the 
economy and society at large so as to transform the social or­
ganization of production, exchange and distribution. To do so, the 
state needs to consolidate and organize its economic power behind
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the strategy for the wider transformation of the economy. That is, 
the state economic power needs to be capable to mobilize social 
forces within society behind the process of change envisaged 
within the development strategy. As such, planning is about chang­
ing society and involves the intervention of state economic power 
so as to propel class forces in society behind the direction of 
social change. This process is by no means unproblenatic and 
involves political struggles over the content and the organization 
of planning as shown in chapters 3 and 4.
However, there is a further reason why this process is not 
unproblematic and this involves the limits of state economic power 
in terms of transforming the economy. It is not because the state 
wants to propel a certain type of change within the economy, that 
this change will actually materialise.
In actual fact, the documents of the Third Congress do not 
consider this question at all. It is more or less asssumed that 
the mere setting up of a central planning framework garantuees the 
effective control of the state over the dynamics of change within 
the economy:
"The new state apparatus as the expression and the 
instrument of the worker-peasant alliance, has to plan 
and organize the economy by managing the state sector 
and aiding the cooperative sector, by controlling the 
private sector and by setting the objectives for all 
sectors" (Frelimo, 1977b: 27; my translation).
Apart from its rather instrumentalist view of the state, this 
quote illustrates the rather unproblematic view on the state's
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capacity to control and to set objectives for the economy at 
1arge.
Another way to look at this with reference to its implications 
for the analysis of money within transition, is that the domain 
of the two circuits of money within the centrally planned economy 
constitutes the official economy;
"There exist a set of economic exchanges which take place at 
official prices, which are chiefly within the state sector 
or involve the state sector. These include wage payments by 
the state and by some local private firms and sales of 
rationed goods and goods produced by the state at official 
prices. They also include (most) purchases by the state of 
agricultural cj’Ops with controlled prices. They further 
include foreign exchange transactions at official exchange 
rates, and payments for imports at prices derived through 
the official exchange rate. This 'official economy', there-
' i
fore, is a real, and to some extent a planned economy, 
depending heavily on continuing control of resources by the 
state, including control of the distribution of imported 
goods" (Mackintosh, 1985; 60).
Implicit in the view of the Third Congress documents is that 
this official economy coincides with the economy at large, and 
hence that the dynamics of change are wholly determined by state 
planning.
This position therefore negates the problon that the interven­
tion of state economic power within the wider economy depends on 
its capacity to mobilise (or coerce) social forces within the
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economy behind its strategy, and this in terms depends on the 
extend to which its policy reflects the material interests of the 
classes it attempts to mobilise.
As such, the policy of state centered accumulation was based on 
the assumption that the state sector through its planning could 
mobilise material resources of the economy at large behind the 
accelerated development of the state sector, and that this process 
would not encounter contradictions within the economy. It is only 
when this assumption is valid that it could be argued that money 
remains passive within the economy, since the whole dynamic of the 
economy is then fully determined by central planning.
In this chapter as well as in the next, it will be argued that 
this assumption cannot be made. The extend to which the state 
sector can direct the overall evolution within the economy depends 
on the extend to which its intervention within the economy 
mobilises class forces behind its strategy, and this depends on 
the content and the organization of its planning.
The argument is that the process of state-centered accumulation 
limited the sphere of the effective operation of the official 
economy, and that as a result of the contradictions within plan­
ning a parallel economy emerged in competition with this official 
economy. It will be argued that within the confines of this paral­
lel economy, money acquired an active function through the 
accumulation of money capital.
The second view on the role of money in the transition to 
socialism argues that money matters a great deal and that a 
cautious monetary policy inspired by financial orthodoxy whould
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constitute an absolute priority in the period of transition. This 
view has been most coherently argued by S. Griffith-Jones (1981).
The basic argument is that newly emerging socialist regimes 
tend to overspend within the ’preliminary’ transition to 
socialism. Dudley Seers, in his preface to the book of 
Griffith-Jones, formulated this position as follows:
"In the first place, commitments to wage increases,
heavy investments in social infrastructure, etc., help 
a party gain power but they greatly complicate its life 
once it has succeeded. The experience documented here 
shows that big gains of this kind cannot by made in the 
early years of socialist governments. These only take 
power at a time of national crisis, which leaves a 
legacy of financial disequilibrium. The civil service, 
inherited from the earlier regime is unlikely to be 
willing, or even able to, to implement farreaching 
reforms. The structural changes that are attempted,
such as land reforms and nationalization, cause— in the 
first instance at least— disorganization and declines 
in output" (ibid: preface).
Hence, the problem is that of a trend towards expansion and 
change in the composition of aggregate demand (as a result of
radical changes in social policy) to which existing supply cannot
respond under any circumstances, and, the existence of specific
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constraints to the supply response caused by the structural trans­
formations in the economy, are seen to constitute the two major 
destabilising forces within the economy (ibid;19).
Given these structural features of the transitional economy, 
the argument then proceeds by stating that the need for sound 
monetary management should act as a binding constraint on the rate 
at which structural transformations should take place.
More specifically, monetary policy should center on two main 
targets: to pursue a cautious policy in curbing expenditures in
foreign exchange so as to avoid large disequilibria on the balance 
of payments, and, to control the expansion of the domestic money 
supply since imbalances as between aggregate demand and supply are 
normally financed through the excessive issue of paper money. Both 
aspects are linked inasmuch as excessive money creation is seen to 
fuel excess demand within the economy, and this will add pressure 
to the demand for imports, thereby depleting foreign reserves 
(ibid:16-17).
The basic problem with this argument is that it essentially 
boils down to a case for cautious demand-management of the 
economy. Hence, it is essentially a macroeconomic argument: money 
should constitute a binding constraint on the rate at which struc­
tural transformations take place. However, this leaves open the 
question as to how this process of change itself determines the 
role of money.
The argument that monetary imbalances can and should be avoided 
is questionable. The role of money can only be analysed within a 
context, and hence, the question is not whether monetary im­
balances are destabilising in general, but whether their
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occurrence within the process of transition propels or counters 
the forces of social change.
It is therefore interesting that the basic framework which 
Griffith-Jones employs in order to analyze inflationary pressures 
within the economy is Kalecki’s structuralist analysis of the 
conditions for balanced development in a mixed economy (Kalecki, 
1976b; Fitzgerald, 1983:1). As I shall argue in subsequent sec­
tions, this argument essentially defines the financial problem of 
development as that of the non-correspondence between the growth 
of national income and the growth of necessities, and as such, 
does not deal with tAe issue of the content of this growth process 
in terms of transforming the economy. This is already implicit in 
the notion of a ’mixed* economy which is essentially a static 
conception when viewed from the point of view of a transition to 
socialism.
Hence, the basic criticism of this approach is that it deals 
with the problem of money within the transition to socialism by 
abstracting from the content of the transition itself. Money 
matters, and this not only in terms of aggregate balances, but 
also in terms of the role which monetary policy needs to assume 
within the process of transition. The approach basically assumes a 
given structure of the economy and analyzes disequilibria against 
the background of this structure, rather than starting from the 
premise that the fundamental aspect of transition is the process 
of transformation itself.
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Both theories on the role of money in the transition to 
socialism provide the background to the further analysis within 
this chapter.
Firstly, it will be argued that monetary imbalances in the
period 1974-77 were by no means destabilizing in view of the
context of the economic crisis in which they arose and of the 
basic aims of econonic policy in this period.
Secondly, it will be argued that the transformation of social
services was not principally a question of an unwarranted expan­
sion in expenditures, but rather a question of transforming the 
content of such services within the available means.
Thirdly, it will be argued that the process of state centered 
accumulation in Mozambique was characterised by a rate of ac­
cumulation far in excess of its capacity to finance it through 
either internal sources or foreign loans, and hence that money 
creation was the principal internal instrument of financing 
development.
Fourthly, it is argued that the question of ’inflationary* 
money creation is not merely an issue of distribution, but rather 
needs to be analysed in terms of its impact on the dynamics within 
production. The latter question will be further developed in 
chapter 7.
Finally, the issue of state planning and its impact in shaping 
the development of the wider economy will be discussed with 
reference to the demand for deregulation at the time of the Fourth 
Congress and after.
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Economic Sabotage and Financial Unorthodoxy
In this section I shall discuss the first question raised in 
the introduction: namely, the argument that the inflationary issue 
of money in the immediate post-independence period was the most 
direct and effective instrument in the combat against economic 
sabotage. Far from being a destabilizing factor, this policy was 
crucial in stabilizing employment, preventing a further collapse 
in production and preserving stable prices.
As shown in chapter 3, during the period of the transitional 
government and into the first year after independence, economic 
policy basically remained on the defensive. In the face of a 
severe production crisis provoked by the massive emigration of the 
settler community and the widespread sabotage which went along 
with it, the immediate aim of the policy was to stabilize employ­
ment, to prevent the total collapse of production and to maintain 
stable prices.
Indeed, the immediate problem was to prevent the widespread 
bankruptcy of productive and commercial enterprises. Acts of 
sabotage and the withdrawal of the greater part of the managerial 
and skilled labour force provoked severe falls in productivity and 
in capacity utilization. The old state apparatus was collapsing 
and the newly emerging structures were overworked, inexperienced
and ill-equipped to deal with managing the economy as well as
I
assisting various enterprises in basic management.
As such, unit costs of production rose steeply, mainly becapse 
of falling productivity and lower capacity utilization. Nothing
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much could be done about falling productivity at that juncture, 
and the attention focussed on maintaining employment while keeping 
production going as well or poorly as possible. The wage bills in 
enterprises therefore de facto became a fixed cost, independently 
of the level of production. This clearly contributed to the rise 
in unit costs (Wuyts, 1983b: 20).
The rise in unit costs in all sectors of production would 
either imply massive price increases to guarantee the financial 
viability of the enterprises, or it would bring about a cascade of 
bankruptcies which would halt production altogether (Ibid: 23).
To prevent price inflation ar^ to stabilize employment as well 
as to assure the highest level of output given the circumstances, 
the policy adopted was to finance the deficits of productive 
enterprises (whether private or 'intervened') through bank credit 
(ibid: 23).
At the eve of independence day, the old colonial bank— the BNU 
(Banco Nacional Utramarino)— ceased to operate and simultaneously 
the BM (Banco de Mozambique) was constituted as central bank as 
well as commercial bank (Ibid: 25). Furthermore, the ICM
(Institute de Credito de Mocambique) was under direct state con­
trol. The remainder of the banking system was privately owned and
acted in an openly hostile fashion vis a vis the new government.
The latter banks became important vehicles to channel the illegal 
export of money capital abroad (field-interviews, 1983).
Through its control over the BM and the ICM, the new government 
sought to struggle against economic destabilization by financing
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the deficits of enterprises through pumping paper money into the 
economy (Wuyts, 1983b: 23).
This policy, however unorthodox it may appear did in fact 
constitute the most direct and effective way to deal with the 
crisis situation at hand. The need imposed itself on the new 
government since fiscal policies within a framework of balanced 
budgets would have been impossible to carry out since this would 
have required a large scale organization of taxes and of govern­
ment expenditures at a time that the whole state apparatus was in 
considerable turmoil.
In fact, Galbraith quite convincingly argued that the weapon of 
the inflationary issue of paper money was rather commonly wielded 
by the newly emerging power in situations of intense revolutionary 
change, although the direction of its use varies according to the 
given circumstances (1975:ch 6).
The important point to note in this concrete case of the 
Mozambican early post-independence period is that this inflation­
ary issue of money was not caused by any excess demand created by 
increased government expenditures or by escalating wage costs, but 
rather by the necessity to avoid the complete contraction of 
production. The issue at stake was not to set a demand multiplier 
working into an inflationary spiral, but rather to prevent a
supply multiplier spiralling downwards through production
2
standstills and bankruptcies.
Clearly, the results were queues and shortages, but an alterna­
tive policy of financial orthodoxy would have had disasterous
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consequences in terms of grinding the economy to a standstill 
(Wuyts, 1983b: 24).
Finally, it could be argued that the considerable quantities of 
money which were pumped into the economy without any effective 
material backing might end up becoming a destabilizing force in a 
later phase in which the consolidation of productivity would 
become of paramount importance. However, this problem was effec­
tively dealt with through the monetary reform of 1980 which 
accompanied the introduction of the new currency— the Metical. 
This reform effectively destroyed large holding of cash balances 
held by speculators. Indeed, it was an explicitly stated policy of 
that reform to create favourable conditions for the stabilization 
of the currency (Ibid: 39).
Undoubtedly, the monetary imbalances continued within the later 
period, but its origins were no longer a question of the immediate 
policies in confrontation with economic sabotage and production 
crisis. Rather, these imbalances originated from the specific way 
in which the economy was being transformed.
The point which I want to make here is that it would be incor­
rect to analyze monetary imbalances independently from the context 
in which they arise. In the immediate post-independence period 
money creation was aimed at preventing a collapse in production so 
as to neutralize the effect of sabotage and destabilization in a 
phase of intense struggle. Subsequently, the nature of monetary 
disequilibria became a product of the way in which the economy was 
being transformed within a system of state-centered accumulation, 
which is a different matter.
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The Cost of Social Services
Dudley Seers, in his preface to the book of Griffith-Jones, 
argues that no big gains can be made through the transformation of 
social services within the early stages of transition since they 
involve an expansion in public expenditures which the new regime 
simply cannot sustain at that time (1981).
Clearly, the specific way in which services such as health and 
education are provided depends on the class character of the 
society and constitutes a significant determinant of the distribu­
tion of income. Preobrazhensky formulated this point within the 
context of socialist transition as follows:
"from the moment of its victory the working class is trans­
formed from being merely the object of exploitation into 
being also the subject of it. It cannot have the same at­
titude to its own labour power, health, work and conditions 
as the capitalist has. This constitutes a definite barrier to 
the tonpo of socialist accumulation, a barrier which 
capitalist industry did not know in its first period of 
development. True, we know the enthusiasm and heroic self­
restrain of the working class in the first years of the 
organization of state industry, especially in the period of 
civil war. But such factors as this are not characteristic of 
the whole period of socialist accumulation... .
The first, quite obvious difference between the state 
economy of the proletariat and the typical capitalist economy
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is the fact that...in relation to the worker it [the state 
economy] begins (but only begins, up to now) to act as a 
system of production for consumption by the producers" 
(1965:122)."
This argument combines both the need for transformation within 
the structure of consumption (including essential services) and 
the need for restrain in the early phases of transition. The 
argument of Griffith-Jones only contains the latter aspect without 
placing it in a context of transformation. In fact, it boils down 
to an argument about quantity, and not about quality. The follow­
ing quote from the introduction shows this clearly:
"...in such cases agregate demand tends to increase sharply 
as the money supply grows to finance large deficits in the 
fiscal sector and the state enterprises. These financial 
flows reflect not only a process of redistribution of nominal 
income— from the wealthier groups of the population to the 
poorer ones— but also an expansion of total nominal income 
available for consumption. The latter tends to occur partly 
because the surplus available for redistribution, par­
ticularly within the specific political context and the 
existant class alliance, is insufficient to compensate for 
the increased income granted to the poorer strata. The 
problem is often not visualized clearly in advance by left- 
wing politicians, who over-estimate the surplus, mainly from 
the ’rich», effectively available for redistibution" 
(1981:19).
1 80
accumulation, the same argument is not made with respect to the 
alternative policy of the continued provision of these services as 
private goods (i.e., commodities). Private medicine or private 
schooling also imply a social cost, even if it does not show up in 
government expenditures. Hence, it would be incorrect to see 
public expenditures on health care as an unwarranted cost, while 
the burden of private medical care is seen as unproblematic.
Clearly, it is possible that in particular situations the 
balance of class forces is such that it is not feasible to do away 
with private medicine or private education. This imposes a further 
constraint on the process of transition inasmuch as it implies an 
added cost which itself presents an issue for struggle.
Turning now to the quantitative dimension of the problem. Graph 
6.1 gives the evolution of public current expenditures at current 
prices for the period 1970-83 (for those years for which data were 
available). As can be seen from this chart, public expenditures 
fell drastically in the immediate post-independence period as one 
would have expected. In comparative terms, current public expendi­
tures constituted an estimated 17$ to 26$ of national income in 
1970 and 19$ in 1980. From 1980 to 1983 this share of current 
expenditure in national income rose rapidly to 27$. However 54$ of 
the increase in current expenditures from 1980 to 1983 was due to 
increased expenditures on defense as a result of the escalation of 
the war which also negatively affected the growth of income (NPC, 
1984).
By 1980 health and education accounted for 28$ of the current 
expenditures, as compared with 16$ for general administration in
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1970. The latter category included education, health and statisti­
cal services. For example, health expenditures amounted to less 
than 3$ on the colonial budget as against 10$ in I960 (Walt and 
Wield, 1984:32).
Hence, it can hardly be argued that current expenditures on 
social services constituted a destabilizing force in terms of 
excess demand, although they obviously implied a significant 
social cost.
Furthermore, as shown in chapter 3, it was realised that the 
extension of health services to the whole of the country could 
not organized totally within the confines of the state sector 
since this would involve a major expansion of budget expenditures 
on wages. Through the training of village health workers a com­
plementary as between the state sector and the popular sector was 
aimed at in terms of the latter providing training and material 
assistance and the former supporting the cost of the technical 
labour involved. Hence, the question of financing health services 
was in part rooted in a concept of labour accumulation in the 
provision of these services as an element of social change 
propelled by state action.
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Central Planning and the Endogenity of the Money Supply
In this section I shall address the question as to the role of 
money creation in the process of state-centered accumulation 
during the period 1977-83.
In this period, major structural changes took place in order to 
set up the institutional framework for central planning. With 
respect to money and finance the institutional set-up became 
restructured in accordance with the requirements of central plan­
ning by means of material balances.
The government budget occupied a central position in the al­
location of financial resources. On the income side, a unique 
progressive income tax was introduced and the pre-existing variety 
of indirect taxes was streamlined through the introduction of a 
general turnover tax. However, over time the major contributing 
factor to the budget was to be the surpluses realized by state 
enterprises (Wuyts, 1983b; 32-33).
Nevertheless, the contribution from surplusses of state en­
terprises remained insignificant up to 1981, in which year they 
amounted to only 18$ of current government income (although the 
state sector had become dominant in terms of output in most sec­
tors of the economy) .(Ibid: 32).
Table 6.1 gives us a breakdown of the major sources of govern­
ment revenue over the period 1978 to 1982 (for selected years). 
In general, current income only left a small surplus over current 
expenditures, and hence the investment budget could not be 
financed directly through the budget.
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Investment in fixed capital as well as part of the investments 
in circulating capital were centralized in the budget (Ibid; 29). 
Table 6.2 gives the evolution of government investment over the 
period 1978 to 1983, as well as that part of this investment which 
was financed through official foreign assistance. Furthermore, 
overdrafts on foreign banks added a further component of foreign 
finance. With respect to internal finance, the main components 
were the small surpluses on current account as well as the profits 
fron the sale of gold. The latter aspect is unknown, but table 6.3 
gives sane indication of the evolution of gold reserves and for­
eign exchange holdings (mainly bank accounts with foreign banks).
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Table 6.1 Current Income of the Government Budget 1978-83 
(millions of meticias), selected years
1979 1981 1983
Direct taxes
1. Profit tax
2. Income tax
2,025
907
3,035
1,248
5,021
1,742
Indirect taxes
1. Turnover tax
2. Custom duties
3. Other taxes
4,075
2,047
1,037
5,307
2,497
806
5,873 
2,449 
1,028
Contributions from 
surplusses of State 
enterprises 271 3,247 2,952
Rent payments on 
nationalized housing 600 1,200 1 ,418
Other incomes 632 1 ,052 1 ,749
Total income 
Total current exp
11,594
10,886
18,402
17,346
22,231
21,343
Source: NPC, 1981
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Table 6.2 Government Investments 1978/79-1983 
(million meticais), current prices
1 978/79 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total Investment 8,010 9,916 13,962 14,255 10,197
Of which foreign 
official assistance 3,689 4,470 6,548 7,796 . 8,180
GDP —— 66,200 70,400 73,000 68,800
Source: NPC 1984
Note: 1978/79 figures refer to both years taken together.
Table 6. 3 External Liquid assets 1980-83 
(millions of meticais)
1 980 1981 1982 1983
Gold 7,271 6,310 1678 1089
Foreign exchange 831 17 -741 -1040
Total 8,102 6,327 964 49
Source: NPC, 1984
The remaining deficit as between available financial resources 
(internal and external) and the volume of investment was financed 
through money creation (Wuyts, 1983b: 33).
However, a problem arises in assessing the deficit of the state 
sector’s investments relatively to the available financial
resources inasmuch as the contributions of state enterprises to
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the budget did not represent aggregate financial surplusses of the 
state enterprises. In fact, deficits of state enterprises over and 
above planned subsidies from the budget to these enterprises were 
not transferred from the enterprises to the budget (as an added 
expenditure), but rather these deficits obliged the state banks to 
reschedule credits which fell due, but could not be met 
(field-interviews: 1983).
To see this, it is necessary to turn to the restructuring of 
the banking system within the institutional set-up of central 
planning. In January 1978 the banking system was nationalized with 
the exception of one private bank (The Standard-Totta Bank) and 
the state banks were reorganized into two banks: the Banco de 
Mozambique (BM) and the Banco Popular de Desenvolvineto (BPD) 
(Wuyts, 1983b: 28). The BM was the state bank: central bank,
financier of the budget, controller of the execution of the plan, 
as well as commercial bank. The BPD was a credit institution which 
specialized mainly in agricultural credit, as well as being a 
savings bank (Ibid: 29).
In 1979, a monetary reform introduced the new currency— the 
Metical. Within this process of change-over considerable balances 
of speculative funds were effectively being destroyed since they 
had not been deposited with the banks beforehand. The most inter­
esting feature of the reform was a new law (issued a few months 
before the actual introduction of the metical) which stated that 
all the institutional bodies (government departments, mass 
organizations) as well as all commercial and productive en­
terprises has to deposit their cash balances with the banks, and
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on a daily basis they were only allowed to keep money in cash up 
to an amount of 10,000 MT (Ibid; 39-40).
Clearly, the rationale behind this measure was to organize 
monetary flows within two circuits: scriptural money was to be 
used for transactions within the state sector as well as with 
the (large-scale) private enterprises. Fiduciary money was to 
circulate mainly ih payments to the wage and salary earners as 
well as in the exchange with household producers.
The inclusion of private enterprise within the circuit of 
scriptural money had mainly two reasons behind it. One was the 
issue of control so as to combat the holding of large speculative 
cash balances held by traders. Secondly, there was the explicit 
measure to integrate larger scale private enterprises within the 
plan and hence to subject them to planning by material balances 
(field-interviews: 1983).
The main function of the banks with respect to the economy was 
to finance the working capital of state enterprises. Hence, with 
respect to investment, a division of labour was set up as between 
the state budget and the banks: the budget would principally
finance investment in fixed capital, while the banks would finance 
investments in circulating capital (Wuyts, 1983: 29).
Within the banking system, the BM was the main financier with 
77$ of all credits, followed by the BPD with 19$, leaving only 4$ 
to the private bank. These relative proportions remained virtually 
constant over the 1980-83 period (NPC, 1984). Table 6.4 gives the 
sectoral distribution of credits for the period 1981/83.
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Table 6.4 Sectoral Distribution of Credit 
(% shares)
Sectors 1981 1982 1983
Agriculture 32 28 28
Industry and
Agro-Industry 45 39 34
Construction 1 2 2
Transport 2 4 9
Commerce and Other 20 27 27
Total 100 100 100
Source: NPC 1984
The greater share of bank credit went to the state sector. This 
was also the case in agriculture, although the state sector 
provided only 50$ of the marketed output (Frelimo, 1983:27). In 
fact, the cooperative sector only received 2$ of all investments 
in agriculture (ibid:28).
Bank credit to the state sector would be advanced in accordance 
with the specifications of the national plan which balanced 
resource needs with their production and/or importations.
Although planned utilization of resources would formally 
balance with planned production or planned importation (financed 
by exports and foreign loans), in practice the actual availability 
of resources did not match their planned utilization. The nature 
of the disequilibria thus created is by no means simply a
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phenomena of the financial sphere;— a situation of excess demand.
Kornai argues this point quite strongly in the following manner:
"As has become clear earlier in this chapter, the state 
of suction in the socialist economy cannot be explained 
simply by the phenomena of the financial sphere: by the 
disproportion between demand and supply, or between purchas­
ing power and the quantity of goods offered at the given 
prices. In that form, and without special restrictions, this 
can be said only about the consumer’s market. On the market 
of the means of production the main problem is not that
there is— using a simplified expression— ’too much money’ in 
the hands of the buyers. To cover the requirements of its 
current production, for a normal or maybe tense utilization 
of capacity, the firm demands more material, more spare
parts, more machines and manpower than it has at its 
disposal. Similarly, for the realization of the agreed 
investment decisions there would be need for more machines, 
more building activity and more foreign currency than can be 
afforded by the investment potential of the country. In this 
case therefore it is not a disproportion in the financial 
sphere we are faced with, but a gap between the actual real 
requirement aroused by plans and decisions, and the actual 
real possibilities." (1971:330)^
Hence, the situation reflects itself in the financial sphere.
but does not originate there. Money is essentially passive with
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respect to the financing of production integrated under the plan 
(and this concerns mainly the state sector) and with respect to 
planned investment. Or, as Kornai would say: the budget constraint 
is soft in these cases (1979:801-19).
High costs and low productivity conditions in the state sector 
implied that a considerable part of this sector ran consistent 
deficits which needed to be financed by bank credit. Furthermore, 
since the surplus generating capacity of the state sector remained 
low, investments could not be financed from an accumulation fund 
originating from the state sector.
Clearly, this raises the question of the pricing policy of the 
government vis-a-vis state enterprises. Higher prices for the 
output of the state sector would enable a bigger financial surplus 
to be generated. In fact, some prices were adjusted in 1981, and 
this accounted for the fact that contributions from state en- 
terprices to the budget became more significant in that year.
However, there was a strong reluctance to resolve the problem 
by price increases. As explained by R. Balthazar— the minister of 
finance who also headed the price commission— the government was 
strongly preoccupied with the financial situation of state en­
terprises, but price increases would only be granted if normal 
average (prime) costs had risen significantly. Indeed, this 
measure aimed to avoid that state enterprises would ofload their 
inefficiencies onto consumers. Hence, the concept of * normal’ 
costs which implied that the enterprise was operating with 
reasonable capacity utilization and with reasonable productivity. 
However, since most state enterprises did not have any proper
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accounting, demands fran enterprises to the commission to raise 
their prices could not be substantiated.^
It was often overlooked, however, that the inefficiencies of 
state enterprises were not merely a question of internal manage­
ment problems, since many of the problems sprang from the planning 
system itself. The focus on accumulation often implied that neces­
sary raw materials were not imported since priority was given to 
importing investment goods. The result was low capacity utiliza­
tion in industry for lack of inputs (Wuyts, 1980a). Furthermore, 
the principal demand imposed on state enterprises was to fulfil 
their targets, although the latter exceeded the actual production 
capacity of the firms. The result was the inflation of costs due 
to added expenditures in order to cope with targets as well as to 
a dispersal of efforts (Ibid).
To consolidate the state sector it would have been necessary to 
start from the real organizational capacity as determined by the 
organization of the labour process and to concentrate on improving 
this organization so as to make targets a real expression of 
productive capacity. Investment would have to aim at strengthening 
the organization of labour within production, rather than sub­
stituting for the lack of such organization and therefore 
amplifiying the problem of high costs/low productivity at a larger 
scale (CEA, 1982c). The plan’s preoccupation with fixed capital as 
a solution to productivity problems as well as to propel economic 
growth effectivily constituted a stumbling block vis-a-vis the 
consolidation of state enterprises. The policy of increasing the 
profitability of the state sector without resorting to excessive
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price increases therefore had little effect in practice, and the 
deficits persisted.
Money creation without a corresponding material backing is the 
logical consequence of this type of disequilibria, since as 
Lavigne explained clearly:
"The bank’s obligation to cover only expenditures tied to 
the execution of the plan does not protect it from an exces­
sive opening of credits. That is the case, first, when the 
plan has been badly drawn up, in particular when it is too 
’tight’, demanding a final production of the enterprise 
without giving it sufficient resources. The enterprise will 
then tend to present additional credit demands, argueing 
from the necessity of buying supplementary supplies or given 
extra pay, in order to succeed in realizing the plan" 
(1978:43).
Two points follow frcwi the analysis. Firstly, as was already
hinted at, the investment budget of the government did not fully
reflect the shortfall of government savings relatively to the
volume of investments. Indeed, all financial deficits of the state
enterprises (which were not covered by the relatively insignifi-
7cant subsidies) were not supported by the budget .
Secondly, these disequilibria were not confined to the state 
sector only, since they inevitable spilled-over into the remainder 
of the economy. Indeed, the two circuits of money were by no means 
separate, but part and parcel of an objective unity. For example.
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if a state farm contracted more seasonal labourers than planned 
for (while often producing well below the target) the increased 
wage bill would inflate the circuit of cash in the economy. 
Similarly, in the case where the actual capacity to import was 
less than the planned capacity, an inevitable competition for 
imports would ensue, which often cut out imports of consumer goods 
and of producer goods for household production, even if the latter 
were provided for in the plan (Hanlon, 1984; 100).
To assess the quantitative importance of this process of exces­
sive money creation with respect to the state sector, the 
evolution of internal credit of the banking system is of par­
ticular interest. This item concerns the credits advanced to the 
economic sectors (and mainly to the state sector), but it does not 
include credits to the government budget (field-interviews: 1983). 
Now, under normal circumstances, the credits advanced by the banks 
to the economy follow the rythm of economic activity inasmuch as 
with the growth of the economy, credits will grow as well, and the 
volume of monetary circulation will consequently increase.
Graph 6.2 compares the evolution of internal credit with that 
of the global social product at current prices for the period 
1980-84. While GSP increased slightly over the 1980-82 period and 
subsequently declined in 83, internal credit has been growing at a 
rapid rate throughout. The main growth component of internal
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credit was due to the need to reshedule the debts of enterprises 
in persistent deficits. Furthermore, the sharp discrepancy between 
both variables was due to a large extend to the escalation of the 
war as well as the spread of the drought over the country and its 
impact on production of state farms (NPC, 1984).
Furthermore, graph 6.3 compares the evolution of the money
g
supply with that of national income. The money supply includes 
cash in circulation, demand deposits as well as time deposits 
(which one would expect to be a relatively small component). As 
can be seen, the money supply grew rapidly in relation to national 
income at current prices (which are of course official prices). 
The fastest growing component of the money supply was cash in 
circulation which doubled in volume from 1980 to 82. This growth 
of the money supply took place against a background of rather 
modest increases in official prices.
Graph 6.4 provides an indication of the rate of increase of 
official prices for the 1980-82 period. The official explanation 
of this rapid increase in the money supply (and especially in cash 
in circulation) was that the velocity of money declined as a 
result of the rupture in the normal commercial circuits due to the 
war and the drought (NPC,1984).
However, as I shall argue in the next chapter, this assumed 
decline in the velocity of money does not take account of the 
development of parallel markets and the rapid inflation of paral­
lel market prices.
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In summary, after the Third Congress the focuss of development 
shifted from consolidating productivity within the state sector to 
its rapid expansion through stepping up the rate of investment. As 
such, the state sector did not generate financial surplusses in 
accordance with the requirements of state accumulation, and only 
part of the difference was financed through foreign aid and loans. 
The remaining gap was financed through the creation of money by 
the banks in extending credits to the budget and to the state 
enterprises. The question now arises as to the consequences of 
these monetary disequilibria.
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Financing Socialist Development
As was shown in the previous section, the accumulation in the 
state sector relied heavily on money creation as its principal 
internal source of finance. This process created monetary im­
balances within the economy and this poses the question as to the 
consequences of such imbalances for socialist development.
Griffith-Jones argues that a useful starting point to examine 
inflation in specific cases of transition to socialism can be 
found in Kakecki's analysis of financing economic development 
in a mixed economy (Griffith-Jones, 1981;18). The basic premise of 
Kalecki’s analysis is the following:
"There are no financial limits, in the formal sense, to the 
volume of investment. The real problem is whether this 
financing of investment does, or does not, create inflation­
ary pressures. ...It is easy to show that the crucial point
in the problem of whether a certain level of investment
creates or does not create inflationary pressures is the 
possibility of expansion of supply of consumer goods in 
response to demand". (1976a:44)
The key issue within this analysis concerns distribution and the 
key concept is that of forced savings as a source of finance of 
accumulation. The method is based on a structuralist analysis of 
real macro-economic balances and subsequently the financial ad­
justment mechanisms are deduced. Financial adjustments are
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analysed in terms of distributional relationships within a given
social structure of the economy, and as such the consequences in
:
terms of changes at the level of production are not explored or
only marginally so. Production enters only in order to explain
certain elasticities or rigidities in supply responses, but not
within a context of tranforming the social structure of production 
itself as a result of the specific processes through which these 
monetary imbalances operate.
A straightforward example of an analysis based on Kalecki's key 
premise is provided by Saith in his article on the distributional 
dimensions of transition in Ethiopia (1985b:162-65). Saith argues 
that to maintain balanced development, economic growth should not
imply a reduction in the standard of living of the poor. This
premise then provides a simple equation of a dynamically specified 
equilibrium condition against which the actual experience can be 
assessed.
To see this, let p be the growth rate of population, y the
targeted growth rate of income (which implies a certain rate of
accumulation in the economy) , and e the income elasticity of
demand for necessities. It follows that the required rate of 
growth in the supply of necessities needed to avoid inflationary 
pressures on the price of nécessites is given by the following 
equation which postulates a condition of balanced growth:
n » p + e(y - p)
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[which is indeed the same basic equation as derived by Kalecki 
(1976b:99)]. Note that e is the average income elasticity of 
demand for necessities which reflects "a weighted mean of class 
specific elasticities" (Saith, 1985b:l62).^
Assuming a plausible value for e, and inserting the real growth 
rates of population and income for the Ethiopian case during the 
1974-79 period, Saith concludes that the actual rate of growth of 
necessities fell short of the warranted rate, and subsequently the 
financial adjustment mechanisms are hypothesized as follows:
"Where the warranted growth rates are exceeded, two pos­
sibilities exist. First, the entire distributional profile 
could be depressed (or controlled) so as to achieve the 
required balance between the excessive demand and available 
supply of necessities. Such an effect could be obtained 
through comprehensive controls over the pricing and dis­
tribution of necessities. Hence, the loss of consumption 
would be shared by all. Secondly, and more generally, the 
rising price of foodgrains would act as an inequitable 
rationing devise, transfering real incomes and food consump­
tion from the poor to the rich. Thus the value of e would be 
adjusted to its warranted level via income redistribution 
from the poor to the rich" (1985b:163).
Within this more general case, financial adjustment takes place 
through the inflation of food prices which implies that "the 
higher than warranted aggregate income growth rate is financed
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through forced savings in the form of lower consumption by the 
poor" (ibid; 163).
Two observations need to be made with respect to this analysis. 
First, the logical chain of reasoning runs from imbalances within 
the real sphere to induced processes of financial adjustment so as 
to arrive at the resulting changes within income distribution. 
This analysis overlooks the fact that the process through which 
imbalances are created is not independent from the specific nature 
of the adjustment mechanisms. The question is not one of either/or 
with respect to possible adjustment mechanisms, because these 
processes take place within a organizational context which also 
determines the nature of the imbalances. The Ethiopian economy is 
characterized by a predominance of the state sector in major 
sectors of the economy and by the organization of the economy 
through central planning. The process of adjustment would not 
proceed through a flexible market price of food, but rather 
through the development of parallel markets and the widening 
differentials between official and parallel market prices of 
necessities. Competing circuits of exchange will exist within the 
context of a two tier pricing system. The character of these 
processes needs to be analysed so as to understand the nature and 
impact of the imbalances in the economy.
Secondly, contradictions within the economy will appear as 
struggles over di stri but ion. Indeed, the terrain in which the 
analysis is set concerns distributional relationships. This is not 
to say that distributional aspects are irrelevant or of secondary 
importance. The point is that a structuralist analysis does not
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address the question of the relationship between the nature of 
imbalances and the changes this can bring about at the level of 
production. It tends to analyse the burden of accumulation without 
reference to its content.
The problem is not solved by introducing production sectors 
within the analysis, and thereby broadening the framework of 
analysis by considering not only the question of forced savings 
(depressing consumption), but also the issue of net resource
transfers as between such sectors. In this type of analysis, the 
key distinction with respect to sectors is not the type of
economic activity (industry, agriculture, etc.), but rather the 
form of ownership (public/private, or more elaborately, state 
sector, capitalist enterprise sector, household production).
The context in which this broader type of structuralist 
analysis is set is the concept of the mixed economy. Within such 
economy, various production sectors characterized by different 
forms of production co-exist and the issue of financing economic 
development is seen to be not merely a question of the real wage, 
but also a question of balance as between the different sectors.
This point has been argued clearly by Fitzgerald in discussing 
the case of Nicaragua:
"We have tried to show that the development of a macro- 
economic strategy based on ’real side’ (in the Kaleckian
sense and not that of the latter day new economics) balances
to achieve macro-economic stability in the Plan, combined 
with a financial policy to support that strategy, is the 
correct way to approach the problem of stabilization rather
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than the other way around. The Nicaraguan case shows how 
this can be done first to achieve a real downwards 
redistribution of income and then to ’force’ domestic 
savings, in order to finance a higher rate of investment and 
substitute for reduced ’foreign savings’.
The shortcomings of the approach were already clear by 
1982, and in 1983 were acted upon. In particular, the effect 
of inflation upon the relations between the ’formal’ (or 
state-capitalist’ in a crude sense) sector and the
’informal’ (or rather petty-commodity form of production) 
sector was clearly negative. It was necessary to restore 
real wages and the internal terms of trade;...
The Nicaraguan experience would seem to indicate that 
financial balance is important, not to retain the required 
income distribution in the formal sector, but rather to 
maintain the current balance with the other forms of 
production— particularly the peasant farmers and the infor­
mal sectors" (1984:16-18).
Hence, apart from ’forced savings’, two other key concepts 
come to the fore in this analysis: the concept of net resource 
transfers between sectors, and linked with this, the concept of 
the internal terms of trade as between two different sectors. The 
analysis therefore becomes more complex inasmuch as the problem of 
financing economic development is not only a question of maintain­
ing a proper balance as between the rate of accumulation and the
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growth in the supply of necessities, but also in the exchange 
between different forms of production.
In fact, this conception of the need to maintain or to restore 
balance between the state sector and the popular sector was very 
much in the forefront of discussion in the concrete situation of 
Mozambique in 1983. The basic argument of the minister of internal 
commerce was that the deficits of the state sector had destabil­
ized the exchange with the peasantry inasmuch as the state sector 
bought commodities from the peasantry in excess to what it sold to 
them. The peasantry was thus forced to hoard cash balances for 
which there was no outlet. As a result, it was argued that the 
peasantry withdrew from this exchange since there was no longer 
any incentive to produce cash crops or to supply labour power 
(Wuyts, 1983a: 1-5).
This theory fitted neatly in a framework of analysis in which 
money flows in two circuits with respect to two sectors within the 
economy (the state sector and the remainder of the economy). The 
imbalances created within the circuit of money within the state 
sector were then seen to spill-over into the other circuit, where 
it accounted for the withdrawal of household producers from the 
exchange. The preoccupation of the minister, not unlike the one 
expressed by Fitzgerald in his analysis of Nicaragua, was to 
restore balance between the sectors (Wuyts, 1983a: 5).
An interesting feature of this analysis of the relationships 
between sectors characterized by the form of ownership and set 
within a context of a mixed economy is that conceptually it runs 
completely parallel to the analysis of inter-sectoral net resource
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flows as between sectors characterized by economic activity 
(principally agriculture versus industry). Saith characterizes 
this latter approach as follows:
"A quite distinct use of the notion of ’surplus’ is made in 
the analysis of inter-sectoral net resource flows (ISNRF). 
Did agriculture generate a ’surplus’ for financing in­
dustrialization in Japan, or China, or the Soviet Union? The 
inter-sectoral accounting framework used by Ishihawa (1967a, 
chapter 4; 1967b) for Japan India and Taiwan, and for China 
during 1950-59, by Elman (1975) and others for the Soviet 
Union during 1928-1932, and by Mundle and Okhawa (1979) for 
Japan during 1889-1937, and by Mody et al for India and 
Japan, employs the word surplus to refer to the balance of 
trade, or the balance of payments, or other related balances 
arising from the exchanges between the sectors. These 
various surplus categories are thus akin to the ones deriv­
able from the international trade accounting framework... .
However, ..., this accounting framework could hide as 
much as it reveals with regard to the financial role played 
by agriculture: when transfer pricing is rampant in inter­
sectoral exchanges, what is required is not a book-keeper 
who records the face value of transactions, but a cost 
accountant who can detect sharp pricing practices." 
(1985a:18)
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Hence, Saith argues that not only the apparent net—resource flows 
between sectors should be taken Into account, but also the hidden 
transfers which result from the movement of the internal terms of 
trade. These are indeed the concepts used by Fitzgerald to analyse 
the question of balance as between different forms of production.
In fact, both approaches converge not only with respect to the 
conceptual framework, but also in terms of substance if production 
sectors by form of ownership relate in a one-to-one fashion with 
production sectors by type of economic activity. The classic 
example is obviously the Soviet case in which the industry versus 
agriculture dichotomy converged with state sector versus peasantry 
division.^^ '
This convergence of conceptual framework in dealing with the 
balance between branches of economic activity on the one hand and 
between different forms of production on the other is not so 
surprising since the underlying questions are very similar. To 
what extent is the burden of industrialization carried by the 
agrarian producers? And similarly, to what extent are the social­
ized sectors of the economy financed by the non-socialized ones? 
Hence, for example, if the state sector is seen to be the (at 
least potentially) socialized sector of the economy, the question 
relates as to how the growth of this sector is in part financed by 
other sectors such as household production and private enterprise.
However, two problems arise here if the method of analyzing 
macro-balances by means of inter-sectoral net resource flows is 
applied to deal with the issue of transformation within the tran­
sition to socialism. First, the danger is to see each sector as
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invariant inasmuch as the process of transformation of the charac­
ter Of the economy would then depend on the evolution of the
balance between these sectors depending on their relative growth
rates, and the latter In turn would depend on the extent to which
one sector accumulates on the basis of resource transfers from the
others. The question as to how these socialized sectors emerge and
how socialization may proceed by transforming other forms of
production (e.g.. peasant production through the cooperative 
movement) is then left aside.
secondly. the question arises as to the organizational
Sechanlcs through which this process of resource transfer between 
different forms of production Is regulated (whether consciously or 
spontaneously). A concept of a 'mixed planned economy' in which 
different forms of production are 'articulated under state 
guldence' basically Implies that the Initiative lies firmly with 
the state with respect to the overall organization of the economy, 
although part of this articulation takes the form of market 
mechanisms (Fitzgerald. 1985:216). This notion does not preclude 
the possibility Of contradiction or crisis, but the underlying 
notion Of struggle Is that of a conflict over distribution.
The concept of primitive socialist accumulation bears close 
resemblance to this type of structural analysis of Inter-sectoral 
net-resource flows between sectors characterized by form of 
production. Nevertheless. It Is somewhat more dynamically con- 
celved inasmuch as It does not take as Its starting point a given 
structure of various sectors within a mixed economy, but rather It
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looks at the process through which this structure evolves over 
time. Two aspects are important in this more dynamic set-up.
First, as clearly stated by Saith, primitive accumulation 
involves a transfer of both stock and flow resources from an 
antecedent mode of production to an emergent one. It represents a 
transfer not between sectors, but between modes of production" 
(1985a:18). And, secondly, the notion of primitive socialist 
accumulation implied a concept of struggle as between two laws: 
the law of value and the law of socialist accumulation 
(Preobrazhensky, 1965:136-146).
Key to the notion of primitive socialist accumulation is that 
within the context of a less developed economy in which household 
production retains a significant, if not dominant, share in 
rural production, the process of transition is of necessity a 
protracted one. The initial nationalizations of the commanding 
heights of the economy and their consolidation within a state 
sector still only represents an enclave within a wider economy. To 
develop, this 'socialist' sector would need to expand not only on 
its owm steam, but also through transforming resources from the 
remaining private sector (Harrison, 1985:86).
With respect to the nature of these transfers, both stocks and 
f1ows are important. Indeed, for example, expropriation and 
nationalization are specific instances in which stocks are trans­
ferred between various forms of production. The expropriation of 
land holdings and either their redistribution to the peasantry 
through a land reform, or their absorption within the state sector 
is an example of this type of 'transfers’. Indeed, the state
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sector emerges precisely as a result of nationalization of private 
enterprises.
with respect to flov^, Harrison points outs that the notion of
primitive socialist accumulation as originally viewed by the
Bolsheviks not only referred to flows of commodities, but also to 
flows of labour power:
"For him [- Bukharin], primary socialist accumulation 
meant the mobilization and militarization of labour from 
beyond the ranks of the existing working class. Concrlptlon 
of the peasantry Into public works would provide the neces­
sities for industrial reconstruction on socialist lines. 
Although popular for a short time (at least among 
Bolsheviks) this Idea was shelved In 1921 with the relaxa­
tion of wartime controls and Initiation of NEF. When 
Probrazhensky (1965:91-112). revived "primary socialist 
accumulation" in the NEP context, the priorities had 
Changed. Now the key dimension appeared to be the mobi­
lization of the agricultural surplus product and Its 
transfer to public sector Industries by means of direct and 
indirect taxation of peasant producers" (1985:87),
In fact, the Issue of the transfer of labour power 'from beyond 
the ranks of the existing working class' has special reference in 
these Instances where the process of proletarianization Itself was 
incomplete. In Mozambique, the colonial plantations and settler 
farms were based on the supply of seasonal labour power drawn from 
the peasantry with the aid of the coercive power of the colonial
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State. This supply of labour power was cheap inasmuch as the 
labour remained linked to household production and hence the wage 
did not cover fully the subsistence requirements of the worker and 
his family. The state farm sector largely inherited this form of 
procuring its labour supply, and in fact, planners at the ministry 
of agriculture often assumed an elastic supply of seasonal labour 
power when elaborating their plans. The fact that the state sector 
itself was based on this specific supply of labour power and hence 
that decisions taken with respect to this type of labour power 
would need to be evaluated in conjunction with a policy on trans­
forming household production was largely overlooked (O’Laughlin, 
1981 ;9-32). In his analysis of the agrarian question in Nicaragua, 
Fitzgerald makes a similar point as to the nature of the source of 
labour power for the state farm sector (1985:21
The key notion of primitive socialist accumulation is that of 
the necessity of transferring resources to the state sector so as 
to propel its more rapid expansion than that of other sectors over 
time. Comparing this with Fitzgerald’s analysis on Nicaragua the 
difference in accent is striking. The latter argues for maintain­
ing balance between the different forms of production, and indeed 
draws this necessity as a lesson from the Nigaraguan experience. 
Within the view of Preobrazhensky:
"if capitalism is motion, socialism is still more 
rapid motion. And what it loses in speed in the 
period of primitive accumulation, in the sense of 
development of its technical economic base, owing 
to extreme poverty in capital, it is obliged to
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make up for by intensified accumulation at the 
expense of the non-socialist milieu" (1965:110).
Disequilibrium in the exchange with other forms of production 
(and specifically with the peasantry) was foremost in 
Preobrazhensky's mind. This comes out very clearly in his view on 
the issue of paper money as a form of primitive accumulation:
"When the state is at the same time an organ which rules the 
country and the master of a huge economic complex, issue of 
paper money directly serves as a channel for socialist 
accumulation. This accumulation is carried out at the ex­
pense either of the incomes of the petty-bourgois and 
capitalist elements or of reduced wages of the state workers 
and office employees"(ibid:91).
In contrast, Fitzgerald's analysis on the rural question argues 
strongly for maintaining balance between the socialized sector and 
household production in the interest of production. Hence, his 
argument is for the consolidation of the state sector while sup­
porting rather than competing with other production forms 
(1985:220). Undoubtedly, Fitzgerald was sharply aware of the 
dangers implied in a scissors crisis if the imbalances got out of 
hand.
However, there still remains the question why Preobrazhensky 
stressed the urgency of this process of transition. For him, the 
key issue was that of struggle as between two laws of organizing 
production, and their co-existence "cannot exist for long, because
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one system must oust the other" (1965:110). In Fitzgerald's 
analysis this notion of internal tension as between two organizing 
systems is not present as can be seen fron the following two 
statements:
"None the less, the major shortcoming of this accumulation 
model was undoubtedly its almost exclusive concentration on 
the APP [state sector] as a focus of modernization. Large 
private farmers might not wish to invest, but the middle 
farmers and the cooperatives were also neglected in 
machinery assignment, cattle restocking, and irrigation 
equiptment. The political objective of preventing the re- 
emergence of capitalist accumulation or the reconstruction 
of a rural bourgoisie (albeit on a petty scale) appears to 
have been the main justification. However, the cost in terms 
of production was high, and in any case such a sector could 
have been simply controlled through the existing fiscal, 
banking and commercial mechanisms, let alone the eventual 
applications of Agrarian Reform Laws (1985:220)... .
"To overcome this contradiction, which is already apparent, 
the APP would have to restore part of the role of estate 
agriculture in the rural economic formation, acting as a 
point of articulation for small and medium farmers instead 
of acting as a competitor to them. This articulation essen­
tial implies subordinating them to the state sector rather 
than marginalizing them, but also means shifting input and
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investment resources towards them in exchange for guaranteed 
production sold to the state" (1985:224).
In this view, the economy is firmly directed by the state which 
can determine as well as alter the conditions under which other 
forms of production develop. The state itself appears to be above 
class forces which those transformations may set in motion. Hence, 
the references to the state ’controlling’ the scope of development 
of the other forms of production, as well as to the state sector 
subordinating’ their dynamic to its own requirements. This view 
precludes the analysis of contradictions which may imply that the 
state looses its grip over the economy (and not merely because of 
a withdrawal reflex from private production) and that it looses 
its own cohesion in action since it too is on object of class 
struggle with respect to the process of transition.
In her analysis of the agrarian question in Mozambique, Bridget 
O’Laughlin stresses the urgency of a broad based process of trans­
formation based on the simultaneous process of the growth and 
transformation of the state sector and the development of the 
cooperative sector. The former requires transforming the migrant 
labour system which underlies production in the nationalised 
agricultural sector (and hence breaking with the pattern of primi­
tive socialist accumulation by drawing labour-power from the 
peasantry), while the latter expresses the need to raise produc­
tivity within family agriculture through its transformation within 
the cooperative movement. Hence, the need to advance on ^  fronts 
within the context of agrarian change. Within this view, the
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sectors are not seen as invariant, rather, each sector is subject 
to motion which interconnects through the relation between them 
(1981)/'*
Implicit within this view is that state economic power can be 
organized to propel this process of transition and hence retain 
the initiative in mobilizing class forces in favour of such 
transition. Conversely, failure to transform does not necessarily 
imply inaction or retarded development, but it may set in motion 
processes which may end up entering in direct competition and 
confrontation with socialist transition.
In this respect, the role of monetary imbalances can be sin­
gularly important. The danger inherent in financing the
development of the state sector by issueing money which aims at 
transferring resources from the private sector to the state sector 
is not merely a question of distributional struggle on the part of 
private producers.
The key issue here is that the capacity of the state to propel 
a broad process of transformation depends on the way in which it 
succeeds to mobilise social forces within the economy through the 
specific forms in which it organises its economic power to inter­
vene within the economy. Through its intervention within the
economy the state sector can alter the terms at which access to
material resources is determined, and as such influence the
dynamics of change. The domain of the official economy is there­
fore dependent on the content and the organization of planning the 
transition.
216
This power Is not absolute, and hence the domain of the offi­
cial economy does not coincide with the economy at large. The 
state fragments the access to economic resources by using Its own 
economic power within the context of a managed economy in which 
the state does not control all production. The boundaries between 
the official and parallel economies therefore depend on the con­
tent and the organization of planning state economic power in its 
intervention Within the economy.
The strength of the argument of O’Laughlin lies in the realisa­
tion that state economic planning (in the concrete conditions 
which prevailed in Mozambique) could not afford to concentrate its 
efforts exclusively on the transformation and quantitative expan­
sion of the state sector, since this would destabilise the peasant 
economy, and ultimately end up frustrating the process of state- 
centered accumulation itself, since it would prove impossible for 
the state to mobilise material resources within the wider economy 
behind the expansion of the state sector.
In the next chapter, it will be argued that the process of 
state-centered accumulation located the dynamics of the develop­
ment of family agriculture within the parallel economy, and as a 
result propelled the forces of social differentiation of the 
peasantry.
Hence, the question of the parallel economy within the process 
of transition is not merely an issue of a nuisance befalling 
planners. The key issue is not its impact on distribution
217
(although the development of parallel markets had important dis­
tributional implications), but its implications in terms of 
shaping production relations within the economy.
In the previous section the apparent fall in the velocity of 
money during the 80-83 period was pointed out. One explanation for 
this phenomena is given by Harrison in his discussion of the 
agrarian question in Soviet development:
"...it is true that before collectivization peasants had 
begun to withhold sales of foodstuffs (especially grains) 
from state procurement agencies, but the reason was not the 
adverse terms of trade, which were improving. The reason was 
that the ambitious public sector investment programme was
inflating household purchasing power in both town and
country beyond the capacity of consumer industries to
satisfy it. Lack of availability of consumer goods forced 
the seller of foodstuffs to accumulate useless cash, and 
constituted a disincentive to sell" (1985:92; my emphasis).
This argument abstracts from the operation of parallel markets 
and the circulation of money within these parallel circuits. As 
will be shown in the next chapter, the experience of Mozambique 
indicates that the hoards of useless cash quickly became trans­
formed into money capital in the hands of speculative commercial 
capital. As such, money acquired an active role within the
economy.
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Financing the War and Deregulation
From 1983 onwards, the war waged by South Africa through the 
MNR against Mozambique became the overriding political, military 
and economic issue. At the economic level, the crucial question 
was how to pay for the war. At first sight, therefore, it may 
appear surprising that in a situation where the issue of organiz­
ing for a war economy became of central importance, the question 
of liberalization of the economy and consequently the demand for 
deregulation became a major issue. Indeed, the organization of an 
economy within a war situation normally implies centralization of 
decision making as well as increased regulation so as to con­
centrate resources behind the war effort.
Both external and internal factors accounted for the fact that 
the demand for deregulation of the economy became a political 
issue. First, as shown in chapter 5, there was the policy of 
opening-up to the west in the second half of 1983. Along with this 
move towards closer alliance with Western countries would come the 
external pressure for deregulation and liberalization of the 
economy.
But the pressure for deregulation and for freeing the market 
was not merely external. After the fourth congress a pragmatic 
position gained strength among party members and government 
officials. The argument was that in times of acute production 
crisis the overriding priority should go towards increasing 
production. To achieve this aim it was felt that it was necessary
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to allow for the partial liberalization of the economy by abolish­
ing ’negative' controls over trade.
This solution appeared pragmatic inasmuch as it was seen to be 
the quickest way to recuperate production. And, de facto, there 
was an objective basis for it inasmuch as the prior development of 
parallel markets had created a certain room for manouvre for 
private enterprise as well as for the richer peasantry to gain 
relatively in strength. Private enterprise therefore appeared as 
more vigourous and capable as well as willing to organize 
production. Hence, the demand to allow more space for the develop­
ment of the unoffical economy next to, and interconnected with the 
'official’ economy.
As such,the economy was operating a "two-tier pricing system, 
with a substantially differentiated market associated with dif­
ferential prices" (Mackintosh, 1985: 59). At the level of domestic 
policy, the question of encountering new solutions in a crisis 
situation was not so much,seen therefore as that of 'freeing the 
market', and hence moving towards a single pricing system, but 
rather the much more guarded approach of increasing the sphere of 
operation of the unofficial economy by deregulating certain prices 
(e.g., for vegetables and fruits as will as for dertain food crops 
such as cassava) and by channelling more resources towards private 
producers on a quid pro quo basis with the state sector (ibid, 
section C).
In fact, there are sound theoretical reasons why a two-tier 
pricing system should by maintained under such circumstances, 
contrary to what the free-market ideologues of many donor
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countries may think. An interesting parallel can be found with the 
debate which took place on the 'planning versus the market' issue 
in Britain immediately after the second World War. Of specific 
interest is the arguments put forward by H.D Henderson in his 
Presidential Address delivered to the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science on September 10th 1948. The opening
paragraph has a 'deja vu' ring to it for anyone familiar with the 
recent Mozambican situation;
A year ago, my predecessor in my present role. Professor 
Dennis Robertson, devoted most of his address to a review of 
the controversy which was then active about the poten-
^i^Hties of economic planning. I had made my own
contribution...and which I was moved to write, partly by 
what seemed to me the incoherence of the planning ideology 
which was prevalent, and partly by the suspicion that plan­
ning appealed to many as having the properties of a magic 
charm which would enable us, not to solve, but to shirk our 
problems. Since then the ideologues of planning have
remained mostly on the defensive, while their opponents, 
marching under the banner of a return to the price system, 
have launched a general assault. I had better confess at 
once that this revivalist ideology seems to me marked by the 
same defects which repelled me in planning ideology, that is 
to say, inchoherence and wishful thinking. The phrase, 'the 
price system', is bandied about as though its meaning wer©
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self-evident, and as though it, too, has the properties of a 
magic charm" (1948:467).
To substantiate this statement, Henderson argued that in times
of large-scale economic maladjustment the concept of an equi­
librium price is plainly ambiguous. In true Marshallian fashion,
he draws the distinction between the short run and the long run
equilibrium prices, which— he argues— in ordinary times are seldom 
far apart. However, in times of severe economic disturbances in 
which there is a large excess of demand over supply, the short 
term equilibrium price may be very high; -effectively much higher 
than is useful to stimulate production since "an exorbitant price 
does not stimulate production appreciably more than a good price; 
it frequently stimulates it less" (ibid:473). And furthermore, he 
argues, "the disadvantages of an exorbitant price, or in more 
popular language, a profiteering price, may be very great" 
(ibid:473). Hence:
"It is a mistake, therefore, to suppose that in such condi­
tions the theoretical short-term equilibrium p^ice is either 
what we want, or what we normally get in a free economy, or 
that relative prices would be "right" if the State did not 
interfere with them by controls and subsidies. ...Prices 
fail in these circumstances, to discharge the function of 
lopping-off excess demand; and problems of allocation must 
be dealt with by other means or left unresolved" (ibid:474).
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He concludes by suggesting regulated prices guided by normal long- 
run equilibrium prices and supplemented by quantitative controls 
and rationing rules.
So much for a neo-classical argument in a different context, 
but the rationale for the two-tier pricing system can be very well 
understood with reference to this argument. As Mackintosh showed, 
the price adjustment of 1985 aimed to allow for profitable produc­
tion at official prices such that the state sector would either 
break even or make profits, and subsequently the state sector 
should rally its economic power within markets to restrain paral­
lel market prices (1985, sections B and C).
i
However, the situation in Mozambique was not merely a question 
of maladjustment as such, but rather that of an economy ravaged by 
an internal war. The key political issue is to regain the initia­
tive in the struggle with the enemy, and this requires that the 
economy is organized such that it can pay for the war.
Two issues are of central importance. First, the state has to 
be able to secure procurement of food crops to feed the army as
well as the towns, and of cash crops to obtain foreign exchange to
pay for the war effort as well as to maintain the economy and to
run essential services. The state sector can do so by producing
these crops directly and by using its economic power so as to 
obtain the necessary marketed surplusses.
Secondly, since the war is waged within the country and hence 
the situation varies from region to region and in time, economic 
decision making cannot be but decentralized inasmuch as it needs 
to adapt to the situation at hand (Mackintosh, 1985:68).
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Both aspects together call for a strategic approach in relation 
to which tactical measures can be decentralized to respond to the 
situation at hand. The tendency however seems to have gone in the 
direction of ad hoc tactics which tend to drift on the existing 
configuration of class forces rather than acting upon them or 
organizing them from a clear strategic perspective. This in turn 
is an indication that the initiative in part has been lost due to 
the action of the enemy.
A case study by Mackintosh suggests that a symbiotic relation­
ship may be developing in some regions between the state sector 
and private enterprise (1985:54). This relationship is essentially 
based on a quid pro quo principle in which the state sector 
through its control over key resources can obtain part of the 
marketed surplus of the private farmers:
"Almost all producers and traders in Chokwe in 1985 were 
engaged in some kind of balancing act between the state and 
private sectors of the market. The state was actively using 
the consumer goods it controlled to provide basic consumer 
goods to the population, but also to do it in such a way 
that it supported production in state and private farms, and 
suceeded in buying rice. The private farmers, for their 
part, were balancing their exchanges with the state against 
operations in the private (legal or parallel) markets" 
(ibid:57).
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The fact that such relationship should develop is not surpris­
ing in the light of the argument put forward in the previous 
section (and which will be developed in more detail in the next 
chapter). The process of state centered accumulation during the 
1977 83 period had as its consequence that the peasant economy 
became located in the parallel economy since the state failed to 
provide material backing for its socialization. Within these 
parallel markets commercial speculative capital gained in strength 
as it transformed the excess money pumped into the economy into 
money capital. The state wielded the power to issue money, but 
speculative capital held the power of money balances within the 
economy. As such, alternative terms and circuits of exchange 
developed which accentuated the differentiation of the peasantry 
and provided a field for operation for private enterprise and the 
richer peasantry. The production crisis of 1983 and the consequent 
pragmatism in policy widened the scope of this parallel economy 
into a more broader unofficial economy in which more resources 
were channeled by the state in search of obtaining a marketed 
surplus. Private enterprise therefore can engage in a balancing 
act which effectively means that it has more options open to it 
which allow it to explore new avenues of operation. The state 
opens up these options in order to secure a marketed surplus under 
its control and uses its economic power to forge the exchange. De 
facto, the state sector has come to terms that private enterprise 
represents an economic power to reckon with. To get immediate 
results, the state sector is driven to build on the best, espe­
cially in a situation where resources are extremely scarce.
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Ad hoc tactics without strategy tend to reinforce the existing 
balance of class forces, rather than propelling it in a certain 
direction. Clearly, the majority of the peasantry functions only 
marginally within this setup inasmuch as the process gravitates 
against them (as will be shown in the nest chapter). Hanlon argued 
that:
"Despite the chopping and changing, Mozambique’s agricul­
tural policy has been consistent. It has consistently 
ignored the two essential tasks of socialist transition—  
changing the relationship between the state and peasants, 
and modernizing peasant agriculture— and has instead consis­
tently tried to obtain quick results.
The Third Congress saw state farms as the ’quickest way’. 
That view carried with it the assumption that machinery, 
expensive, imported hybrid seed and fertilizer ’must* 
produce more. The Fourth Congress looked to family and 
private farmers as the ’short-term’ solution. So the same 
machinery, seeds and fertilizer are given to private instead 
of state farms." (1984:119).^^
The notion of 'building on the best' indeed preempts the 
development of a broad front which aims to reach the mass of rural 
producers. It is a fallacy to believe that the state sector 
through material support, extension services or credit facilities 
would be able to reach the majority of the poorer peasantry on an 
individual exchange basis. Only through the cooperative movement
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based on the organized poorer peasantry can the state encounter a 
real alternative in recuperating production on a broad front. The 
poorer peasantry have an objective interest to ally with the state 
sector to widen the reach of the official economy since the sharp 
inflation on the parallel markets has reduced them to poverty and 
starvation. This choice is not that of the private farmer who 
balances his rates of return as between the official and parallel 
economies since he manages to occupy a crucial point of intersec­
tion in the circuits of exchange. Rather, their real and only 
choice is to struggle against the further erosion of their living 
standards by an unofficial economy which engulfs them. As such, 
they constitute a viable alternative to widen the sphere of the 
official economy and to curb the scope of the parallel market.
Such policy would not imply that no support would be channeled 
to private enterprise, but rather that the balance of relative 
priorities would be redressed. However, it would not merely be a 
question of micro strategies at the regional/local level in terms 
of state support to the cooperative movement. Rather, it would 
also crucially depend on how financial adjustment policies are 
worked out at the national level.
Essential, two broad strategies appear to confront the present- 
day situation. One is that donor countries as well as IMF and 
World Bank missions will tend to favour a solution which would 
deflate the economy such as to curb excess demand as well as 
deregulate prices while devaluing the exchange rate.
This strategy is likely to have disasterous consequences in the 
context of Mozambique. The crisis which Mozambique goes through is
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principally a production crisis which to a large extent has been 
deepened through the war as well as previous drought years. 
Average consumption per head of basic necessities is therefore 
precariously low, but the fact whether this produces widespread 
famine and starvation is not merely a question of average 
availability of food, basic medical services, etc., but also of 
the distribution of access to such commodities or services (Sen, 
1981). Given the wide disparities between the official and paral­
lel price systems, and given the concentration of money balances 
within the unofficial economy, a policy of deregulation combined 
with deflation would radically alter the distribution of income 
within the economy. Existing safety nets such as the rationing 
schemes for the towns and the quota system in rural areas would 
fall away and lead to severe cuts in real incomes.
It is unlikely that such policy would be implemented overnight 
because of its obvious disastrous implications. The real danger 
lies in a creeping encroachment of such policies on the economy as 
a result of the external pressure exerted on policy making and the 
ad hoc attitude of the Party and the government. This would lead 
to a situation not unlike the one in Tanzania in which the govern­
ment (or more correctly, certain forces within the Party and 
government) is placed in a position of defense of its policies 
without maintaining the initiative in shaping the country's 
policies. In a recent interview with former minister Jamal on the 
effects of partial liberalization of the economy, he stated that 
his main preoccupation was the "erosion of formal earnings" 
(Interview, July, 1985). In other words, the informal (parallel)
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economy was gradually eroding the sphere of operation of the
1 Q
official economy.
An alternative strategy would imply adjustment policies which 
aim to widen the reach of the official economy and simultaneously 
reduce the differential between the two-tiers of the pricing 
system. To do so would require a policy package which would aim at 
monetary reform so as to sterilize/destroy excessive cash balances 
in the economy, combined with currency devaluation and compensat­
ing adjustment in minimum wages. The objective would have to be to 
do curb the influence of the money balances held within the inof­
ficial economy so as to stabilize the currency by placing the 
burden of adjustment on speculators.
229
Footnotes
1. However, as stated in the introduction, the aim of this 
chapter is hot only to contribute to the analysis of the political 
economy of transition in Mozambique, but also to the wider debate 
on money and the transition to socialism.
2. The concept of supply multipliers is taken from Benassy: 
"symetrically to this case [demand multipliers], one may define 
supply multiplier chains, with all goods in the chain in excess 
demand and all traders' demand constrained. In such chains, shocks 
on the supply side of one market in the chain will be transmitted 
to the other markets with the same sign and will thereby give rise 
to multiplier effects" (1982:49). This concept is quite useful in 
the analysis of resource-constrained systems (Kornai:1979).
3. The aim to hit at speculative money balances was specifically 
stated in the preamble of the law of 16/6/80 which led to the 
creation of the metical.
4. Colonial statistics were generally of poor quality and few 
consistent series existed for any length of time. This was also 
the case with national income data. National accounts were com­
piled for Mozambique for the period 1959-61. After that, the 
statistical estimates of national income merely extrapolated the 
above mentioned estimates. Hence, the report on the Fourth 
Development Plan drawn up in 1973 estimated GDP at 46,770 million 
escudos for 1970, as compared with the estimate of 30,750 million 
escudos made by F. Pereira de Moura and F. Amaral (1977).
5. See also Nove (1983:70-73) on the issue of tensions within the 
plan and their relation to money.
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6. This information was obtained in an interview with R.
Balthasar, Minister of Finance, made by a CEA research team in 
June 1983.
7. Rather, this deficits were effectively dealt with as a ques- 
tion Of debt resheduling by the banking system, and as such 
financed through money creation (field-interviews: 1983).
8. The data on the money supply and on internal credit were taken 
from the report by Mackintosh (1985:91).
9. Saith applied this formula for the 1974-75 period to check the 
food balance for the Ethiopian economy. Hence, he used this 
equation to compare the growth in real GDP with the growth in food 
production (which he approximated by the growth rate of real 
agricultural GDP). For purpose of comparison, the 1977-81 period 
was taken for the Mozambican economy.
Annual
growth rates
Ethiopia 
1974/75-79/80 (%)
Mozambique 
1977-81 (%)
y 2.5 2.8
n 1.6 1.6
P 2.7 2.6
y - P -0.2 0.2
n - p -1.1 -1.0
10. Fitzgerald (1983:17) refers to Kalecki's work as "marxian (if 
not marxist)". I would argue that Kalecki’s work is essentially 
Ricardian in inspiration inasmuch as his concern is to investigate 
the relationship between accumulation and distribution. Within 
such conception, class struggles within capitalist economies are
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seen as struggles over the shares of profits and wages in income. 
See, for example, the growth model of Kaldor (1970:81-91) or more 
recently of Taylor (1981 :32-36) as illustrations of this approach. 
Within the discussion of growth in a socialist economy, this type 
of model will investigate the problem of choice as between im­
mediate and future consumption, as is the central theme of the 
Feldman model of growth (see Domar, 1972:149-172). Alternatively, 
the model can be extended to include sectors characterized by 
various forms of production and the distributional relationships 
between them (f.e. Fitzgeral, 1983).
11. Another example of this approach in the context of a state 
versus peasantry dichotomy is provided by F. Ellis’ work on 
Tanzania (1982 ) . He defines the principal struggle as 
springing from the drive on the part of the state sector to 
achieve control over the marketable surplus. Also, in this case, 
the analysis concerns a struggle over distribution and the key 
concept is the internal terms of trade. The institutional set-up 
of parastatal marketing boards is integrated into the analysis 
since producer prices appear as the residual factor after 
(inefficient) marketing costs and the commercial mark-up have been 
deducted from the sale-price of the parastatals.
12. "The classical division between between ’rural proletariates’ 
and ’peasants’ is not a very meaningful one in Nicaragua because 
as ’pure’ classes they are not dominant. The permanent labour 
force is roughly 20 percent of the total, while independent 
peasants and their family labour are another 25 percent. The 
remaining 50 percent...are semi-proletarians, seasonal workers at 
harvest time and sup-subsistence peasants the rest of the year" 
(Fitzgerald, 1985:211).
13. In the case of the state farm sector in Ethiopia A. Ghose 
argues that : "the state farms are engaged in the exploitation of
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peasant labour. The permanent labour force employed by the state 
farms is small and highly paid. For much of their production 
activities, the state farms in fact depend on hired casual labour 
which is supplied by peasants in search of cash incomes. Casual 
labourers are usually paid a daily wage equal to the statutory 
minimum daily wage of 1.92 birr. In general, average labour 
productivity on state farms is much above this while the implicit 
wage rate of permanent workers is much above the average labour 
productivity" (1985:140).
14. Saith argues that the priority accorded to industrialization 
sets the limits within which institutional change within agricul­
ture can take place:
"The new socialist governments in the Third World have had 
to tailor their rural developmental and institutional 
strategies in the limits provided by the three needs for 
surplus utilization, namely, accelerated industrialization, 
defence apparatus and basic needs, with the last forming an 
’also-ran’ in some cases and a non-starter in others. For 
reasons which are not too far removed from those discussed 
in the Soviet case, the choice becomes whether the national 
development strategy places agriculture first, or industry 
first. The unquestioned primacy of industrialisation then 
defines the stategic space for the formulation of rural 
development policies. The question here becomes whether the 
government should aim for generalized rural development or, 
whether, instead of spreading the left-over butter--after 
greasing the industrial sector— too thinly, it should con­
centrate its available resources in projects of high 
returns. The answer is implicit in the question: since 
agriculture provides the vital resources for the state, the 
crucial variable is the marketed surplus, not the total 
output of the rural sector. A higher output, if achieved at
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the expense of a decline in the marketed output, would 
become cause for concern to a state interested in sharply 
accelerating industrialisation. As such, the state goes in 
for a strategy which pivots on selective agricultural com­
moditization, while excluding the rest ofr the peasantry 
from the mainstream development process. Such a strategy
represents simultaneously the cause of imbalanced growth, as
also an institutional arrangement for absorbing its 
implications. As far as the food balance is concerned, the 
state now carves out a core economy within the national 
economy, comprising the modern industrial sector and the 
selectivity commoditised component of the rural sector. For 
this core economy, a food balance might be maintained 
through first, the concentration of the state’s available
resources for rural development in the commoditised sub­
sector which supplies itself and the urban modern industrial 
and state sectors, and, second, through restricted imports 
of foodgrains to supplement these supplies where necessary. 
The excluded sector then is more or less left to its own 
devices and has to generate a growth rate at least to match 
its additional population’’ (1985a:36).
15. An interesting parallel can be found in the following
argument: "But the longer the socialization of the countryside is
delayed after the revolution, the more the half-baked putty of 
transitional or ’tenporary’ rural production relations becomes 
clay, and the harder it becomes to remould it without having to 
break the structure altogether. Since Soviet-style collectiviza­
tion is hard to accept as being even remotely feasible in 
contemporary situations, the progress must be that the socialist 
programme for institutional transformation of the countryside will 
not get beyond the first stage of intervention: indeed, sub­
sequently, institutional regression— in the form of
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differentiation of the peasantry and a subversion of partial co­
operative organizations— is likely to set in. What is more, this 
regression itself could be institutionalized. Thus, the de­
collectivization and the peasantization of the collective sector 
in a wide range of socialist countries is ironically being con­
ducted as a response to the ostensible 'failure' of socialist 
agriculture" (Saith, 1985a:36).
In relation to the policy of opening-up towards private en­
terprise after the Fourth Congress, the important point is that 
the assumed vitality of that sector was in fact a product of state 
policy.
16. Saul's analysis of the significance of the Fourth Congress 
with respect to the issue of rural transformation is quite dif­
ferent from Hanlon’s view as quoted here. Saul sees the Fourth 
Congress as the outcome of a struggle between "the primitive 
accumulationists" and the "socialist reproductionists": a struggle 
which tipped the balance in favour of the latter. For Saul, the 
'economics of socialist expanded reproduction’ refers to a posi­
tion which argues that the process of accumulation can take place 
along with the growth in the supply of basic necessities (not 
unlike Kalecki’s view) as against the ’primitive accumulation’ 
view which he identifies with the position that accumulation 
implies a sacrifice in terms of the standards of living. Also, and 
not identical to the former distinction, Saul refers to the former 
as a view which sees a broader process of transformation in which 
town and country Reinforce themselves through the expanded ex­
change , rather than a view which sees the extraction of surplus 
from the peasantry as the key equation. To Saul therefore the 
struggle was about two paths of agrariari socialist transformation 
distinguished by their concept of accumulation. He traces the 
'socialist reproductionist’ view back to the fourth session of the 
CC of the party (in 1978), and through various policy statements 
up to its victory within the Fourth Congress. Definitely, the
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Fourth Congress stressed the importance of the cooperative move­
ment as well as the need to support household production within an 
exchange which is acceptable to the peasantry. However, Saul does 
not take account of the fact that neither the Third nor the Fourth 
Congress analyzed the peasantry as being subject to class forces 
from within as determined by an overall context of development. 
The argument put forward in this chapter and further developed 
within chapter 7 is that state action itself created the objective 
conditions for the development of parallel markets, and as such, 
for the increased differentiation of the peasantry. The demand for 
deregulation and increased reliance on private initiative were 
also objective forces within the Congress, although often 
presented as a need to aid the ’peasantry’ in general.
17. In fact, in his article, ’’On Cooperation’’, Lenin pointed out 
that it was precisely within the context of the liberalization 
under the New Economic Policy that the cooperative movement be­
comes of paramount importance: ’’By adopting NEP we made a
concession to the peasant as a trader, to the principal of private 
trade; it is precisely for this reason (contrary to what some 
people think) that the cooperative movement is of such immense 
importance.
...We went too far when we introduced NEP, but not because we 
attached too much importance to the principle of free enterprise 
and trade— we went too far because we lost sight of the co­
operatives, because we now are already beginning to forget the 
vast importance of the cooperatives..." (1968:683-84).
18. A recent analysis of monetary imbalances within the context 
of the Tanzanian economy is provided in a working paper of J. 
Verloren van Themaat (1984).
CHAPTER 7
MONEY AND THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
Introduction
In this chapter it will be argued that the question of the 
dynamics of the parallel economy is of crusial importance to 
understand the processes of agrarian change as they took place 
within the context of the system of state centered accumulation.
At the time of the Fourth Congress in April 1983, Mozambique 
was in the grip of a severe economic crisis which was compounded 
by war and the drought. Within the rural economy the symptoms of 
the crisis were well known; the decline in official marketing of 
food and of export crops produced by the peasantry, the deprecia­
tion of the metical and the rampant inflation on the parallel 
markets. In fact, the report of the central committee to the 
Fourth Congress stated clearly that:
I
"The center of gravity of the class struggle in our 
country is located increasingly in the economic field.
Together with the defence of the country this is the
major battle that we are waging in the process of
building socialism in our country" (Frelimo, 1983a:
26).
Furthermore, it was stressed that:
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"Speculation, hoarding and the black market have been 
transformed into a system of economic destabilization" 
(Ibid: 25).
Notwithstanding the emphasis which was given within the 
Congress documents on the destabilizing role of the parallel 
economy, the documents do not provide any economic analysis as to 
the causes of the parallel markets. Hence, in the section on "The 
main lines of development" (Ibid: 57-62), no reference is made to 
combatting the erosion of the official economy through the opera­
tion of the parallel markets by means of economic policy.
The question of candonga (= the term used to refer to all
parallel market activities) only was raised again in the dis­
cussion of the character of the class struggle in Mozambique. In 
the section on ’internal agents’ the document stated:
"Hoarding and speculation worsen the situation of supply 
for the people, sabotage our state pricing policy and
cause discontent and social instability. Thus they are
part of the global process of destabilisation of our
society.
The successive analyses made by our Party leadership 
clearly indicates the need for an energetic fight 
against armed gangs, infiltrated agents, rumour mongers 
and black marketeers. They are the agents of 
counter-revolution." (Ibid: 69; my underlining)
As such, candonga was seen to be the outcome of the activities of 
candongueiros (» black marketeers).
However, in the discussions of the 11th Session of the Popular 
Assembly (March, 1983) there were several interventions which
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hinted at the fact that part of the problem of candonga was due to 
the economic policies of the government (Noticias, 25/3/83). More 
specifically, it was argued that excessive money creation by the 
banks in order to finance the deficits of the state sector created 
the objective conditions for the the emergence and the development 
of candonga (Ibid).
In the first section of this chapter, I shall develop this view 
in more detail within the framework of the Soviet-theory of money 
under central planning in a context of an economy in transition. 
It will be argued that this view basically identifies the main 
problen as a distributional struggle over the balance in the 
allocation of resources between sectors and over real inccwnes of 
producers within these sectors.
In a subsequent section I shall argue that the development of 
the parallel economy can only be understood as the product of a 
managed economy in which the state uses its economic power to 
fragment markets by imposing its priorities and its rationing 
rules on the allocation of resources within the economy. The 
erosion of the official economy by the operation of the parallel 
circuits reflect the failure on the part of the state to transform 
the economy. The excessive money creation by the state, which 
itself is a reflection of the priorities and rationing rules of 
its strategy, can fuel the development of this parallel economy by 
the impetus its gives to the accumulation of money capital in the 
parallel circuits.
In this sense, money acquires an active role in the economy, 
but it is not the cause of the problem. The real cause of the
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problem lies in the failure of the state to transform class rela­
tions within the rural economy, and hence its planning de facto 
boiled down to pseudo planning.
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Excessive Mopey Creation and the Parallel Economy
In chapter 6 it was argued that the monetary system of 
Mozambique in the period 1977-83 was set up within the context of 
two circuits which correspond to the organization of central 
planning. The first circuit concerned the circulation of money 
within the state sector (as well as incorporating larger-scale 
private enterprise). This sector was directly organized by the 
system of material balances. Secondly, there was the circuit which 
articulated the exchange between the state sector and the 
popular/small-scale private sectors. Here, it was planning of 
aggregate flows which aimed at regulating this exchange. Both 
circuits together constituted the domain of the official economy.
The exchanges between the peasantry and the state sector form 
part of the second circuit. Fig 7.1 provides a simple diagrammati­
cal representation of this exchange of commodities and money as it 
was viewed by cadres within the ministry of internal ccxnmerce and 
in banking (Wuyts, 1983a: 1-4).
In this circuit, the peasantry appears as a homogeneous entity. 
Furthermore, the exchange between the state and the peasantry with 
respect to buying and selling commodities is to a large extend 
intermediated by private trade.
The basic question was to explain how imbalances can arise 
within this circuit, and how these can lead to the development of 
parallel circuits.
FIG 7 1
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In his intervention to the 11th session of the Popular Assembly 
in March 1983, the Governor of the BM, Prakash Ratillal, analysed 
this Question by taking as his starting point the excessive money 
creation by the banks in order to finance the deficits of the 
state sector;
"To put more money in circulation than there are com­
modities produced implies handing over money to people
who will not be able to spend this money for lack of
commodities. This implies that each month the stock of
money in the hands of the public increases without 
there being any outlet for it" (Noticias, 25/3/83).
From this proposition he deduced two consequences in terms of
economic development: Firstly, "the pressure exerted by these cash 
balances oblige us to import more commodities, and hence to 
spend more foreign exchange on consumer goods instead of on those 
means which allow us to increase production" (Ibid). This argument 
is in line with that of Griffith-Jones (1981 : 16-17).
Secondly, the Governor of the BM went on to argue that the
existence of a volume of money superior to that of commodities (at 
official prices) gave room for speculation, and hence, "as a 
result we encounter growing dissatisfaction and social 
instability. The metical depreciates and is no longer accepted as 
a means of exchange. This is the situation we live today in our 
country" (Ibid).
In fact, in 1982 the aggregate wage bill exceeded by far the 
available supply of commodities on sale to the public. The dif­
ference amounted to 10,000 million meticais, which in relative 
terms meant that the available commodity fund amounted to about
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15% of the total wage bill (Frelimo, 1983:60). This does not
include the demand for commodities springing from the income from
the sale of cash crops. The imbalance was much more felt in the
rural areas since no rationing system with guaranteed minimum
quantities of basic consumer goods existed there unlike in the 
major towns:
"the combination of a lack of consumer goods and a 
continued weak marketing network meant that peasants 
were able to buy goods worth only about half the 
meticais value of the produce they were selling" 
(Hanlon, 1984; 81).
Furthermore, the escalation of the war after 1981 necessitated 
the diversion of resources to pay for the war effort. This 
together with the weight of the investment cost effectively 
reduced the available supply of commodities to the public. As 
such, the commodity fund dropped by 8^  from 1980 to 1981, of which 
the major drop was recorded for non-food products. The latter fell 
by M%  (mainly due to the reduced supply of textiles). From 1981 
to 1982, commodity supplies fell by another 8%, while the sub­
sequent year the drop was much more catastrophic (Frelimo, 
1983:1 3).
This imbalance between the volume of money and the 
availability of commodities (at official prices) within the rural 
economy was seen to the major destabilising factor in maintaining 
the exchange with the peasantry. Indeed, the lack of availability 
of consumer goods forced the peasantry to accumulate useless cash, 
and hence constituted a disincentive to sell either cash crops or 
labour power (Wuyts, 1983a; 5).
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Hence, contrary to Preobrazhensky’s view that the excessive 
creation of money constituted an important source for primitive 
socialist accumulation, the position of the ministries of internal 
commerce and finance was in line with Griffith-Jones’ remark that 
"money issue has a declining yield to the state" (1981: 6).
The argument therefore is that the peasantry will effectively 
withdraw from official exchange for lack of incentives in terms of 
the real availability of commodities.
Turning back now to the analysis of the Governor of the BM at 
the 11th meeting of the Popular Assembly, the proposition that the 
excessive issue of money gives room to speculation boils down to 
an analysis which views the development of the parallel markets as 
directly resulting from the excess supply of money.
This view is expressed by Hanlon as follows:
"... there was still too much money chasing too few 
goods: it was largely taken up by black-market traders. 
With the price of basic foodstuff rigidly controlled, 
inflation showed up in less strictly controlled goods. 
Clothing and restaurant meals, for example, tripled in 
price in the eight years after independence. Goods 
transport, still largely in private hands, became 
vastly expensive. A black market grew up in consumer 
goods and hard to control items like fish (1984: 81)..
The basic question therefore concerned a struggle over dis­
tribution, and the decline in official marketing of food and cash 
crops as well as the price inflation of consumer goods in the 
parallel markets constituted the manifestations of this struggle.
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What then were the policy implications drawn from this analysis 
in the context of the Mozambican situation before the Fourth 
Congress?
Basically, a solution was sought along two complimentary lines: 
(1) an austerity policy with respect to budget expenditures of the 
state as well as to outlays on wage bills in the state sector, 
and, (2) a shift towards barter exchange (or more correctly, an 
exchange based on a quid pro quo principle) as between the state 
and the peasantry (Wuyts, 1983b: 34-38).
The former measure had as its objective to reduce the size of 
the state sector deficits. The state budgets of 1982 and 1983 laid 
down limits on the growth of aggregate wage and salary payments of 
the state apparatus (Ibid: 36). Furthermore, the rule was estab­
lished that growth of the wage bill of state enterprises had to be 
inferior to the growth of the aggregate value of production (Ibid: 
36).
In this respect, Ellman argues that in a system of state 
socialism:
"Money created in excess of the real need for money is 
regarded as inflationary, a disorgansing and thoroughly 
undesirable feature of economic life. It is inflation­
ary, since an excess supply of money in the hands of 
the population causes suppressed inflation in the state 
supply of consumer goods and services, and open infla­
tion in the private supply of goods and services (e.g. 
free markets for agricultural products). ... The essen­
tial feature of monetary policy under state socialism 
is the wide variety of instruments that are used to
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ensure the cautious monetary policy dictated by theory 
is in fact implemented. ... The basic instrument of 
monetary planning under state socialism is wage fund 
planning" (1983: 96-7).
This argument does not imply that money becomes active within a 
centrally planned econmy. Rather, the argument concerns the need 
for financial austerity within the plan so as to avoid that exces­
sive money creation in the state sector spills over into the 
circuit of fiduciary money.
Similarly, the budget measures of 1982/3 in Mozambique did not 
imply any change the pattern of planning inherent in the process 
of state centered accumulation, but rather aimed at imposing a 
more rigid discipline in its execution.
The second policy measures was directly concerned with the 
question of the decline in official marketing of peasants' cash 
crops. The argument was that, even if the respective flows within 
the state-peasantry circuit could be made to balance, the accumu­
lated cash balances held by the peasantry would continue to be a 
destabilising factor.
Hence, the solution was sought in organising official exchange 
within the rural areas on a quid pro quo basis by making the 
purchase of consumer goods conditional upon the sale of either 
cash crops or labour power (Wuyts, 1983b: 36-38).In actual prac­
tice, the exchange was not purely a barter exchange. Indeed, cash 
crops or labour power would be purchased (at official prices) in 
part against money and for the remaining part against consumer 
goods (at official prices). As such, the state could gain some
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leverage in obtaining the marketed surplus and labour power from 
the peasantry (field-interviews 1983).
In summary, the analysis presented in this section can be 
synthetised in two major propositions:
Firstly, that the development of parallel markets was caused by 
the excess supply of money in the consumer goods markets resulting 
from excessive money creation by the state sector in order to 
finance its deficits.
Secondly, that the key problem was one of distribution (the 
question of resource flows between sectors and of forced savings 
through price inflation in the parallel markets), which required a 
longer term solution of imposing stricter financial austerity on 
the state sector (through demand management) and short term 
measures (barter exchange with the peasantry) to assure the con­
tinued control of the state over the marketed surplusses of the 
peasantry and over its supply of labour power.
As such, the analysis was situated within the context of plan­
ning for state centered accumulation, which itself was not seen to 
be part of the problem.
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Planning and the Dynamics of the Parallel Economy
This section aims to develop a critique of the theory presented 
in the previous section. The basic argument is that the parallel 
economy arises within the context of a managed economy in which 
the state uses its economic (as well as coercive) power to impose 
price differentiation in accordance with its priorities as in­
formed by its economic policy. The key issue therefore concerns 
the fragmentation of markets brought about as a result of state 
intervention within the economy.
Clearly, an economy in transition to socialism is always a 
managed economy. The formation and consolidation of state economic 
power constitutes an essential feature in propelling the 
socialisation of production. Firstly, the nationalisation of key 
sectors of the economy provides the conditions for their 
socialisation, although it does not imply their immediate 
socialisation merely because of the fact of the formal change in 
ownership. |
Secondly, the state economic sector has to assume a dynamic 
role in terms of propelling social change within the wider 
economy. Lenin expressed this position with respect to the impor­
tance of cooperative movement as follows;
" Co-operatives must be politically so organised that it 
will not only generally and always enjoy certain 
privileges, but that these privileges should be of a 
purely material nature. ... A social system emerges 
only if it has the financial backing of a definite 
class. There is no need to mention the hundreds of
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millions of roubles that the birth of "free"
capitalism cost. At present we have to realise that 
the co-operative system is the social system we must 
now give more than ordinary assistance, and we must 
actually give that assistance" (1977, 684; my
underlining).
Hence, it follows that, in the transitional economy, access to 
resources is differentiated in accordance with the priorities of 
economic policy, and that the latter is not neutral, but reflects 
the class interests propelled by the state. Furthermore, as is 
clear from Lenin's analysis, differentiated access to resources in 
accordance with the class interests propelled by the state is by 
no means only a characteristic of socialist experiences.
In fact, the development of colonial capitalism in Mozambique
provides a clear example of this. As argued in chapter 2, the
colonial economy was to a large extend a 'managed' economy.
A crusial aspect of this colonial 'planning' was the backing 
provided by the state to the development of the plantation sector 
and of the settler farms. As such, the state fragmented the labour 
markets by specifying zones of influence over the recruitment of 
labour, and it used its repressive apparatus to coerce the 
peasantry into supplying cheap 1abour-power. As a result, wage 
levels were not only differentiated as between different regions, 
but also within the same region. Clearly, 'parallel' circuits 
existed within this context since the peasantry often sought to 
escape the harsh conditions and low pay on the plantations and 
settler farms by means of 'illegal' migrant labour to the neigh­
bouring countries.
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The colonial state also used its coercive power to evict the 
peasantry from their land so as to make room for the development 
of plantations and settler agriculture. As such, access to land 
and its privatization was differentiated in accordance with the 
class interests of the colonial state.
Both examples gave instances where it was mainly the coercive 
power of the state which provided the support to settler produc­
tion and plantations. However, the state also made use of its 
economic power to aid the development of these forms of 
production.
The Caixa de Credito Agraria, which in 1971 became integrated 
in the Institute de Credito de Mozambique, was virtually ex­
clusively concerned with providing credit to settler farmers 
(Wuyts, 1983b: 9-10). The rich peasantry had to rely on income
from wage labour or on informal circuits of credit to finance 
their agriculture. Secondly, the technical assistance of the state 
concentrated predominantly on settler production, both with 
respect to technical advice as well as to the provision of inputs 
(Mackintosh, 1986: 14; CEA, 1981a: 20-21; Hermele, 1986: 3-8). The 
rich peasantry was only marginally integrated within this process 
(by obtaining the status of agricultores or that of colonos on 
probation in the Limpopo scheme), and mostly had to rely on buying 
its agricultural inputs from settler farmers or traders. Finally,
I ■ ■
in the case of cotton for example, settler producers could obtain 
a better producer price by selling ginned cotton rather than raw 
cotton, an option which was not available to peasant producers 
(CEA, 1981a: 19).
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In summary, state intervention was consistently used to enhance 
the development of settler agriculture and of plantations. Access 
to resources was by no means free for all, but differentiated in 
accordance with the class interests of the colonial state. Markets 
were fragmented so as to provide a fertile breeding ground for the 
development of capitalist agriculture based on cheap labour-power 
obtained from the peasantry. As a direct consequence, the develop­
ment of family agriculture was subordinated to this aim.
Turning now to the question of the content of planning and the 
development of the parallel market in the period 1977-83. As shown 
in chapter 4, the period was characterised by a process of state 
centered accumulation in which resources were concentrated on the 
development of the state sector and the emphasis shifted toward 
accumulation at the expense of consumption.
Within the rural economy, this development strategy led to the 
nationalisations of settler farms and plantations, and the con­
stitution of the state sector in agriculture. Subsequent
development put the emphasis on the quantitative expansion of this 
sector;
"In 1977, $ 40 million were spent on machinery for
agriculture, including 1200 tractors and at least 50 
combine harvesters; in 1978, 25 out of $ 38 million
budgeted for agriculture went to state farm equipment. 
CAIL was the most important state farm of them all: in 
1977, CAIL accounted for 50% of the agricultural sec­
tor’s capital budget and for one-third of the whole 
capital budget of Mozambique. ...
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... the degree of mécanisation in some respects did not 
surpass that of colonial days. For instance, the number 
of tractors in post-independence Mozambique did not 
grow and the level of mécanisation (measured in this 
sense) thus was not higher than in 1969. What did 
change, though, was the concentration of ownership that 
independence brought along: from a wide-spread, thin
layer, the responsability passed onto a few units: the 
ministry of agriculture increased its possession of 
tractors by 1000^" (Hermele, 1986: 13)
The development of this state farm sector remained rooted in 
the seasonal labour of the peasantry within the context of the
migrant labour system. In fact, as argued in chapter 4, the plan­
ners of the ministry of agriculture assumed an elastic supply of 
labour-power without any attempt to restructure the system of
exploitation on which it was based. In actual fact, the tendency 
towards monocropping in the state farm sector often accentuated
the seasonality of labour recruitment.
This development of the state sector was seen to be the quick­
est way to bring about rural transformation. As argued in chapter 
4, the implicit assumption of this policy was that the peasantry 
could continue to rely on its own resources.
In chapter 5, I argued that this assumption was totally
erroneous. The massive drop in labour recruitment by the South 
African mining sector (and the differentiated access to mine 
labour) as well as the reduction in recruitment of migrant labour 
to Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, produced a sharp crisis of rural unemploy­
ment which progressively weakened family agriculture because of
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its dependence on income from wages. This crisis hit hard at the 
poorer proletarianised peasantry, and especially younsters who had 
no means to establish themselves in family agriculture.
In chapter 2, I argued that the colonial econœiy was charac­
terised by a three-tier wage structure with respect to labour 
power supplied by the peasantry within the migrant labour system. 
The above argument implies that recruitment for the two upper 
tiers became increasingly more restrictive, while the state farm 
sector accentuated the pattern of seasonality in its own recruit­
ment through its policy of monocropping and mécanisation. The 
concentration of resources on the state farm sector meant that the 
state did not aid the peasantry in providing them with alternative 
sources of access to resources so as to raise productivity in 
family agriculture.
Furthermore, in cotton growing areas, the breakdown of the 
networks of commercialisation in the immediate post independence 
period and the subsequent emphasis given to state farm production 
worsened the conditions for small-holder peasants (Wuyts, 1978: ).
Apart from ending the practice of forced labour and of forced 
cultivation of cash crops, the remarkable feature of the agrarian 
policy in this period was the continuity of the colonial patterns 
of agrarian change. The Fourth Development Plan of the colonial 
government for the period 1974-79 defined as one of its main 
objectives :
"the acceleration of the process of transformation of 
the subsistence economy into a market economy (Da Costa 
et al, 1973: 138).
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Similarly, the pattern of state centered accumulation implied that 
the emphasis was placed on the accelerated development of the 
nationalised modern state sector.
Furthermore, the assumption that the peasantry could subsist on 
its own steam was also made . The class character of this 
peasantry was not analysed, and hence the dependence of this 
peasantry on wage labour for its survival was not understood.
However, the context had changed drastically: from labour
shortage to rural unemployment. The result was a protracted crisis 
of peasant agriculture, which was at a later stage compounded by 
war and drought. The state, through its policy of state-centered 
accumulation, - failed to respond to the crisis of the family 
agriculture.
A crisis is never neutral in terms of its impact. That is, it 
does not hit equally hard on all strata within the population. On 
the contrary, within the context of a peasant economy, crisis is 
often a potent vehicle in propelling social differentiation.
The failure on the part of the state to respond to the crisis
by supporting the poor peasantry within a process of
cooperativisation and the development of communal villages, de
facto meant that the peasantry had to survive within the parallel 
economy.
Indeed, the essence of the agrarian policy in this period was 
the state's attempt to mobilise material resources behind the 
development of the state sector: the supply of labour power for 
the state farms, of export crops to earn foreign exchange and of 
food to feed the towns. As shown in the previous section, this
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exchange with the peasantry was essentially unbalanced since the
policy implied the curtailment of consumption.
Private trade was seen to constitute a mediating role in the 
exchange of the state with the peasantry. However, these traders 
rapidly assumed an independent role which was made possible by the 
fact that they had access to commodities supplied by the state 
sector as a result of their mediating role. As such, they control­
led the interphase between official and parallel exchanges
(Mackintosh, 1985: 82-83).
The dynamics of private trade in the rural areas was not merely 
to sell consumer goods at a higher price than officially
specified, but rather to search avenues for accumulation by in­
creasing its grip over the marketed sur plusses of food 
(Mackintosh, 1986).
Within a context of a shortage economy, the control of private 
traders over the supply of basic consumer goods enables them to
mobilise marketed surplusses of food at terms of trade which are
less favourable than the official ones. For example, in the case 
of Angonia, some traders would only sell consumer goods in ex­
change for purchases of food, and would do so at terms of trade 
which were much less favourable to the peasantry than the official 
ones (CEA, 1983a: 64). The control over milling by traders was
another form to obtain such sur plusses as traders would charge the 
peasant 15-25% in kind for milling his/her maize (Ibid: 70). In 
the case of Angonia, Mackintosh showed how a small cohesive trad­
ing community gained control over the marketed surplusses of food 
without having to offer a better producer price to the peasantry.
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but by channeling consumer goods towards the commercialisation of 
grain (Mackintosh, 1985: 83).
In fact, traders in the rural areas de facto applied the 
principle of making the purchase of consumer goods conditional on
the sale of food even before it became the official policy.
However, as private trade mediated the state-peasantry exchange, 
the official policy merely endorsed the grip of private traders 
over the peasantry without being able to control the terms at
which this took place (Wuyts, 1983a: 14).
The increased control of private trade over food surplusses
eroded the coherenpe of the state sector itself. A CEA study
showed that in Zambezia the official supply of food could not
respond to the demand coming from the towns, the army and the 
plantations (since the latter needed food to attract labour 
power). As such, state enterprises and institutions resorted to 
buying on the parallel market to obtain the necessary supplies
(1982). I
As a result, this drive on the part of private trade to 
mobilise the food surplusses conditioned the supply of consumer 
goods in terms of who gets what. The logic of this system is that 
those who have a better agricultural base, aqd hence, have 
surplusses to sell will get the greater share of the available
supply of consumer goods. In a context of shortage, the control of 
food and of basic consumer goods provides enormous leverage to the 
owner. More specifically, the control over wage goods provided the 
means to attract cheap labour power.
The combination of private trade (and control over milling and 
transport) with private farming provided several avenues of
257
accumulation. Private farmers could opt to integrate within 
production organized by the plan and as such obtain inputs as well 
as services from the state sector (CEA, 1983a: 61-70).
Also, as a result of the presidential speech of March 1980 
(Machel, 1980) more room was left for small-scale private
enterprise. Also in this case there was a remarkable similarity 
with colonial policies. As shown in chapter 2, the colonial state 
rarely supported actively the development of the rich peasantry, 
but nevertheless in the latter days of colonial rule more room was 
left for the emancipation of this strata provided they could 
finance their own development. Similarly, the 1980 speech provided 
the space for this type of development, provided it was 
to a large extend self-financing .
Hence, as stated by the president in his speech:
"The state will create the opportunities for aiding 
traders, farmers and private industries whose ac­
tivities conform with our objectives. The state will 
aid thm in its organization and by providing the neces­
sary means to work with.
I have received many letters from Mozambicans in South 
Africa, Swaziland and Rodesia who want to know whether 
they can come and invest in trade, agriculture, res­
taurants and other activities".
These are patriotic Mozambicans who want to contribute 
to progress in their country. They hope that the State 
will help them and create the conditions for their 
return.
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... Let them come back. Let us help them to invest 
their savings in agriculture, in industry or in com­
merce, so as to develop our country" (Machel,1980 : 
105).
Hence, room was left for those who had the means and the or­
ganizational ability to invest in commerce and in agriculture (as 
well as in other activities). In the rural economy, these con­
cerned mainly the rich peasantry who already had a better base 
and/or migrant workers abroad who had access to foreign exchange 
and hence could invest it to set up a farm or a shop.
The aid from the state sector basically amounted to selling 
agricultural inputs and providing services such as ploughing the 
land against payment (CEA, 1983a: 63-72 > Field interviews 
Marracuene project).
Furthermore, the control over wage goods allowed them to at­
tract cheap labour ppwer. For example, in Marracuene district near
I
Maputo, a private farmer who also owned a shop in Maputo would 
channel part of the staple food received through official channels 
to his farm so as to attract wage labourers, and would sub­
sequently sell the vegetables produced on his farm at
speculative prices in his shop. During 1983 when drought and war 
had reached a peak, private farmers in the district put pressure 
on the government to supply them with food so as to attract more 
labour. As a result, within a policy of given priority to produc­
tion, private farms obtained special food rations for their 
workers. This particular private farmer took advantage of this 
syston however by extracting a longer working-day from his 
workers. He paid the nominal wage rate for a normal day of work.
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and subsequently the labourer would be compelled to do overtime 
for the "right to buy food with his wage" (Marracuene, 1983; own 
field notes).
Hence, the policy to concentrate resources on the state farm 
sector while attempting to mobilise resources from the wider 
economy behind this drive, meant that the developments outside the 
state sector was shaped by the principle of 'building on the 
best*.
Moreover, as the development of the plantation sector became 
critically dependent on the supply of food to feed its workers, 
and as official marketing of food became increasingly unable to 
supply to necessary quantities, this sector became dependent on 
private traders and private farms to supply it with food.
Indeed, as shortages in the rural areas became more pronounced 
and as prices inflated on the parallel markets, seasonal workers 
on the plantations and other state farms came to depend more and 
more on their weakened agricultural base as a result of the ero­
sion in their real wages. To continue to attract labour, the state 
sector had to be able to supply staple food as well as sane other 
basic wage goods to their, workers.
The majority of the peasantry found themselves in dire 
circumstances. Peasant producers of export crops were caught in a 
real squeeze. As producers, they confronted official prices for 
their crops, and as consumer they had to resort to the parallel 
market prices. Mackintosh showed that the decline in marketed 
output of export crops was specifically pronounced in the period 
after 1981 (1985:9).
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However, the withdrawal of the peasantry from the market in 
this case is not due to the fact that they have surplus cash and 
no commodities to buy. Rather, their situation is one in which 
they have an acute lack of both cash ar^ commodities. In certain 
circumstances a switch to food crops can prevent a sharp decline 
in income, but even in this case, success depends on whether a 
stable marketed surplus of food can be produced.
In contrast, large scale private farmers of export crops, whose 
production was integrated within the plan, did not find themselves 
in a similar squeeze since they were allowed to transfer part of 
their income in foreign exchange. Not surprisingly, private en­
terprise accounted for a significant part of the marketed output 
of these crops in this period (Mackintosh, 1985:29).
As stated above, the majority of seasonal workers on the state 
farms and on private farms confronted worsening economic condi­
tions as their nominal wages were eroded by the inflation on the 
parallel markets and their family agriculture in itself insuffi­
cient and weakened by this erosion in their real wages.
Therefore, contrary to the conclusions of the theory discussed 
in the previous section, the problem for the majority of the 
peasantry was not that of having surplus cash and no commodities 
to buy. Rather, they witnessed a severe shortage of both cash and 
commodities.
The excess money pumped into the economy as a result of the 
state sector deficits fuelled the accumulation of speculative 
commercial capital, and therefore were transformed into money 
capital. The state had the power to issue money, but the power of
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the stock of money within the economy increasingly came to be 
concentrated in the hands of commercial capital.
Hence, the outcome of this process was the development of 
private agriculture and trade within the rural areas in the con­
text of the parallel economy.
In summary, the process of state centered accumulation implied 
that the state sector did not intervene to aid a process of the 
socialisation of agriculture. This was left to the mobilisation of 
the peasantry by the party guided by the principle of relying on 
one's own resources. However, the crisis of family agriculture 
meant that it was being depleted of resources, and hence
desperately needed active material support from the state sector. 
This support was only marginally provided and based on a principle 
of building on the best.
The need to mobilise the agrarian surplus (and specifically,
the food surplus) behind the development of the state sector 
provided private trade as the mediator between the state and the 
peasantry with the opportunity to assume an independent role in 
this process by enlarging its control over food surplusses and 
making the state sector dependent on it. The accumulation of 
commercial speculative capital within the parallel circuits in the 
rural areas therefore propelled the forces of differentiation 
within the peasantry by supporting the development of private
agriculture in food production. By 1983, the state sector had
become so dependent on this momentum that the immediate (and 
quickest) solution to the crisis appeared to be no other but to 
give greater room to the parallel economy.
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